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The relentless political pressure the Ethiopian government put on Ethiopian 
journalists, political dissidents and opposition activists drove hundreds of them out of 
their country. However, after leaving their country, the journalists and the opposition 
activists remain engaged in the politics of their country of origin through the media 
outlets they establish in diaspora. Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) and Oromia 
Media Network (OMN) are two media platforms that have emerged in the United States 
under such conditions. This dissertation chronicles the rise of ESAT and OMN and their 
far reaching political influence in Ethiopia. Using mixed method research, it provides 
their detailed profiles that range from their inception, to their impact on the Ethiopian 
public sphere and the Ethiopian government’s response to them, to their reporting of 
political events in Ethiopia.  
 
This research makes the case that ESAT and OMN, through the instrumentality of 
a transnational public sphere have altered the Ethiopian political dynamics during the last 
five years. Particularly, ESAT and OMN use Facebook and Twitter as a backbone to 
gather information and foster relationships with news sources inside Ethiopia; they also 
transmit uncensored information back to Ethiopia via satellite television. In response to 
v 
 
their communication activities, the Ethiopian government seeks to undermine the links 
that ESAT and OMN have in the country by routinely blocking the internet, requesting 
Facebook and Twitter to take down their content and jamming their satellite 
transmissions. The Ethiopian government also responds to the reporting of ESAT and 
OMN by changing its policy positions on domestic political issues. This illustrates that 
Ethiopian political exiles remain key players of Ethiopian political dynamics in ways that 
thoroughly exemplify trans-local reciprocity. It also shows that ESAT and OMN might 
very well be a prototype of a diaspora community media that keeps grievances alive and 






NAME OF AUTHOR: Endalkachew H. Chala 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
University of Oregon, Eugene 
Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
Dilla University, Dilla, Ethiopia  
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
Doctor of Philosophy, Media Studies, University of Oregon 2018 
Master of Arts, Journalism and Communications, Addis Ababa University 2008 
Bachelor of Education in English, Dilla Univerrsity 2005 
 
AREAS OF INTEREST: 
Diaspora and Journalism  
Digital Activism 





Teaching Assistant, University of Oregon 
Eugene, OR, September 2013 — June 2018 
 
Lecturer, Arba Minch University 
Arba Minch, Ethiopia, September 2005— November 2012 
 
Reporter, Sub-Saharan Informer 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 2007 — June 2008 
 
Editor, Global Voices 
April 2017— November 2018 
 
Writer, Global Voices  
June 2011 — June 2018 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS: 
Colombia Scholarship, School of Journalism and Communication, University of 
vii 
 
Oregon $3,000, Fall 2013  
 
Google Policy Fellow. Electronic Frontier Foundation, $7,500, Summer 2014 
Colombia Scholarship, School of Journalism and Communication, University of 
Oregon $1,000, Fall 2016 
 
International Press Freedom Award, Committee to Protect Journalists 
 
PUBLICATIONS: 
Jeslyn Lemke, and Endalk Chala. Tweeting democracy: An ethnographic content 
analysis of social media use in the differing politics of Senegal and Ethiopia’s 
newspapers Journal of African Media Studies 8(2):167-185 (2016) 
 
Endalk Chala. Is “Rising Africa” US Newspapers’ Latest Narrative? A Content 
Analysis that examines whether the glow of the 2010 World Cup casts Africa in a new 
positive light Journal of African Media Studies 8(2):167-185.  (forth coming)  
 
Endalk Chala "Freedom on the Net 2016." | Freedom House.2016.   
Endalk Chala Play Station Video Games amongst Ethiopian Children: Digital 
Playing: An Investigation into Popularity of Play Station Video Games amongst 






My dissertation could not have been done without the generous support I have 
received from various people throughout my tenure as a student at the School of 
Journalism and Communication. I am grateful to these people for the kindness they have 
shown towards me. 
I owe my deepest gratitude to the chair of my committee members, Dr. Gabriela 
Martinez. I never imagined that she would end up being my supervisor in the summer of 
2013, when I helped her conduct a Skype interview with a family of an Ethiopian 
award-winning journalist for a short film she produced for UNESCO. It would have 
been next to impossible to write this research without her consistent guidance and help. 
Her commitment and her friendly nudge kept me going throughout my research. I also 
want to thank my committee members–Dr. Erin Beck, Dr. Gretchen Soderlund and Dr. 
Leslie Steeves–for their precious contributions and suggestions toward making this 
dissertation what it turned out to be. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Erin Beck for 
giving me pertinent literature on framing that shaped one of my chapters. I would also 
like to thank the School of Journalism and Communication which has provided me with 
a wonderful graduate education through the whole process that has expanded my 
opportunities. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Leslie Steeves, a loyal advocate of 
international students. Her constant support and encouragement of students from Africa 
was a source of inspiration and hope for me.  
I want to express my deepest appreciation to my wife, Betty, who forfeited her 
own career to be with me and help me materialize my dream. She has been my most 
important support system throughout my studies. I would like to express my thanks for 
 
ix  
my beloved little daughter, Hasset; she is a joy of my life. Also, my thanks especially go 
to my mother, who understood the value of higher education without having even a 
primary school education.  
Special mention goes to my Zone 9 friends and colleagues, Abel, Atnaf, 
Befeqadu, Edom, Jomanex, Kirubel, Soli, Natty,Mahlet  and Zelalem, for cheering me 
and asking me about my study whenever we discuss about it over a phone. I am grateful 
to Dr. Derese for being a source of inspiration. 
I am very grateful to Teddy, a true friend, an amazing person and a part of my 
family. He is the one who created my connection with the University of Oregon. I would 
love to thank him. Similar, profound gratitude goes to my amazing friends, Wonde and 
Tesfaye. I am particularly indebted to their constant encouragement and support when my 
Zone9 friends were unjustly arrested in Ethiopia in 2015. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my colleagues at Global Voices. Were it 
not for their sincere friendship and emotional support, I would not have fought back 
when my friends were unjustly arrested in Ethiopia in 2015. I would like to thank my 
Global Voices colleagues for keeping me going in my moments of despair. Of course, 
many friends at School of Journalism and Communications made my studies very 
exciting. I particularly want to thank Charlie Dietz, Derek Moscato, Jeyslin Lemke and 
Justin Francis. I must not fail to acknowledge my Ethiopian friends who are at the 
University of Oregon, Emrakeb, Gubae, Hailay, Netsenet and Willy. I thank them 
immensely for the conversations we used to have on issues that range from Ethiopian 














TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter              Page 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 
Brief Political Background of Ethiopia............................................................................ 4 
Ethnic Overview .............................................................................................................. 5 
Historical Overview ......................................................................................................... 8 
The Oromo Expansion ............................................................................................. 12 
The Formation of the Modern Ethiopian State ........................................................ 13 
Haile Selassie I 1930 -1974 ..................................................................................... 15 
Military Rule 1974 -1991......................................................................................... 16 
The EPRDF Regime 1991- Present ......................................................................... 17 
A Snapshot on the History and Current State of Ethiopian Media .............................. 21 
ESAT and OMN: A Preliminary Analysis ................................................................... 27 
Significance of the Study ............................................................................................. 31 
Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 33 
Methods ........................................................................................................................ 34 
Outline of Chapters ...................................................................................................... 34 
A Note on Translation .................................................................................................. 37 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW ............................ 38 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 38 
Diaspora and Transnationalism .................................................................................... 38 
Diaspora .................................................................................................................. 39 
Transnational............................................................................................................ 41 




Chapter              Page 
Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................ 47 
Definition and Application of Transnational Public Sphere .................................... 47 
Framing Theory ....................................................................................................... 52 
Elements that construct a frame and frame Analysis ................................... 53 
Frames, Ideology and Journalism  ............................................................... 54 
Taxonomy of Frames  .................................................................................. 56 
Master frames .............................................................................................. 57 
Principal Master frames of Ethiopian Media Discourses  ........................... 58 
III. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY ........................................................................ 59 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 59 
Chronology of Events ................................................................................................... 60 
Sampling ....................................................................................................................... 60 
Content Analysis .......................................................................................................... 64 
Definitions and Procedures ...................................................................................... 64 
Producing a Coding Book: Step 1 ............................................................................ 66 
Collecting Data: Step 2 ............................................................................................ 67 
Coding Procedure: Step 3 ........................................................................................ 67 
Analyzing Results: Step 3 ........................................................................................ 68 
Problems with Content Analysis ............................................................................. 69 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).............................................................................. 71 
Norman Fairclough's Theories of Critical Discourse Analysis................................ 74 
Discourse as Social Practices .................................................................................. 77 
Discursive Practice................................................................................................... 78 
 
xiii  
Chapter              Page 
Material Selection and Analytical Procedure .......................................................... 79 
 
Selected Materials  ....................................................................................... 79 
Headlines ..................................................................................................... 80 
News content  ............................................................................................... 80 
Transcription  ............................................................................................... 81 
Analysis ....................................................................................................... 82 
Frame Analysis ............................................................................................................. 83 
Interviews ..................................................................................................................... 85 
IV. ESAT’S ORIGINS, IDENTITY AND POLITICS ..................................................... 88 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 88 
ESAT’S Beginnings ..................................................................................................... 90 
Who Watches ESAT and Why: A Statistical Snapshot ............................................... 93 
Website .................................................................................................................... 95 
Social Media Platforms ............................................................................................ 96 
ESAT’s Identity as Pan-Ethiopian Ethiopian Channel ................................................. 99 
The Politics of ESAT ................................................................................................. 103 
Political Economy of ESAT ....................................................................................... 103 
ESAT’s Transnational-Local Dimension ................................................................... 108 
Programming Content ................................................................................................ 109 
News Broadcasting ..................................................................................................... 112 
ESAT’s CNN Effect ................................................................................................. 113 




Chapter              Page 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 118 
V. OMN ORIGINS, IDENTITY AND CONTENT ....................................................... 120 
OMN Beginning ......................................................................................................... 120 
OMN’s Reaches ......................................................................................................... 123 
OMN’s Content and Programming ............................................................................ 126 
OMN’s Identity ......................................................................................................... 129 
OMN as the Voice of Oromo Community .............................................................. 129 
OMN’s Political Economy ......................................................................................... 134 
Ethiopian Government’s Pushback Against OMN ................................................ 135 
The Reporting of Oromo Protest: Context and Process ............................................. 137 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 145 
VI. THE TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE IN ETHIOPIA POLITICAL .......... 146 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 146 
ESAT’s and OMN’s Operations: Summary ............................................................... 146 
Back to the Theoretical Framework: Transnational Public Sphere ............................ 151 
VII. ESAT AND OMN’S FRAMING OF POLITICAL EVENTS IN ETHIOPIA ....... 156 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 156 
Results and Discussion .............................................................................................. 157 
The 1st Wave of the Protest: Quantitative Analysis Results and Discussion ............. 157 
Master Frames and Discussion of the 1st Wave of Protest ........................................ 158 
Masterframes: Oromo Nationalism vs. Pan-Ethiopian Nationalism ..................... 158 
Masterframe of Oromo Nationalism: Oromo Protest  ........................................... 160 
Quantitative Analysis, Results and Discussion ......................................................... 160 
 
xv  
Chapter              Page 
Masterframes and Discussion ................................................................................ 164 
Ethiopian Government Tigrayan Minority and Authoritarian Regime ..... 164 
Oromos - the victim of TPLF's Security Forces  ....................................... 168 
The 2nd Wave of the Protest  ...................................................................................... 170 
Masterframes and Discussion of the 2nd Wave of Protest ......................................... 173 
The Actions of Ethiopian Security Forces in Oromia ............................................ 173 
Criticism of the Regime ......................................................................................... 173 
Ethiopian Government Censorship and Propaganda ............................................. 176 
Solidarity with the Protesters ................................................................................. 176 
The Regime’s Response ......................................................................................... 177 
The 3rd Wave of the Protest ........................................................................................ 178 
Quantitative Analysis Results and Discussion ....................................................... 178 
Masterframes and Discussion ................................................................................ 180 
Masterframes of Oromo Nationalism .................................................................... 181 
Feyesa Lelisa - Symbol of Oromo Defiance to Repression  ...................... 181 
Masterframe of Pan-Ethiopian Nationalism: Feyisa as an Ethiopian Patriot 
and anti-authoritarian sport icon  ............................................................... 183 
Summary  ................................................................................................................... 185 
VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................ 187 
Response to Research Question One .......................................................................... 187 
Response to Research Question Two ......................................................................... 189 
Response to Research Question Three ....................................................................... 190 
Conclusion and Recommendations  ........................................................................... 192 
 
xvi  
Chapter              Page 
APPENDICES  ............................................................................................................... 194 
A. OROMO PROTEST COVERAGE CODEBOOK ................................................ 194 
B. RECRUITMENT LETTER OR EMAIL ............................................................... 198 
C. INTERVIEW GUIDE ............................................................................................ 201 
D. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ................................................................................... 203 
E. LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INDIGENOUS WORDS ...................................... 204 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure              Page  
3.1. The Aanalytical Framework of Critical Discourse Analysis .................................... 75 
4.1. ESAT’s Google Search Trends of the Last Five Years  ............................................ 96 
7.1. ESAT’s and OMN’s Overall Reporting Freuencies of the 1st Wave of Protest ...... 161 
7.2. ESAT’s and OMN’s Overall Frequencies of Themes During the 1st Wave of Protest 
......................................................................................................................................... 161 
7.3. 1st Wave Protest Frequencies of Themes – ESAT ................................................... 163 
7.4. 1st Wave Protest Frequencies of Themes – OMN .................................................... 163 
7.5. ESAT’s and OMN’s Overall Reporting Frequencies of the 2nd protest ................... 170 
7.6. ESAT and OMN 2nd Wave of Protest Overall Frequency of Themes ..................... 171 
7.7. 2nd Wave Protest Frequencies of Themes – ESAT .................................................. 172 
7.8. 2nd Wave Protest Frequencies Themes – OMN ....................................................... 172 
7.9. ESAT’s and OMN’s Overall Reporting Frequencies of the 3rd Wave of Protest .... 178 










LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table                      Page 
 
3.1. Sample of Videos Selected ........................................................................................ 64 










Over the last few years, a far-reaching change has been taking place across 
Ethiopian media landscape. Although the Ethiopian government has suppressed and 
monopolized the Ethiopian domestic press, the government’s monopoly on media came 
to be challenged by transnational information flows derived from diaspora-based 
broadcasters. Since 2010, Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) and Oromia Media 
Network (OMN) challenged, and occasionally supplanted, Ethiopian government’s 
control over the flow of information. Although they operate outside Ethiopia, they have 
reversed the flow of information between diaspora and homeland and have played a 
significant role in Ethiopia’s socio-political development during the last five years. 
Fostered by the proliferation of satellite dishes and the growth of internet, ESAT and 
OMN arose as pivotal part of the country’s opposition political movements. They served 
as a foundation for the elevation and political prominence of protest movements that 
prompted the resignation of the country’s top political leaders and the release of political 
prisoners. The Ethiopian government’s censorship against ESAT and OMN is a response 
to the recognition of their role within in Ethiopian public sphere. Nevertheless, despite 
pervasive state-censorship, the thriving oppositional diaspora-based satellite television 
stations played a significant role in mobilizing and articulating public dissent during the 
last five years. 
ESAT and OMN have gained popularity amid a state-saturated media 
environment in Ethiopia. They are guided by formal and/or informal ties with the 
Ethiopian diaspora community and the interests of exiled political groups. ESAT 
represents ‘a Pan-Ethiopian’ ideology that encourages and strengthens bonds of solidarity 
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between Ethiopian people, regardless of their ethnic or religious background. OMN is a 
broadcasting organ of the Oromo diaspora community and has been considered to be a 
representative of a political movement historically derived from Oromo nationalism, 
which seeks independence of the Oromo people within or out of the Ethiopian State. 
Nevertheless, the two institutions have been accused of political biases on a number of 
grounds, with the Ethiopian government alluding to their complex ties to exiled political 
parties such as Patriotic Ginbot 7 and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). 
 
ESAT and OMN work hand-in-hand with covert reporters within Ethiopia in an 
effort to facilitate a two-way flow of communication between their content and their 
target audience. They also include a relative diversity of ‘voices’ by incorporating 
content in two main Ethiopian languages, Amharic and Afan Oromo. By doing so, ESAT 
and OMN have achieved significant success in building a communicative space in a 
transnational setting that is outside the bounds of the Ethiopian State. The formal and 
informal connections that ESAT and OMN have with exiled opposition groups raises 
concerns about their journalism and their potential influence on Ethiopian politics. 
However, the unique nature of these media’s journalistic production processes, their 
diasporic location, and their relationship with the Ethiopian population of whom they see 
themselves a part of, suggests that ESAT and OMN may fall into a distinct classification 
of media outlets that distinguishes them from other Ethiopian media outlets. 
Since their inception, ESAT and OMN have been circumventing state 
communication barriers through clandestine networks of journalists. As a result, they 
have opened up new avenues for the identification and deliberation of matters of concern 
among Ethiopians throughout the country. Founded by exiled journalists and political 
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activists who have established sources of information and have hired covert reporters 
inside Ethiopia, the personnel of ESAT and OMN have both a personal and political 
interest in the issues and stories they report about Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian 
government’s relentless effort to silence ESAT and OMN and their ‘exile/diasporic' 
community has greatly inhibited their operation in the transnational communicative 
space. 
The discourse of ESAT and OMN are potentially different from the traditional 
‘diasporic media’ discourses because these media’s journalistic practices appear to 
epitomize the interpretations of a ‘transnational public sphere’. Consequently, the unique 
challenges posed by ESAT and OMN and the technological infrastructure serve to define 
their political influence in Ethiopian domestic/local politics and their journalistic 
practices in distinct ways. Accordingly, any adequate understanding of the ways in which 
these institutions’ journalistic practices contribute to Ethiopia’s political and public 
sphere–or of the influence of their ideological rendition on their journalistic practices–
necessitates a theoretically-grounded appreciation of the relationships between Ethiopia’s 
socio-political and media landscape and the technological, economic, and political 
context in which ESAT and OMN are embedded. Consequently, an exploration of the 
relationship that ESAT and OMN have with both the Ethiopian State and the Ethiopian 
public sphere–as well as their counter-hegemonic stance–seemingly affords a unique 
insight into theorizations of transnational public sphere and its significance in Ethiopian 
politics. 
Hence, this study is about these two media organizations’ roles in the formation 
and shaping of Ethiopian public sphere. It seeks to put ESAT and OMN in the Ethiopian 
political context. In doing so, I will highlight the development and operations of ESAT 
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and OMN and their coverage of political events in Ethiopia. To put the research within 
relevant historical, social, cultural, and technological context, I will provide Ethiopia’s 
socio-political history in a broad stroke as it relates to the rise and evolution of ESAT and 
OMN and their relationship to current media landscape. In the subsequent section, I will 
provide an overview of Ethiopia’s political history, its ethnic composition, and its media. 
This will include a preliminary analysis of Ethiopian diaspora media. 
 
Brief Political Background of Ethiopia 
A contextual research on Ethiopian diaspora media requires reference to the 
complex historical events that led to the formation of Ethiopian diaspora in the United 
States. Ethiopians have had a long history of migration within their own homeland, but 
they have a relatively recent history of migration outside of Ethiopia. The earliest record 
of Ethiopian migration to the United States goes back to 1808, when a group of traders 
from Ethiopia arrived in New York (Dunlap, 2004). Next, Ethiopians participated in a 
mission to the United States in 1919, when the Ethiopian government sent delegations to 
seek assistance for developing national resources (Uhling, 2007). But the Ethiopian 
Revolution of 1974 marked the beginning of the continuing migration of Ethiopians to 
the United States (Tassé, 2007, Kaplan, 2010). Thousands of Ethiopians who were on the 
losing side of the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution–which turned into a civil war–were driven 
either to remote parts of the country or out of Ethiopia (Berhanu & White, 2000). From 
1974 to 1991, during the civil war, about 1.25 million people in Ethiopia abandoned their 
homes and sought temporary protection in Kenya and Sudan. Some were resettled in 
countries of the West, but others returned home when the civil war was over in 1991. 
(McSpadden, 1988). While most of the western countries such as the United Kingdom, 
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Germany, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands and Australia were generous in resettling 
Ethiopians, the United States accommodated the most (Singer & Wilson, 2007).  
Currently, the Ethiopian diaspora amount to around two million throughout the 
world. The second generation–those born to Ethiopian parents in the host countries–
should be added to this number, estimated to be at least half a million; although, the 
numbers are not reliable because census data collection in several countries follow widely 
variant protocols. A significant majority of the total Ethiopian diaspora population is 
domiciled in the United States (Lyons, 2007), with most residing in Washington DC, 
Dallas, Houston, Minneapolis, Los Angeles and Seattle. Other major hubs of the 
Ethiopian diaspora include, Las Vegas, Denver, Portland, Oakland, and Atlanta. The 
process by which Ethiopians first came to the United States and began to form a diaspora 
in the late 20th and early 21st centuries points to complex political, historical, and social 
forces (Kaplan, 2010). It is necessary that some reference be made, if only briefly, to 
these forces. 
 
Ethnic Overview  
Ethiopia is situated in the Horn of Africa, a strategic yet tumultuous 
peninsula in northeast Africa. The population of Ethiopia today stands at 105 million, 
second largest in Africa next to Nigeria (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). The 
population is ethnically, culturally and religiously distinct; however, the ethnic 
distinctions are the most important. In the context of Ethiopian politics, ethnic 
classification involves contested notions such as culture, language, so called 
‘psychological make up’, history, and territory. Ethnic classifications are defined as 
‘Nation, Nationality or People’ (The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
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Ethiopia, 1995). The 2007 census identified 86 ethnic groups (CSA, 2007), but many 
believe the number of ethnic groups and the size of their populations are deeply 
miscalculated (Berhanu, 2015). Introduced in 1994, the current Ethiopian map shows 
nine exclusively ethnic, administrative regions along with two chartered cities, Addis 
Ababa (the capital city) and Dire Dawa. The Oromos, who constitute the single largest 
ethnic group, making up 34.49 % of the population, predominantly live in Oromia. The 
Amharas, the second largest ethnic group, account for 26.89 % of the population and 
reside in the Amhara region. The southern Region, which is awkwardly called ‘The 
Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples Regional State,’ or SNNPR, is home to 
diverse minority ethnic groups that represent 14.93 % of the population. The Tigrayans, 
who account for 6.07 % of the population, live in Tigray in the North. Somalis, with 
almost the same percentage of the Tigrayan population, inhabit the Somali region in the 
eastern part of the country. Afar, Harari, and Gambella each make up less than 2 % of the 
Ethiopian population and have their own exclusive regions. Benishangul-Gumuz make up 
1.25% of the population as the remaining member of Ethiopia’s federal government 
(Vaughan, 2003). 
Ethiopian ethnic composition and statistics give a misleading appearance that 
except for the southern Region (a collective region for 56 distinct minority ethnic 
groups), all regions are unilingual regions with homogenous ethnic groups. However, 
there are a significant number of ethnic minority pockets in all the regions. For instance, 
the Agaw people in the Amhara region (CSA, 2007) and the Irob people in the Tigray 
region (CSA, 2007). There is a substantial percentage of Amhara population residing in 
Oromia and other regions. Conversely, there is a district known as the ‘Oromia Zone’ in 
the Amhara region for its sizable Oromo community. Several other ethnic groups dwell in 
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different regions as well; notably, the Amhara in the Somali Region, the Oromos, in 
Benishangul-Gumuz, and the Tigrayans, in Amhara and Oromia. Intermingled throughout 
different regions across the country are also the Gurage people, a minority ethnic 
group whose homeland is in one of the ethnic districts of the southern Region (CSA, 
2007). There are also people with mixed ethnic background within many of these 
unilingual ethnic regions. However, the Ethiopian constitution neither defines the term 
'mixed' nor delineates the criteria for determining a mixed population and there is no 
readily available data about their amount.  
The two main elements of the Ethiopian population are people speaking Cushitic 
and Semitic languages. Amharic, a Semitic language and spoken as a mother tongue by 
the Amhara people, is the official working language of the federal government (Vaughan, 
2003). Correspondingly, it has status as the official working language in Afar and in the 
southern Region. A substantial percentage of Ethiopians speak Amharic as their second 
language. Amharic is also the main language of advertising, newspapers, and of the 
budding national television networks (Gebre Yohannes, 2009). Afan Oromo is a Cushitic 
language spoken mainly by Oromo people. While Amharic, along with many other 
Ethiopian languages, use Ge’ez alphabet, Afan Oromo and few other languages adopted 
the Roman alphabet. Alphabets are occasionally a political flashpoint of ethnic relations 
in Ethiopian diaspora media (Gebre Yohannes, 2009). 
In general, there is a cultural division between the North and the South. There are 
many pronounced highland-lowland dynamics and dichotomies: the highland core versus 
the lowland peripheries; the Coptic Christian of the North versus the eastern Muslim 
lowland; the southern people who are mostly Protestant Christian or follow more 
traditional religions, and so forth (Prunier, 2015, Clapham, 2017 and Trimingahm, 1952). 
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One thing that stands out on the Ethiopian political map is the accentuation of minority 
ethnic groups across a north-south divide. The southern part of Ethiopia has more 
minority ethnic groups than the northern part. The divide exists along the lines of the Rift 
Valley of Ethiopia that runs from northeast to southwest, dissecting the country into 
topographic regions of the Ethiopian plateau, the lowland, and the valley (Trimingahm, 
1952). The northern and the central Ethiopian plateau along the lines of many westward 
flowing rivers such as the Blue Nile and Tikeze have been mainly inhabited by the 
Amhara and Tigrayan people. The South, the central highland, and the Southwest, which 
is more forested than the North, is populated by the Oromos, the Sidama, and numerous 
other ethnic groups. The sparsely populated eastern lowland is dominated by Oromos, 
Somalis and Afar. Population density is greatest in portions of the central highlands, 
where the capital Addis Ababa is located, and also in the southern part; it is lowest in the 
southeastern interior (Prunier, 2015, Clapham, 2017). 
 
Historical Overview  
 
The historical events discussed in the subsequent section are imperative for this 
research because they provide a historical background of the news events that are covered 
by ESAT and OMN. Ethiopia’s history dates back almost 3,000 years (Marcus, 1994). 
The first major civilization in what is now Ethiopia was that of the Axumites, who might 
have settled in present-day northern Ethiopia (formerly Abyssinia) as early as 100 AD 
(Marcus, 1994). Christianity was introduced and quickly adopted as a religion of the 
kings of the empire in about 330AD (Crummey, 2000). In a short interval, followers of 
Islam arrived in Axum after they escaped persecution in Mecca in about 613AD. Over 
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time, Christianity and Islam have become the two major religions in Ethiopia 
(Trimingahm, 1952, Hussein 1994). In present-day Ethiopia, Christians, who represent 
about 62 percent of the Ethiopian population, have come to dominate northern and central 
Ethiopia. Muslims, who represent about 33 percent of the population, prevail in eastern 
Ethiopia (CSA, 2007). Also, a significant number of both the Christian and the Muslim 
population intermingled across the country’s villages, towns, and cities (Owens, 2008).  
The Axumite empire grew and stretched to vast areas in the Horn of Africa along 
the coast of the Red Sea in the East, stretching to present-day Sudan in the West (Henze, 
2000). The city of Aksum, whose ruins still remain intact in present-day 
northern Ethiopia of the Tigray Region, was the heart of the empire (Dunlap, 2004). The 
rule of the Axumites weakened and fell into decline at the beginning of the 10th century 
when the Agaw people formed their own reign, known as the Zagwe dynasty to become 
rulers of the empire (Munro-Hay, 1991). The Zagwes lasted for about 370 years, allowing 
successive kings to exert influence and facilitated the spread of Christianity in the empire 
(Oliver, 1982, Negash, 2006). They moved the center of the Axumite empire southward 
to the land that is now called the Amhara region (Negash, 2006). Also, some historical 
documents refer to this empire as Abyssinia. At the height of their power, the Zagwes 
built monumental rock cut churches at their center, Yeha- Lalibela. These churches are 
now inscribed as a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage sites (ICOMOS, 1978). 
In about 1270 the Zagwe dynasty was overthrown by Emperor Yekuno Amlak 
(Munro-Hay, 2002). Yekuno Amlak claimed an ancestral lineage to the last king of the 
Axumite kingdom (Negash, 2006). The removal of the Zagwe dynasty by Yekuno Amlak 
is regarded as the beginning of an incredibly long imperial reign of what is now called the 
Solomonic dynasty (Tamrat, 1972). Yekuno Amlak’s claim of recovering and reinstalling 
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the Axumite reign is reflected in “Kebra Negast” or “Glory of Kings,” a national epic, 
which was published at the beginning of the 14th century (Ullendorff, 1978). “Kebra 
Negast” stretched the history of the Solomonic dynasty as far back as the 10th century 
B.C. The story goes something like this: when an Ethiopian ruler, the biblical Queen of 
Sheba, also known as Saba, traveled to Jerusalem in search of the wisdom of King 
Solomon. Queen of Sheba and King Solomon met and spent the night together. When she 
returned home from Israel, she was pregnant with a son, Menelik, who would become 
Ethiopia’s first emperor. Queen of Sheba raised Menelik on her own. When he came of 
age, Menelik traveled back to Israel to meet his father, King Solomon. Solomon, wanted 
to name Menelik as his heir. But Menelik left Jerusalem for Ethiopia and established the 
Solomonic dynasty in Axum (Kebra Nagast, 1922).  
This national epic of ‘Queen Sheba’ is at the heart of religio-political traditions of 
the Solomonic dynasty (Ullendorff, 1978). It linked Ethiopia with the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, and provided a basis for Ethiopian empire through Semitic culture (Zewde, 
1991). However, it has always been a sore point with some Ethiopian ethnic and religious 
groups such as the Oromos and Somalis because they do have their own ancient myths, 
symbols or a specific historical narrative (Baxter, 1978). The beginning of the Solomonic 
dynasty resulted in the inception of the Ethiopian empire in the 13th century 
(Huntingford, 1965). At roughly the same time, its eastern neighbor, the sultanate of Ifat, 
was also being consolidated. The sultanate of Ifat unified the people in what is now 
eastern Ethiopia, Djibouti and northern Somalia. Later in 16th century, Ifat was succeeded 
by the Adal Sultanate (located in a present-day eastern Ethiopia), which largely inherited 
its foundation (Huntingford, 1989). 
With few discontinuities, the Solomonic monarchs ruled the Ethiopian empire 
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from 1270 to 1974 AD, making the dynasty one of the longest and most influential 
dynasties in Africa (Abir, 1980). During their lengthy seven centuries of reign, the 
Solomonic monarchs had power struggles within themselves, against the sultanates of 
Ifat, and later against Adal in the East (Abir, 1980). The rivals involved in the struggles 
fall into three categories. The most obvious of these rivals were the Christian Solomonic 
monarchs and the Muslim sultanates of Ifat and Adal (Abir, 1980). The expansion of Ifat 
and Adal in the peripheries of the Christian territories, and the incursion of the Ethiopian 
empire into the lands of the sultanates, have fostered these rivalries. A second category 
were the rivalries within Solomonic rulers themselves. Solomonic rulers who hail from 
different ethnic lines of the dynasty looked to enforce their ethnic reign over the 
Ethiopian empire (Pankhurst, 1967). Particularly, the rivalries between the Amhara and 
Tigrayan monarchs of the dynasty were the most common of all. And finally, there were 
rivalries between those whom what mattered was not religious adherence or ethnic 
underpinning of the dynasty, but rather the incorporation of southern peoples into the 
empire and control the lands they inhabited (Zahorik, 2014). 
The struggles that went on within the Solomonic monarchs or between the 
monarchs and sultanates lasted for hundreds of years and they have left deep marks on 
the long course of Ethiopian history (Abir, 1980). Though the sultanates particularly the 
Adal Sultanate have contrived to establish a brief measure of political control in 16th 
century over the significant part of the Ethiopian empire, the Solomonic monarchs had a 
lasting success. However, the Solomonic imperial power dealt with crushing defeat when 
emperor Haile Selassie I was overthrown in 1974 (Sorenson 1993, Zahorik, 2014). The 
repercussions from these historical rivalries continue to resound in the rhetoric of 
contemporary Ethiopian diaspora media.  
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The Oromo Expansion  
Ethiopia’s present-day ethnic picture was completed by migration of various 
groups to various parts of Ethiopia during its long history. In the 16th century, an event 
took place that determined the ethnic composition and geographic distribution of modern 
Ethiopia: the Oromo migration/expansion. Prior to their expansion to the central highland 
of Ethiopia, the Oromo people were settled in what is now the southern areas of Ethiopia. 
Most historians say waves of Oromo migration/expansion happened in the 16th century. 
Due to population pressures, the Oromos expanded throughout the length and breadth of 
Ethiopia during or before the beginning of the 16th century (Pankhurst, 1967). However, 
it is also possible that their movement gained impetus due to the Abyssinian–Adal war of 
the 16th century that debilitated both the Christian Abyssinian empire and the Adal 
Sultanate (Pankhurst, 1967).  
The Oromos had an ‘age-set’ system known as Gada, in which all males born into 
an eight-year generation pass through all of the stages of life together (Legesse, 1973). 
They say that the Gada System was the cradle of their tradition that facilitated their 
expansion to the core of the Ethiopian empire. An analysis of their movement seems to 
indicate that they have moved far and wide to reside in the heartland of Ethiopia. After 
their expansion into the west, the Oromos founded small and separated feudal states 
known as the Gibe States. Consequently, their cultural system was largely absorbed into 
that of the aboriginal culture of the area, so they developed into feudal states with a 
character of their own. The kingdoms of Jimma and of Gumma attained special 
importance (Pankhurst, 1967). Their northward migration, however, brought them within 
the zone of the Abyssinian Amhara culture, by which they were strongly influenced. 
Thus, the Oromo culture lost more and more of its original character and increasingly 
 
13  
resembled the Abyssinian, predominantly Christian Amhara, culture. In the North, the 
Oromos were also brought into the political sphere of Abyssinia, as shown by the fact 
that marriages took place between the ruling classes of the Oromos and Amharas (Yates, 
2009). In the east, the Oromos have largely become Muslims (Pankhurst, 1967). 
 
The Formation of the Modern Ethiopian State 
Following the expansion of the Oromos, the control of the Solomonic emperors 
weakened and the Ethiopian empire broke into a small number of regions under various 
rulers. From the mid-18th to mid-19th century, there was no effective central authority. 
The empire was divided into several regions with their own rulers: Tigray in the North in 
what is still the Tigray region, and Gonder, Wag and Lasta, Yejju, Wallo, Gojjam and 
some parts of Shoa, which were all in what is now called the Amhara region (Bekele, 
2015). In the history of Ethiopia, this period has come to be called ‘The Era of the 
Princes’ (Abir, 1968). The ‘Era of the Princes’ came to an end after almost a century, 
when Tewodros II, an Emperor who hailed from Gonder, claimed Solomonic ancestry 
and put the groundwork for the modern Ethiopian State in 1855. When Tewodros II 
emerged on the horizon, he found that none of the feudal states were strong enough to 
exercise control over the others any longer (Zewede, 1991). Tewodros II forced his rivals 
into his monarchical rule. Thus, Ethiopian historians consider this period to be the 
beginning of the modern Ethiopian State. When Tewodros II died in 1868, his Tigrayan 
rival, Yohannes IV, who claimed Solomonic lineage, rose to power. After he gained 
control over several regions, he was crowned king and maintained rule of the Ethiopian 
empire (Zewede, 1991).  
Meanwhile, further south in Shoa, the power of Menelik II steadily grew. At the 
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same time, the influence of Yohannes IV diminished more and more through the 
disloyalty of his feudatories and through wars with Sudan in the west (Zewede, 1991). In 
about 1889, Menelik II pushed into southern Ethiopia. His army was formed by an 
alliance between the Oromos from Shoa and the Amharas. Menelik II forced a passage 
across the Awash river in the east and annihilated any semblance of resistance (Zewede, 
1991, Donham, 1992). He pursued the vestiges of the Adal sultanate in Harar and 
captured Amir Abdullahi, the last emperor of the Adal sultanate (Zewede, 1991). Thus, 
this founded the modern Ethiopian State in its current geographic form. Menelik II 
brought strong elements of Abyssinian Christian culture. While this created a new empire 
that was able to maintain itself as a political unit, there were no common linguistic or 
religious elements among all Ethiopians to create a cultural unit (Adejumobi, 2007, 
Sorenson 1993, Zahorik, 2014).  
In 1896, an event took place that transformed the destiny of modern Ethiopia. 
Italy wanted to expand its territory in Africa and invaded Ethiopia. The Ethiopians 
inflicted a heavy defeat on Italy in March, 1896 at the Battle of Adwa, after which the 
two countries signed the treaty of Addis Ababa (Jonas, 2011). The agreement gave Italy 
the land (now Eretria) north of the Mereb river, which remains the boundary between 
Ethiopia and Eretria. The Italian colony of Eretria officially lasted until 1947. In 1947, 
Ethiopia federated Eritrea. Then, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962, leading to 
the Eritrean War of Independence (Araya, 1990, Cambell, 1971). The war lasted for 
thirty years and after a referendum in April 1993, resulted in Eritrean independence 
(Reid, 2014). Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eretria still exist, particularly after 
Eritrean–Ethiopian border War of 2000 (Negash & Tronvoll, 2000). The Ethiopian 
victory over Italy propelled Ethiopia as a sovereign state, founded on the refusal of 
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colonialism that dominated Africa during the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Jonas, 
2011). The victory at Adwa gave rise to numerous diplomatic exchanges between 
Ethiopia and foreign powers. It also gave Menelik II an opportunity to reinforce his rule 
all throughout Ethiopia. Menelik II, who is mostly regarded as the founder of the modern 
Ethiopian State, died in 1913 (Jonas, 2011).  
 
Haile Selassie I 1930 -1974 
Three years after the death of Menilek II, Ethiopia’s longest serving emperor, Ras 
Tafari (later named Haile Selassie I, was appointed as a regent, or acting ruler, in 1916), 
eventually became emperor in 1930. In 1935, Italy recaptured Ethiopia for five years but 
with the help of the British, Italy was defeated and gave up all its claims to Ethiopia. 
Then, Haile Selassie I began the rebuilding and modernizing project of the Ethiopian 
State (Zewde, 2002). Under Haile Selassie I, Ethiopia entered the age of modernization, 
nation-building, and nationalism with the legacy of a longstanding historical awareness 
and cultural consciousness for pan-Ethiopian nationalism (Abbay, 2010). The modern 
ideas of nation, pan-Ethiopian nationalism, and Ethiopian identity–as a set of sentiments 
about the modern Ethiopian nation-state with Abyssinian cultural roots and with 
Amharan/ Tigrayan ethinic undertones–were laid as a foundation (Jalata, 2005, 2010). 
However, these ideas have not brought a transformation of peoples’ lives from subjects to 
citizens across all regions and ethnicities, including the Amharas and Tigrayans. 
Since 1960, increasing dissatisfaction with the incompetence and corruption of 
the monarchy, together with students’ radical activism, found expression in a mass 
movement (Zewede, 2002). An attempted coup d'état against Hali Selassie I in 1960 was 
quashed by the monarchy, but the coup left behind a tradition of revolution that took the 
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shape of various movements, an important one being student movements (Clapham, 
1968, Gobeze 2014). In the 1970s, a student movement erupted against the monarch’s 
land tenure system that left ownership to the monarch or to provincial rulers who were 
empowered to make land grants (Bruce, Hoben & Rahmato, 1994). Additionally, the 
demand to recognize the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic identity of various groups who 
were incorporated to the Ethiopian State during Menilek II’s southward expansion was 
one of their central concerns (Gobeze, 2014, Hassen 2002, Alemayehu, 1993). The 
students’ resentment turned into a widespread movement and insurgencies flared up in 
different places. The outcome of this movement was ultimately the demand for removal 
of the monarch, which were implemented in 1974 (Gobeze, 2014). 
 
Military Rule 1974 -1991 
Taking advantage of political instability, Colonel Mengestu Haile Mariam, leader 
of the armed forces (also known as the Derg), overthrew Haile Selassie I in a military 
coup in 1974 (Kebede, 2011). Following his ascension to power, Mengestu consolidated 
military power over all realms of society. From 1974 to 1991, the country was ruled by a 
military government that completely inhibited all forms of dissenting expression 
(Kebede, 2011). The Derg regime realized one of the most important demands of the 
student movement: land reform (Gobeze, 2014, Gudina, 2007). The land reform led to the 
collapse of a social and political order that had prevailed throughout monarchical rule. 
Although this ended the exploitative land tenure system, other demands such as 
recognition for ethnic and cultural identity were not realized (Gobeze, 2014, Gudina, 
2003). At first the regime looked progressive in terms of recognizing ethnic and cultural 
identities of various peoples, but it reverted to pan-Ethiopian nationalist ideology with 
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Amharic as a common language for all Ethiopian cultural and linguistic groups 
(Alemayehu,1993).  
During this period, Ethiopia’s political environment was characterized by social 
division and political instability. In part, the military regime fostered a legacy of Haile 
Selassie I’s hierarchical imperial rule. This is also a period that is characterized by forced 
migration. Following the violent removal of Emperor Haile Selassie I, an escalating 
revolutionary movement–spearheaded largely by university students–coupled with 
polarized political environment, triggered a civil war between the Derg regime and 
several political groups rooted in university student movements. After the political 
instability and the revolutionary movements of the 1970s, it morphed into a full-blown 
civil war, structured along ethnic lines. Movements became rebel groups, such as the 
Tigrayan Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). 
 
The EPRDF Regime 1991- Present  
In May 1991, the rebel groups who were transformed into political parties–mainly 
the TPLF and OLF–entered the capital, Addis Ababa, after having spent the previous 
seventeen years in the bush fighting against the Derg regime (Young, 1996). It was a 
watershed moment that ended Ethiopia’s prolonged political repression in which tens of 
thousands of Ethiopians disappeared, perished, fled, or were imprisoned. It was also the 
start of the period when Ethiopia forged its current political settlement by the current 
Ethiopian governing coalition known as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF). Also, Eritrea passed a referendum declaring its 
independence and seceded from Ethiopia in 1993. 
The EPRDF was founded by TPLF in 1989. After overcoming its main rivals in 
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the bush in early 1980s, TPLF became the main rebel group in the struggle against the 
Derg . They (the TPLF) had fought first for independence of Tigray,–or at least 
autonomy–but later framed their war in the wider context of Ethiopia and formed EPRDF 
as an umbrella political organization (Hagmann & Abbink, 2012). TPLF also drove out 
OLF from Ethiopia and started consolidating their grip on EPRDF (Jalata, 2007). The 
EPRDF is a coalition of four other ethnic-based parties: the Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM), the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), the 
Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM). All four purport to 
represent Ethiopia’s major ethnic groups, but are closely aligned in ideology, political 
association, and policy preferences. This effectively raised the ‘ethnic profile’ of 
previously marginalized ethnic groups. The ‘profile of ethnicity’ was further reinforced 
by the 1995 Constitution, which explicitly turned Ethiopia into a federation of nine ethnic 
states; but, as some have argued, it was still without a corresponding devolution of 
authority or resources in real terms (McCracken, 2004). Some argue the TPLF is the core 
of the EPRDF coalition, holding absolute power over the last quarter of a century. 
“Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front” is a misleading term because 
among the four parties, it is the TPLF–not the other three parties–that determines whether 
to bestow power to other members of the coalition, or to take it away. Criticism claims 
that TPLF uses the coalition to confirm its own ability to keep both the center of the 
country and the regions under control while the remaining three ethnic parties participate 
as a “patronage network,” trading the needs of their people for political influence 
(McCracken, 2004). Some argue that the resulting discontent serves as a driver for 
identity-based mobilization, disregarding the ‘shared’ sense of pan- Ethiopian 
nationalism (Kebede, 2011).  
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The current regime has held regular parliamentary elections every five years since 
1995. But its use of state resources and repression, coupled with boycotts by 
marginalized opposition parties, left most Ethiopians without any meaningful choice 
during the first decade of multiparty elections. In 2005 however, EPRDF gave voters 
meaningful political options for the first time in the country’s history (Arriola, 2005). 
Two large opposition coalitions competed against the EPRDF and actively campaigned 
across the main regions of the country. According to official results, the combined 
opposition increased their number of seats. But the short-lived optimism culminated in 
post-election violence when some opposition leaders refused to accept the results, 
claiming voter fraud and intimidation had denied them victory. They announced a 
boycott on parliament and called for protests (Arriola, 2005). The EPRDF government 
responded to the protests with brutal force that left hundreds of people dead, hundreds 
imprisoned, and many more exiled.  
Given the widespread post-election turmoil in 2005, the 2010 election did not 
attract enthusiasm (Tronvoll, 2011). The regime made the political environment 
uninhabitable for opposition groups. Instantly after the 2005 election, the regime kept top 
opposition leaders in court for treason. People identified as opposition supporters lost 
access to government services and jobs. Then, in the run-up to the 2010 election the 
regime muzzled its critics by adopting laws aimed at eliminating independent media and 
civil society (Tronvoll, 2011). For example, the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 
broadly defines terrorism, establishes sentences of up to twenty years for published 
statements judged to encourage acts of terrorism, and authorizes intelligence services to 
conduct surveillance over the Internet (HRW, 2010). The law has been used to arrest 
many independent journalists and to make public discussion of major public-policy issues 
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a dangerous activity. The law’s key provisions are vague, and Ethiopia’s judicial system 
lacks both the capacity and the independence to serve as a check on government’s abuse 
of the law (HRW, 2010). 
In the latest parliamentary elections in 2015, the EPRDF won 100 percent of 
parliamentary seats without conceding a single seat for either an opposition or an 
independent candidate (Arriola & Lyons, 2016). However, only months after the 2015 
election, students in Ethiopia’s largest regional state, Oromia, started protesting the 
EPRDF regime. Initially, the protesters revolted against the EPRDF’s plan of expanding 
the area of the capital, Addis Ababa, into Oromia. The protestors argue that the 
controversial plan, known as the “Addis Ababa Master Plan”, to expand Addis Ababa 
into Oromia state would result in mass evictions of farmers who mostly belong to the 
Oromo ethnic group. The protesters also have other demands such as making Oromo 
language a federal language. Oromo, the language of the Oromo people, is the most 
widely spoken language in Ethiopia and the fourth largest African language. The 
government response has been brutal: hundreds have been killed, thousands have been 
arrested, and critical voices–both on and offline–have been systematically silenced 
(HRW, 2016). Although the government has scrapped the plan to expand Addis Ababa, it 
has still fallen far short of addressing the demands of the protesters, which include greater 
questions of self-rule, freedom, and identity.  
The protest that started in the Oromia region spread in other part of the country, 
mainly to the Amhara region. In Amhara, the country's second largest region, protests 
started in Gonder on July 31, 2016. In just four months, the protests rapidly devolved 
from addressing local identity questions of the Welkait community, into a region-wide 
movement that has spread into numerous other provinces. The large-scale July 31st 
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incident in Gonder marked the first major confrontation between Amhara protest leaders 
and the Ethiopian government. However, the dispute between the Amharas and the 
regime can be traced back as far as the early 1990s, when the TPLF-dominated EPRDF 
redrew the district boundaries of the Welkait community into the Tigray region, which 
belonged to ethnic Amharas. Some Amhara activists have described the ongoing Amhara 
protest as ‘25 years of anger unleashed’ (Chala, 2016)  
The protesters in Gonder have also expressed slogans of solidarity with the 
protests in Oromia. Although the protests in Oromia and Amhara started for different 
reasons, they both stem from Ethiopia's complex identity politics. In both regions, 
demonstrators were challenging the dominance of elites from the same group–the Tigray. 
The Tigray make up 6% of the population, but dominate the ranks of the military and the 
government; while the Oromo represent 34% and the Amhara 27% of the country's 
population. Since November 2015, hundreds of protesters have been killed and thousands 
have been arrested. The protests spreading from Oromia to Amhara seemed to represent 
an important turning point in challenging the 27-year rule of the EPRDF (Chala, 2016).  
 
A Snapshot on the History and Current State of Ethiopian Media  
 
The three successive Ethiopian governments set up a system of control that 
penetrated all spheres of life in Ethiopia. The media were strictly supervised, regulated, 
and controlled by the government. The control over media is so pervasive that it includes 
not only political expressions, but all kinds of information, including artistic expressions 
through theatre performances, literature, and music. During the imperial regime of Haile 
Selassie I, nothing could be published without prior approval by authorities. Within this 
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context, any work of art, a newspaper, or a radio program was scrutinized before it could 
be released to the public (Reta, 2013). There were only a few state-owned publishers, and 
they were often required to delete paragraphs or entire articles before publication (Reta, 
2013). In some instances, a book was outright banned, mandating that the entirety of a 
print run be discarded (Reta, 2013). As a result, publishers have long engaged in heavy 
self-censorship in order to keep their work or avoid imprisonment. However, these 
writers have been faced with the inherent challenge of balancing the risks of invoking 
censorship, making them use metaphors with symbolism too vague for the audience to 
make the desired connection (Kebede, 2014).  
Following his ascension to power in 1974, Mengistu Haile Mariam 
institutionalized censorship and turned all forms of media into an ideological apparatus of 
the state (Reta, 2013). Due to high illiteracy rates and poverty under the three successive 
regimes, radio was the “primary media of mass communication” in the country (Skjerdal, 
2012). Radio was first introduced to Ethiopia in 1935. To date, domestic radio consists of 
one state-run station along with a few joint semi-private-semi-public FM stations. 
Ethiopia did not obtain television until 1963, and it was not until 1995 that most parts of 
the country could receive TV broadcasts. There are still areas where television signals do 
not reach. From 1963 until 2014, Ethiopia carried only one government-run television 
station. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) operated under its parent division, 
Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency, –formerly Ethiopian Television–which was 
commonly viewed as a propaganda tool used by the successive Ethiopian governments. 
From the beginning, the Ethiopian television channel has contained government edited 
news reports and images of lush vegetation, skyscraping buildings, and new roads, 
intended to evoke a sense of economic development. Since 2015, the Ethiopian 
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government has issued two licenses for state-affiliated broadcasters to operate as private 
television stations. 
Although the Internet was officially introduced in Ethiopia in 1998, with the 
establishment of the country’s first data communication link, it was not until 2000 that 
individual citizens were able to access the network (Freedom House, 2013). To date, 
there is only one state-owned Internet service provider operating in the country, Ethio-
Telecom. Most Ethiopian Internet users access the Internet through mobile phones and 
cyber cafes (Freedom House, 2013). However, government restrictions, prohibiting costs, 
and slow connection speeds have kept penetration rates significantly low (OpenNet 
Initiative, 2007; 2012; Freedom House, 2013). When Ethio-Telecom launched its dial-up 
service in 1999, it charged approximately $300 (USD) for annual service (Freedom 
House, 2013). At the time of its inception, service was restricted to business groups, 
travel agencies, and government ministries (Freedom House, 2013). When Internet 
service subscriptions were ultimately afforded to private citizens, it made negligible 
progress in the way of facilitating access (CIA World Factbook, 2010; ITU, 2014). While 
the current influx of state investment has led to a dramatic expansion of 
telecommunications access, both Internet and mobile phone penetration in Ethiopia still 
remain among the lowest in the world (ITU, 2014). Moreover, in addition to barriers in 
the form of infrastructure and cost for other forms of media, Internet access in Ethiopia 
has been further precluded by a legacy of government censorship (Freedom House, 
2013).  
However, over the years, the heavily censored and ideologically saturated state-
controlled media system has driven many Ethiopians to turn to external media outlets. 
Transmitting via shortwaves and satellites from the United States and Europe, the most 
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notable of these international broadcasters have included the Voice of America (VOA) 
and Deutsche Welle (DW). While VOA and DW are valued for their provision of 
uncensored local political news, their popularity also extends from their facilitation of 
political information and cultural programing in three major Ethiopian languages: 
Amharic, Afan Oromo, and Tigergna. VOA has Amharic, Afan Oromo, and Tigregna 
language services, but DW only broadcasts in Amharic. The BBC announced that it will 
also begin radio broadcasting in these languages in 2018. The BBC already launched 
three websites in Amharic, Afan Oromo, and Tigergna in 2017. Similarly, political 
organizations such as OLF and Ginbot 7 broadcast radio contents from externally-
operated radio programs into the country. During the Ethiopian civil war in the 1980s, the 
rebel groups such as TPLF had a history of transmitting radio contents into Ethiopia from 
areas outside of the control of the Derg regime. They transmitted daily broadcasts that 
featured news from the civil war, party propaganda, and revolutionary music in Amharic, 
Tigeregna, and Afan Oromo languages.  Moreover, diaspora-based opposition groups, 
exiled journalists, and individuals have often employed the Internet to achieve their 
objectives; notably, documenting government human rights violations inside Ethiopia and 
subsequently distributing the reports through websites, blogs, and social media. 
While both the Derg and the EPRDF regimes jammed international and 
opposition groups’ broadcasts, the primary method used to control the spread of 
information among the population has been the use of threat by arresting journalists (CPJ, 
2005). The EPRDF briefly relaxed the state’s strong grip on media in 1990s, but a 
campaign against the free press started as soon as the EPRDF passed the free press law in 
1992 (CPJ, 1995). Scores of journalists were imprisoned in successive waves of arrests. 
In 1994, the regime arrested 31 prominent journalists in an apparent attempt to stunt the 
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growth of the private press at an early stage (CPJ, 1995). However, to build a façade of 
democracy, the Ethiopian government allowed some space for political expression 
without jeopardizing its grip on power. The EPRDF regime tolerated the emergence of 
private newspapers that were limited to the capital city and select urban areas, while 
retaining tight control over television and radio. The EPRDF mostly allowed free press to 
operate in Ethiopia until 2005, albeit the opening of Ethiopia’s public sphere was an 
uneven process where journalists regularly faced threats of arrest and exile. But following 
the contentious election of the 2005, the EPRDF assaulted the private press. For some, 
the 2005 crackdown on private press represents an abrupt departure from the grudging 
toleration that was accorded to the private press during the first fifteen years of EPRDF’s 
tenure. Following the electoral success of opposition groups in 2005–and against the 
backdrop of the private press in the public sphere playing an increased role–the regime 
denounced the private press as ‘mouthpieces’ of the opposition that are ‘playing a key 
role in implementing’ the post-election ‘violence’ (Ross, 2008). A glance at the treason 
charges that were brought against 13 journalists whose names were on the government's 
watch list, suggests however, that the regime found them threatening, not because they 
committed ‘treasonous crimes,’ but because they reported on the unfolding political crisis 
(Ross, 2010). Indeed, I would contend that it was the development of the private press–
and its growing influence as an alternative source of information and as a platform for 
opposition in Ethiopia–that prompted the regime to move against it. 
Since 2005, hundreds of newspapers and magazines were shut down. These left 
hundreds of journalists arrested, exiled, or sentenced to long-term prison rulings (CPJ, 
2016). As the government’s clampdown on private, independent, and free media 
widened, the number of journalists, bloggers, and media executives in exile have been 
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increasing since 2005. The Committee to Protect Journalists lists Ethiopia among the 
worst countries in the world for exiling journalists. According to the CPJ, from 1991 to 
2016, at least 163 journalists were forced into exile. Even though many of these 
journalists are resettled in the United States, Canada, and Europe, they continue to be 
involved in some kind of diaspora media initiatives. At the same time, the upsurge in 
connectivity of the internet and in access to television and satellite dishes–which was 
initiated by the regime for its own purposes–broadened the resources and institutional 
space available for opposition and aggrieved groups to reach each other. This resulted in 
the locus of political expression from Ethiopia to shift outside of Ethiopia, particularly to 
the United States and Europe. Much to the regime’s frustration, however, the diaspora 
community based in the United States and in Europe provided financial support for 
journalists who took initiatives to launch media outlets. 
Consequently, Ethiopia’s contemporary media landscape is built on a number of 
political and economic factors discussed above. It encompasses a system of 
interdependent media actors that are simultaneously local, national, and transnational. 
Particularly media in the diaspora and the media inside Ethiopia are two distinct but 
influential elements of the Ethiopian media landscape. The diaspora media represent 
independent elements within the broader Ethiopian media system, in which they are 
connected to the Ethiopian public, albeit physically located in different countries. Not one 
of these two (the media in diaspora or the media inside Ethiopia) can be ignored and they 
both are determinative to understand the Ethiopian media system. These two are so 
closely related that there is a communicative linkage between the media inside Ethiopia 
and the media in the diaspora. This communicative linkage encompasses a wide range of 
phenomena such as news reporting, political campaigns, and cultural exchanges through 
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different communicative infrastructures. In particular, Ethiopia’s satellite dish penetration 
grew hand-in hand with the internet penetration. Various independent and private media 
organizations that were exiled from Ethiopia over the years get access to the news and 
events through media–private, public, blogs, online journals, social media platforms, 
friends, readers and communities–and broadcast them back to Ethiopia. This makes the 
offline and the online media overlap and converge in a distinctly different manner with 
different socio-political implications. In this context, I evoked Tufekci and Wilson’s 
(2012) concept of ‘connectivity infrastructures’ that suggests media systems ‘should be 
analyzed as a complex ecology rather than in terms of any specific platform or device.’ 
For this research, this includes diaspora-based satellite TV, short wave and internet-based 
radio stations, social media platforms, mobile phones, and interactions with offline social 
networks. Diaspora-based websites, satellite radio, and television broadcasts reach 
equivalent–if not more–number of audiences than the official media controlled by the 
Ethiopian government.  
 
ESAT and OMN: A Preliminary Analysis  
 
As shown above, the Ethiopian media landscape took shape in the specific 
historical circumstances of political conflict and resulting migration. At the time of the 
2005 national election, the diaspora media comes into the fold of the Ethiopian media 
landscape as a major alternative source of information in the form of blogs and websites. 
At least twenty websites and blogs were active during the contentious 2005 national 
election, and about half of the major newspapers were taking contents from the diaspora-
based websites and blogs (Jon Abbink, Tobias Hagmann, 2012). Subsequently, the 
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regime blocked the blogs and the websites, and the newspapers were shut down after the 
election. These hostile government measures have led to the following: the proliferation 
of massive numbers of diaspora media platforms; and the pattern of censorship that 
perpetuates the longstanding distrust between different diaspora-based community 
members and the Ethiopian government. The flourishing of the Ethiopian diaspora media 
gained new impetus in 2010, after journalists and opposition leaders fled the country in a 
pre and post-election crackdown. After the crackdown on journalists intensified between 
2010 and 2015, many journalists and opposition politicians came to the United States 
through asylum. Washington D.C. and the Twin Cities area in Minnesota have been 
headquarters to Ethiopia’s diasporic media scene. Between 2010 and 2015, at least four 
satellite diaspora television stations were formed. Among the four television stations, 
ESAT and OMN are the most prominent, with their growing influence as agents for the 
flow of uncensored information into Ethiopia. ESAT was established in 2010 with the 
help of Ethiopian immigrant communities in the United States, while OMN was created 
in 2014 by Oromo diaspora groups. The introduction of satellite diaspora television 
stations into Ethiopia’s public sphere as an example of “feedback loop,” in which news 
reports are gathered covertly by sources in Ethiopia, produced in ESAT and OMN studios 
in Washington D.C. and Minneapolis, and then broadcasted back into Ethiopia via 
satellite. 
Since the emergence of ESAT and OMN, the Ethiopian media scene has 
undergone momentous changes. One of the outcomes of these changes was the 
emergence of a media coverage of political events that is free from Ethiopia’s 
government control. The autonomy of these two media narratives vis-à-vis government-
controlled media narratives created a standard against which the truthfulness of 
 
29  
government’s version of the news inside Ethiopia is measured. Executives and journalists 
of ESAT and OMN believe that they are countering the government’s misinformation 
and propaganda. But the Ethiopian government frequently targets these two channels 
with allegations of them working to bring about regime change by supporting political 
movements in Ethiopia. 
Simultaneously, there is an ideological rivalry between ESAT and OMN 
themselves. The rivalry between ESAT and OMN emanates from the interpretation of the 
history and historicity of the Ethiopian State. ESAT’s point of reference for the origins of 
the current political problems of Ethiopia are the institutionalization of ethnic based 
political mobilizations and the withering of the transcendental identity called ‘Ethiopian 
identity’. According to ESAT, until 1991, the emphasis of the Ethiopian State was on 
constructing the sense of collective ‘Ethiopian identity’ so that ethnic identities were less 
important than ‘Ethiopian identity’. For ESAT, the current regime institutionalized 
ethnicity when it reorganized the Ethiopian State into a federation of nine administrative 
regions along ethnic lines. Journalists of ESAT usually reproach the Ethiopian 
government for using linguistic differences as the only means of internal political 
administration, which they claim becomes a fundamental strategy of divide-and-rule to 
legitimatize the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). ESAT emphasizes the 
historicity of the Ethiopian State. Generally, it traces the formation of the Ethiopian State 
beyond the 19th century. They view Emperor Menelik’s 19th century southward expansion 
as merely a re-incorporation of the lands that belonged to the Ethiopian State long before 
the south-north expansion of the Oromos in 16th Century. 
On the other hand, OMN views the current Ethiopian political malaise as a 
condition shaped during Emperor Menelik’s 19th century southward expansion. Some 
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Oromo scholars who have an ideological association with OMN deployed Veracini’s 
conceptualization of settler colonialism to characterize Emperor Menelik’s 19th century 
southward expansion. Veracini defines settler colonialism ‘a distinct type of colonialism 
that functions through the replacement of indigenous populations with an invasive settler 
society that, over time, develops a distinctive identity and sovereignty’ (2015). For OMN, 
the Amhara/Tigrayan-dominated Ethiopian State is settler colonialism and it developed 
the distinctive ‘Ethiopian Identity’ which is not inclusive and hence, does not represent 
the Oromos. For them, the current regime is the modern-day extension of Emperor 
Menelik’s Ethiopia, albeit with the Tigrayan domination and a false recognition of the 
rights of the Oromos and other ethnic groups. 
Therefore, I argue that this complex nature of loyalties to ethno-national identities 
provides an important framework for understanding the operations and reporting of 
ESAT and OMN. Although the proponents of Ethiopian identity who migrated to the 
United States during the military government of socialist Ethiopia dominate diaspora 
groups, the ethno-nationalists that have come to the United States over the past twenty-
five years have all drawn on the ethno-nationalistic rhetoric of the current regime. This 
pattern persists in the setup of ESAT and OMN. The supporters of the collective 
‘Ethiopian identity’ mostly coalesce around ESAT, while ethno-nationalists–mainly the 
Oromo nationalists–support OMN. ESAT frames Ethiopia’s violent ethnic relations as 
nonlinear and complex historical actualities that occurred throughout the formation of the 
Ethiopian State. ESAT’s interpretation of Ethiopia’s violent past signifies a mission of 
shielding the collective ‘Ethiopian identity’ that has been constructed over hundreds of 
years, and repairing the damage of ‘Ethiopianess’ caused by the current regime. OMN on 




Significance of the Study  
The arrival of ESAT and OMN on the Ethiopian media landscape has not only 
broadened the breadth and diversity of informational resources for Ethiopians both at 
home and in the diaspora, but it has also continued their hostile relationship with the 
Ethiopian government on a transnational communicative space. In this context, it is 
important to mention that during the Ethiopian election cycles, opposition candidates 
usually travel to the United States to hold fundraising events and appear on ESAT and 
OMN. However, this is not limited to opposition political leaders. The Ethiopian 
government also regularly sends delegations to meet with its supporters and solicit 
political and financial support from the Ethiopian diaspora community (Lyons, 2006). A 
panel discussion organized by pro-government groups in Washington D.C. in December 
2016 alluded to the possibility of launching a pro-government diaspora media in the 
United States. This would open a new site of conflict between ESAT, OMN, and the 
Ethiopian government. It represents the concept of the “de-territorialized nation-state,” in 
which boundaries are defined socially rather than geographically (Basch et al., 1994; 
Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998). It also shows that in the Ethiopian political context, 
ESAT and OMN are a pervasive phenomenon that puts Ethiopia on the map for millions 
of Ethiopians throughout world. Additionally, it shows that Ethiopian media is being re-
produced throughout a transnational public sphere. If Nancy Fraser is correct that a 
transnational public sphere is defined by its capacity ‘to be a vehicle for mobilizing 
public opinion as a political force to empower the citizenry vis-à-vis private powers and 
permit it to exercise influence over the state’ (1992), then ESAT and OMN, although 
located outside Ethiopia, are politically and socially consequential and qualify as a 
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veritable transnational diasporic public sphere that are worthy of a careful scholarly 
study. Furthermore, in a post-globalization era and ongoing struggle to frame 
immigration and diaspora communities, Ethiopian diaspora and their media activities 
offer an interesting site for the study of the impact of diaspora on their country of origin, 
attempting to shape political discourse and force a regime change from a distance.  
The fact that little has been written on the influence of ESAT and OMN provides 
another impetus for this study. No scholarly work has captured the rise, the burgeoning 
influence, and the ideological rivalry of ESAT and OMN. In a related but slightly 
different context, a study on Ethiopian web-based diaspora media and their journalistic 
practices suggest that their reporting tends to be influenced by their political positions 
(Skjerdal, 2009). While the journalistic practices of Ethiopian diaspora media tend to be 
“conflict-oriented and politicized” (Skjerdal, 2009), the study left us largely ignorant of 
what historical, social, political, and institutional factors drive the diaspora media to 
politicize their reporting. In a sense, the study conflates the cause and effect of 
events. Skjerdal’s study would have been benefited from exploring the history of the 
conditions under which the diaspora media arose, how Ethiopian journalists moved out of 
Ethiopia, and why they continue their journalistic enterprises from a distance. Hence, this 
research will make empirical contributions on the rise of ESAT and OMN, their 
journalistic practices, and their ideological rivalry that are embedded in their 
interpretations of Ethiopian history. Therefore, this study will have a significant 
contribution because it captures the journalistic practices and the ideological rivalry of 
ESAT and OMN on a transnational scale. 
This study will be the first to systematically chronicle and explore the rising 
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power of ESAT and OMN through the instrumentality of a transnational public sphere. 
Different diaspora communities have frequently been described as politically 
inconsequential groups in the local/domestic politics of their country of origin because of 
their ‘hybrid identities’(Brinkerhof, 2009). Most diaspora communities often use their 
media outlets to negotiate their identities in the host countries, promote solidarity, and 
nurture collective, national, nostalgic memories. There is a desire to go back ‘home’ and 
the fight the sense of uprootedness that comes along with geographic displacement to 
new socio-cultural habitats. Arif Dirlik describes these types of diasporic media as a 
‘mournful discourses of marginalized diasporics’(2004). These types of diasporic media 
are never used as instruments to influence the local/domestic politics of their country of 
origin. However, ESAT and OMN have changed this hallmark of diaspora media. This 
study, therefore, makes important contributions to the existing literature on critical 
diaspora discourse in that it demonstrates how through ESAT and OMN, the Ethiopian 
diaspora community are interlinked with their country of origin. 
This study makes original contributions to the scholarship of transnational public 
sphere, diaspora study, and frame analysis by doing the following: by tracing the rise of 
ESAT and OMN within Ethiopian diaspora media; by exploring their variegated 
ideological rivalry; by capturing the relational and political tensions they have with 
Ethiopian government and between themselves; and by showing how all this has altered 
the Ethiopian politics over the last five years. It therefore joins and advances disciplinary 
conversations in media studies and transnational public sphere theory. 
 
Research Questions 
With a purpose to explore the links between the Ethiopian diaspora media and 
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their impact in Ethiopian local political dynamics, the following three research questions 
have been formulated to guide this study. A methodology based on these questions will 
follow. 
 
1. What is the historical, social and political context in which the Ethiopian diaspora 
in the United States sets up media outlets? When and why were ESAT and OMN 
developed? Here, I am interested in probing the contextual factors that have 
fostered the development of Ethiopian diaspora media.  
 
2. What is the influence of ESAT and OMN over the diaspora in the United States 
and in Ethiopia? How might the influence of these two major outlets differ from 
others? Here, I will be analyzing the transnational aspects of diaspora media, their 
power (or lack of) to influence political discourse, and their leverage with 
different audiences. 
 
3. What are the differences and similarities between ESAT and OMN in using 
frames in reporting political events related to Ethiopia? Here I will be looking at 
what major frames ESAT and OMN have used when they report political events 




I have adopted mixed method research methodology to provide a contextual 
narrative of the rise, the development, and the struggle of ESAT and OMN within the 
Ethiopian public sphere. My methodology is divided into two sections. In the section that 
deals with the rise of ESAT and OMN, I will provide the justification and specification of 
the research procedures I have used for studying the two media organizations. In the 
section that deals with the reporting of ESAT and OMN, I have given detailed 
methodological justification for content, discourse, and frame analysis separately in 
chapter three.  
 
Outline of Chapters  
Chapter I provides a contextual background for the study. It includes an overview of 
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Ethiopian history, as well as an account of Ethiopia’s media landscape and the role and 
significance of ESAT and OMN. It also provides the significance and justification for the 
study by identifying the gaps in the existing research on Ethiopian diaspora media and 
pointing out the contributions that this study makes to the disciplinary conversation. Last, 
it presents research questions that guide the investigation and a note on methodology that 
is deployed to provide answers to these research questions.  
Chapter II reviews relevant literature on diaspora and transnational public sphere 
framing theory. It unites them with the various conceptions of Ethiopian diaspora media. 
In addition, it highlights two broad theoretical frameworks: transnational public sphere 
theory and the framing that undergirds this study. 
Chapter III discusses the combination of research methods this study employs and how 
they are applied in its empirical work. In total, there are three methods of data collection 
and analysis. It provides a brief description and analysis of selected political events that 
were covered by ESAT and OMN. It also provides a wide-ranging literature review, 
quantitative content analysis, and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It also presents 
description of frame analysis and interview as a method. 
Chapter IV is and empirical part of the study and one of the sections that discusses 
results. It traces the history of ESAT and locates the evolution and influence of ESAT in 
the Ethiopian media landscape in the context of broader discussions about the factors that 
contribute to the the rise of ESAT. It then provides a detailed account of the fundraising, 
community engagement, and news and programming content of ESAT. It also points out 
the following: ESAT’s organizational identity; its reach on its various online platforms; its 
potential audience and its most important stories; the tone of its journalism; its 
limitations; and the Ethiopian government reactions to ESAT’s reporting. 
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Chapter V provides basic background information about OMN. It presents background 
to the factors that led to the rise of OMN in the United States. It answers the key 
questions that pertain to OMN’s identity, its history, how is it funded, where its 
journalists are, where it is watched/available, and what its notable moments since its 
establishment are. OMN’s coverage of the Oromo protest garnered significant attention. 
It had the highest viewership and accolades of any other episode in the channel’s history. 
With extensive access, resources, and connections in Ethiopia’s largest region, Oromia, 
the channel became a primary source for the Ethiopian public and other media outlets, 
trying to make sense of historic protest in Ethiopia. This chapter reviews its news and 
programming and how OMN covered the Oromo protest.  
Chapter VI builds on the theoretical discussion of a transnational public sphere and 
starts the analysis of the empirical data. It explains how ESAT and OMN contribute to 
the formation of transnational communicative space in the Ethiopian context. As we learn 
from chapter four and six, ESAT and OMN’s role in restructuring public discourse and 
publicizing political debates beyond their traditional enclaves is undisputed. The practical 
manifestation of the roles of ESAT and OMN is what this chapter is trying to demonstrate. 
The political impacts listed in this chapter are the practical manifestations of ESAT and 
OMN and they respond to the research questions this project set out to answer.  
Chapter VII presents the third results chapter of the research. It presents the analysis and 
discussion of the news reporting and feature programming of ESAT and OMN on the 
protest that rocked Ethiopia for more than three years. News items (n=238), are analyzed 
in three parts according to three separate reporting periods. Within each section, the 
analyses of quantitative and qualitative results demonstrate the two frames–pan-Ethiopian 
nationalism, and Oromo nationalism embedded in the news items–in order to answer the 
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following question: what frames did ESAT and OMN choose to report on the protest 
that was started in Oromia and later progressed to other part of the country? Furthermore, 
comparisons between ESAT and OMN are made to explore not only the difference 
between themselves in relation to the frames they choose, but also the differences 
between the three selected periods.  
Chapter VIII is the last chapter. It juxtaposes the research questions presented in 
Chapter one against the data presented in the last three chapters. It also highlights the 
implications and draws conclusions from the findings of this study. The findings, where 
applicable, are compared to existing theoretical formulations in order to discover 
patterns, themes, key issues, nuanced divergences, and new insights. Since this 
dissertation is ultimately about the nature and consequences of ESAT and OMN, I draw 
connections between my finings and the theory of transnational public spheres. I also 
show the limitations of the study and recommend areas for future research. 
 
A Note on Translation  
For data collected through interviews with the journalists and employees of ESAT 
and OMN, I have translated the statements of my informants and represented them as a 
direct speech in English, even though the statements were made in Amharic or Afan 
Oromo. For the data I have used for discourse analysis of the news coverage of the ESAT 
and OMN, I have translated their news coverage after I have transcribed them in the 
sources language in a summarized version. The reader should keep in mind that the 







THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter provided a contextual background for the study. It included 
the synopsis of Ethiopian history, a brief account of Ethiopia’s media landscape, and a 
preliminary analysis of the role and significance of the Ethiopian diaspora media within 
broader Ethiopian media landscape. In order to situate my research in pertinent literature, 
I will outline the main scholarships about diaspora, transnationalism, and framing theory 
in the following chapter. While diaspora and transnationalism will build on what I have 
laid out in the first chapter as a foundation for the preliminary analysis of ESAT and 
OMN, the theoretical concept of framing will lay the foundation for a discussion of the 
study’s research question that inquires about ESAT’s and OMN’s framing of political 
events in Ethiopia. 
 
Diaspora and Transnationalism 
Faist (2010) discusses how the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism have 
served as theoretical frameworks through which migration and shifting of state 
borders across populations are researched. According to Faist, those researches have 
focused on delineating the origin and reproduction of transnational social formations 
and macro-societal contexts in which these cross-border social formations have 
operated, such as ‘globalization’ and ‘multiculturalism’ (2010). As he contends, both 
terms refer to cross-border processes, while diaspora refers to migrant groups living 
outside of their homeland, and transnationalism denotes the ties that both migrants 
and organizations such as NGOs have across countries. Although diaspora and 
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transnationalism are occasionally used interchangeably, the two terms reflect 
different intellectual genealogies.  
Relative to diaspora, transnationalism has historically attracted little scholarly 
attention from researchers. While diaspora has been used widely in numerous academic 
studies over the last few years, there is a growing profusion of scholarly interest in 
transnationalism. This is partly a consequence of both popularity and the expansion of 
transnational communicative spaces that it enables, evidenced in the flourishing of 
several internet and satellite communications technologies. Although many scholars have 
robustly and carefully captured the emergence, constraints, motives, practices, prospects, 
singularities, and dominant thematic preoccupations of diaspora and transnationalism 
there are no universally agreed conceptions of what these terms mean. As Faist has noted, 
striving for exact definitions of terms such as ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnationalism’ may 
seem a futile exercise. But Faist, quoting Wittgenstein (2009), suggested that the 
essence of concepts can be inferred from how they are used. Hence, in the following 
section I will give a brief overview of the two concepts.  
 
Diaspora  
Rooted in migration studies, the uses and meanings of the term diaspora have 
undergone dramatic changes. Initially, the concept denoted the historic experience of 
Jews. However, since the 1970s, ‘diaspora’ has been used with diverse applications 
and interpretations. For instance, in the early 1990s, the African Union extended the 
use of the term to refer to people of African origin living outside the continent. Most 
application of the term can be characterized by three main features, each feature with 
its own meta meaning. The first characteristic feature relates to the causes of 
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migration or dispersal. Older notions of forced dispersal refers to the experience of 
Jews and the experience of people of African origin through slave trade. Newer notions 
of diaspora often refer to both forced and voluntary forms of dispersal such as trade 
(Cohen 1997). The second feature of the term links cross-border experiences of 
homeland with destination. Older notions clearly imply a return to an (imagined) 
homeland (Safran 1991). An example is homeland-oriented projects meant to shape a 
country’s future by influencing it from abroad or by encouraging return (Fiast, 2010). 
A great number of studies about Ethiopian diaspora (Lyons 2006, Levine, 2008, 
Solomon, 2007) apply this notion of diaspora. However, of late, scholars have 
replaced the idea of ‘returning to an imagined homeland’ with ideas of dense and 
continuous linkages across borders (Faist, 2008). The addition of the continuous 
linkages emphasizes lateral ties of the diasporic community with their ‘imagined 
homeland’. Such broader uses of the term can speak of a diasporic experience of all 
mobile persons as ‘trans-nation’ (Appadurai 1996). In this context, the application of 
the notion of diaspora demonstrates the fact that the older uses of the term refers to 
both ethnic and religious groups or communities. The final characteristic feature of 
the notion of diaspora concerns the integration of migrants and/or minorities into host 
countries. Older notions of diaspora suggest that its members do not fully integrate 
with the society of the host countries–that is, they are at the political, economic, 
cultural margins of the host countries. This notion of diaspora is also often associated 
with boundary maintenance by a dominant majority through discrimination against 
diaspora groups. Assimilation would mean the end of diaspora, whether ethnically or 
religiously defined (Fiast, 2010). Newer notions of diaspora emphasize cultural 
hybridity in the wake of ‘dissemination’ (Bhabha, 1994). In line with older notions, it 
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seems that diaspora implies some sort of cultural distinctiveness of the diaspora vis-
à-vis other groups.  
As I have shown above, the older and newer notions of diaspora are not 
always well-matched. Yet, this tension may also constitute an opportunity to raise 
questions for further analysis. First, newer notions of the diaspora denote any form of 
migrations or dispersal, which blurs the distinctions between various kinds of 
international migrations. Fiast (2010) mentions the differences between voluntary and 
forced forms of migration as an example. Next, the importance placed on return to 
one´s ‘homeland’ is substituted by dense and continuous transnational ties. The 
addition of dense and continuous transnational ties to the notion of diaspora raises 
important questions about changing forms of diaspora membership in the countries 
of origin and destination. In this dissertation, I have adopted this concept of diaspora, 
emphasizing that the Ethiopian diaspora have a deep, continuous, and dynamic tie 
with their country of origin.  
 
Transnational 
While the term ‘diaspora’ denotes a community, –and has been frequently 
used in migration research, history, and media studies–concepts such as 
transnationalism–and transnational spaces, fields, and formations–refer to processes 
that transcend borders and therefore appear to describe more abstract phenomena 
(Faist, 2012). The term transnational spaces implies a constant, lasting, and dense 
sets of ties between at least two reaching sovereign states (Fiast, 2012). Transnational 
spaces comprise combinations of ties and their substance, positions within networks 
and organizations, and their networks of organizations that cut across the borders of 
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at least two national states (Faist, 2000b). When the term was first coined by 
migration researchers, the emphasis was on the grassroots activities of immigrants 
across borders as being something distinct from the dense and continuous relations 
of macro-agents, such as multinational or transnational companies. In this sense, the 
term ‘transnationalism’ builds upon–yet is distinct from–transnational relations in the 
political science sub-discipline of international relations as it differs from that usage 
in its focus on non-state actors (Portes, 1996). Transnational, non-state agents–
prominently but not exclusively migrants–are defined as crucial agents (Faist, 2012). 
The country of origin, country of destination and the migrants themselves thus create 
a triangular social structure, which can be expanded through the inclusion of 
countries of onward migration. In this multi-angular structure, the element of migrant 
formations covers a host of organizations and groups. It includes migrant 
associations such as hometown associations, religious communities, and employer 
organizations (Fiast, 2012). In this sense, diaspora and transnationalism have 
similarities. In sum, the two notions and their studies overlap and intersect. Tölölyan 
(1991: 5) describes the intersection of diaspora and transnationalism eloquently, 
saying they are, ‘the exemplary communities of the transnational moment’. 
As I have shown in the first chapter, the Ethiopian diaspora media have 
significant presence in the Ethiopian public sphere. Since diaspora and transnationalism– 
which are the core constructs of this dissertation–have varied and are sometimes hotly 
contested significations in the Ethiopian media context, it is appropriate to give a brief 
historical context in which these are used in academic and political debates. The next 
section therefore discusses the meaning and application of these two terms in the context 
of media studies. 
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The Ethiopian Diaspora Media Context  
Media that is produced outside the boundary of Ethiopia (homeland) by people of 
Ethiopian origin are variously called: ‘diaspora’, ‘exiled’ ‘ethnic’, ‘immigrant’, 
‘transnational,’ and ‘opposition’ media. The most common of all these terminologies is 
diaspora media, a broad tent term that is generally understood to refer to media that is 
produced outside the bounds of Ethiopia(homeland). Often times, the term ‘diaspora 
media’ is used interchangeably with the other terminologies (exiled, ethnic, immigrant, 
transnational, and opposition), but there is a crucial difference among them in the 
Ethiopian context. These terms reflect different premises, interests, and political agendas. 
Since clarification of these elusive terms is vital for theoretical purposes, I will briefly 
explore noteworthy distinctive terminologies that merit mention. 
The distinguished sociologist, Donald Levine, who researched Ethiopian diaspora, 
characterized Ethiopian media produced abroad as ‘diaspora media,’ while maintaining 
the expansive sense of the term that denotes media that is produced by Ethiopian 
nationals living outside of their homeland (2011). According to Donald Levine, primarily 
digital Ethiopian diaspora media ‘deterritorialized’ Ethiopian politics, culture, and 
economics. They were used to maintain strong sentimental or material links with the 
homeland. Other key works on the subject have attempted to build upon Donald Levine’s 
characterization of Ethiopian diaspora media. Worth mentioning are the study of Terje 
Skjerdal (2009) on Ethiopian diaspora digital media and the research of Nancy J. Hafkin 
(2011) on how Ethiopian diaspora use digital technologies to maintain strong links with 
the homeland. Both researchers have deployed diaspora media as a site for 
‘deterritorialised’ politics and culture. Skjerdal in particular has pointed out the 




Meanwhile, Getahun (2007), considered Ethiopian diaspora media as an ‘exiled 
media’ that has transformed the participants from being purveyors of ‘long distance 
nationalism’ into ‘ethnic minority’ press in United States. He argues that as Ethiopian 
immigrants settled in the United States or as the homecoming was no longer feasible, the 
diaspora media focused on the needs of Ethiopian immigrants in the United States. In 
fact, Getahun’s characterization of Ethiopian diaspora media generally coincides with 
Robert Park’s definitive characterization of ‘immigrant press’ of the 1920s. Robert Park, 
a renowned American sociologist, concluded in his seminal research that immigrants 
‘maintain contact and understanding between the home countries and their scatted 
members in every part of the United States of America’ (p. 55) through their press. There 
are few Ethiopian diaspora media that can be markedly included in this vein. For 
instance, Amharic language newsletters, magazines, and community radios that are 
‘focused on the concerns and interest of immigrant populations’ of Ethiopian origin can 
be considered an immigrant media or an ethnic press. Most of these periodicals and radio 
programs are lifestyle, education and business oriented, and they focus on the needs of 
immigrants and/or naturalized citizens in the United States. The distribution and 
circulation of this press tends to follow the settlement pattern of Ethiopian community in 
the United States. Historically, Ethiopian immigrants are highly concentrated in 
Washington D.C., Los Angeles, Seattle, Atlanta, Oakland, Minneapolis, and Dallas 
metropolitan areas. Within each of these metropolitan regions, Ethiopian immigrants run 
newspapers and rent radio air time from local radio stations to broadcast information 
pertinent to the Ethiopian immigrant communities of varying sizes. While these media 
organizations can be considered as an ethnic or immigrant press of Ethiopian diaspora 
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community, they are not the subjects of my research, as their focus is confined in the 
needs and interest of the Ethiopian immigrant community in United States. 
Tellingly, Getahun also specified the exilic character of the Ethiopian diaspora 
media as a transient feature that morphed in to an ethnic minority press as Ethiopian 
immigrants settled into life in the United States. However, many of the newspapers that 
sprung up in the early 1990s, such as the Ethiopian Review, Ethiopian Tribune, and 
Ethiopian Register, remained as exiled media until their interruptions and or replacement 
with online publications. Largely, the purpose of these publications was to provide 
information and opinion about Ethiopia, to change or solidify opinions about politics, and 
to assist in raising funds for political groups–although mostly their distribution is limited 
within the confines of Ethiopian diaspora communities in the United States. Quite 
strikingly, over the last few years, the term ‘exiled media’ has become popular among 
Ethiopian journalists. The term is usually invoked to mobilize support for journalists that 
are forced out of Ethiopia or for press freedom projects in Ethiopia. However, classifying 
the Ethiopian diaspora media as ‘exiled media’ solely on the basis of their reach and 
purpose may function for supporting Ethiopian exiled journalists, but does not function 
well for studying the Ethiopian diaspora media that have become a primary vehicle for 
Ethiopian immigrant community in the United States to influence politics from afar.  
Yet again, there is a shift in meaning of diaspora media when one speaks of 
opposition politics in Ethiopia. Given many journalists and opposition politicians were 
forced into exile after the contentious 2005 parliamentary elections, the new twist in the 
meaning of diaspora media is not necessarily surprising. However, it is also important to 
mention that the antipathy to diaspora media is one of the hallmarks of Ethiopian 
government. ESAT and OMN are chief among the various Ethiopia diaspora media that 
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are ostensibly labeled as ‘opposition media’ by the government and its supporters. 
Apparently, Ethiopia’s diasporic media is oppositional in character in a sense that it 
competes against the government in Ethiopia. Although the leading diaspora media 
organizations such as ESAT and OMN do not have an overt allegiance to a particular 
political party, they are sympathetic towards some political parties and movements that 
the government considers hostile.  
These characterizations of Ethiopian diaspora media are not without merit, but 
they fail to take full account of the influence of diaspora media in Ethiopia. Much of the 
research on Ethiopian diaspora media centers on ‘deterritorialisations’ of Ethiopian 
politics, modes of communication, and their assimilation or anti-assimilationist functions. 
The studies make little or no attempt to link Ethiopian diaspora media with the influence 
on Ethiopians back home. I consider this significant, given the intimate relation the 
Ethiopian diaspora have with Ethiopian politics. Furthermore, the use of these terms often 
overlaps and are sometimes even interchangeable. Therefore, it may be imperative to 
qualify its uses for the context of this research. 
My research essentially concentrates on the influence of the diaspora media on 
Ethiopia’s political process. This demarcation is necessary to provide a clear focus for the 
study. As a result, I propose to use diasporic transnational media to show the dense and 
continuous linkages the Ethiopian diaspora has created through their media organizations. 
The addition of the term transnational is paramount here. While the term ‘diaspora’ 
refers to the Ethiopian migrant communities that are settled in the United States, 
transnationality captures the dynamics and the strong interconnectedness that the diaspora 
community in the United States have created through their media that links to the politics 
in their country of origin. Indeed, one of the most striking features of Ethiopia’s diaspora 
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media is that its natural target is toward political engagement is their country of origin. 
Transnationaity also attributes some form of neutrality better than terms such as 
opposition or exiled media. Hence, I have adopted the term for my study.  
The term ‘transnational public sphere’, another core construct for my research, 
emerged out of transnationality and has also varied, having sometimes hotly contested 
significations; hence, it is appropriate to precede with the contextualization of 
transnational public sphere. The next section, therefore, discusses the meaning, history, 
application, critiques, and limitations of the concept of transnational public sphere that 
undergirds this research. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
Definition and Application of Transnational Public Sphere  
I have adapted the theory of transnational public sphere to examine the emergence 
of ESAT and OMN, two main diaspora media organizations, as a means of practicing 
journalism, seeking ‘liberty,’ and (re)constructing identity from afar. I use the term 
transnational public sphere both as a descriptive and analytical category.  
First, transnational public sphere is used as a descriptive category to refer to an 
arena where several transnational entities such as NGOs, diaspora groups, terrorist groups 
etc. communicate with each other. Scholars have designated different terminologies to 
this kind of ‘discursive arenas that overflow the bounds of both nations and states’ 
(Frazer, 2007). For example, Crack (2007) listed ‘global,’ ‘cosmopolitan,’ ‘international,’ 
and ‘virtual’ sphere/s before she characterized them as ‘extraterritorial public spheres’. 
Anthropologist Michel S. Laguerre deployed it as a ‘diasporic public sphere,’ in which a 
diasporic community ‘discusses its project for the homeland and the diaspora, interacts 
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with host land and the homeland government officials and politicians, and reflects on its 
contribution to society’ (2005). Similarly, Mehta calls it the site where ‘political visions 
of homeland are articulated, celebrated, and actively realized’ (2014). This certainly is 
the loose sense of the term that refers to transnational public sphere as an arena where a 
wide range of people, including immigrants, refugees, and exiled communities, 
participate in a discursive practice that goes from their host land to their homeland.  
The second use of the term is as a conceptual apparatus that invokes Habermas’ 
work on the ‘public sphere.’ The ‘public sphere’ was outlined in his detailed account of 
the development of European bourgeois public culture, from the early literary salons and 
periodicals of the eighteenth century, through to the advent of the capital-driven mass 
media of the twentieth century (Habermas, 1962). It refers to the expanding of the 
Habermasian classical notion of public sphere to explain the discursive practice that goes 
beyond national borders with the discourse that participants belong to different nations, 
states and political communities. In this context the classical notion of public sphere is 
scaled up to encompass ‘residents of distinct places (states or localities) and members of 
transnational entities’ (Guidry et al., 2000: 7–8). In this sense, the transnational public 
sphere is used as a type of public sphere that implies the inclusion of the interlocutors as 
members of a political community, with equal rights to participate in political life with 
the purpose of reaching a solution (Frazer, 2005). While this sense of the term could be a 
pertinent analytical construct to aid in explaining diasporic media, it cannot be taken 
without qualification because “it will not be sufficient merely to refer to such public 
spheres in a relatively casual commonsense way” (Frazer, 2005). Rendering those 
qualifications, Frazer argues that when classical public sphere is linked to the nation-state 
structure, they are rendered unusable to study transnational political arenas. Fraser 
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identifies six elements that are taken for granted in the Habermasian public sphere: 
modern state structure, territorially bounded political community, national economy, 
national media, and linguistic and cultural homogeneity. However, current mobilizations 
of public opinion go beyond national borders, they are not necessarily covered by 
national media, the interlocutors do not belong to a bounded political community, and 
targets of protest are often trans-territorial.  
In classical theory of public sphere, public opinion is considered legitimate 
when it is inclusive of all citizens, and efficacious when citizens can translate their 
communicative power into binding laws (Frazer, 2009). That is, public sphere must be a 
platform that allows all citizens of a country to publicly debate through media and other 
institutions to identify social problems and suggest possible solutions that would end up 
as a binding laws. However, the transnational public sphere is regarded as a sphere that 
does not contain these two elements of Habermasian public sphere: legitimate public 
opinion, and the ability to translate their communicative power into binding laws. 
To avoid the conceptual flaws of transnational public sphere, I have supplemented 
the framework with empirical analysis that is firmly grounded in a concrete political, 
social, and historical context. It examines the roles that Ethiopian diaspora media play in 
the transnational public sphere. Rather than adopting transnational public sphere as a 
mere discursive arena, I argue that it is necessary to examine the Ethiopian diaspora 
media in the framework of the transnational public sphere. It attends to the ‘legitimacy’ 
and ‘efficacy’ critiques of the transnational public sphere because the focus of Ethiopian 
diaspora media is still on ‘local’/domestic issues, such as corruption, political repression, 
and human rights abuse within Ethiopia. Another running parallel to this is the ‘intrusion’ 
of the Ethiopian State into the realm of Ethiopian diaspora media, thus blurring the 
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boundary between Ethiopia and the diaspora. Here it is important to mention that in 
December 2016, a panel discussion organized by pro-government groups in Washington 
D.C. alluded to the possibility of launching a pro-government diaspora media in the 
United States.  
Therefore, a transnational public sphere in the Ethiopian context must be seen as a 
sphere that is inter permeable to a degree that displays the characteristic features of the 
Habarmasian public sphere. However, it is also important to mention that regardless of 
the significant presence of ESAT and OMN on the Ethiopian public sphere, they do not 
possess ‘legitimate public opinion’ and ‘efficacious communicative power’ in order to 
directly influence life and politics in their homeland. Furthermore, their presence in the 
Ethiopian public sphere is largely dependent on global information infrastructure such as 
satellites and the internet, enabling their capacity to circumvent Ethiopia’s government 
restrictions. Nevertheless, the influence of ESAT and OMN are evinced in Ethiopia in 
terms of government reactions to their discursive practices. For example, the Ethiopian 
government frequently accuses ESAT and OMN for instigating political 
instabilities and spreading false rumors during the political protest that lasted for about 
four years from 2014-2018. It went even further by passing a law preventing people from 
watching these two TV channels. It also tried to fend off the reception of ESAT and 
OMN by jamming their airwaves and confiscating satellite dishes from citizens in 
Ethiopia. Transnationally, Ethiopian government uses its economic and diplomatic power 
to prevent ESAT and OMN from broadcasting. The administrative personnel of ESAT 
and OMN accuse the government of Ethiopia of pressuring satellite service providers– 
such as the French company, Eutelsat, and the Egyptian company, NileSat–to remove 
ESAT and OMN from their satellite systems. Here it is useful to employ Nick Couldry’s 
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flexible and functional characterization of the Habermasian public sphere (2007). 
Couldry argues that rather than focusing on the definition of transnational public sphere, 
it is better to study how transnational processes affect public spheres at different levels of 
locality, leading to a trans-territorial network of discursive practices. It is also necessary 
to consider the discursive practices, particularly the journalistic engagement and identity 
(re)construction, of ESAT and OMN, as well as the responses of the Ethiopian 
government. The tensions, struggles and interplay between ESAT and OMN and the 
Ethiopian government contribute to the realizations of Ethiopian diaspora media in the 
context of the transnational public sphere. Thus, this study uses transnational public 
sphere as a basis for the exploration and understanding of Ethiopian diaspora media. In 
doing so, it contributes to the theoretical understanding of the structures and functions of 
the transnational public sphere through empirical analysis of the Ethiopian diaspora 
media.  
Along with the exploration of the emergence of ESAT and OMN in the 
transnational public sphere and their adversarial relationship with Ethiopian government, 
this inquiry seeks to gain insight into the nature of news frame construction by ESAT and 
OMN. As this pursuit necessitates an overview of framing and frame analysis, I will 
highlight them as a theoretical framework for the analysis of ESAT’s and OMN’s 
representation of political events in Ethiopia. In the following section, I will give a 






The concept of framing is generally considered vague and muddled with several 
conceptualizations. Some scholars suggest that because framing has been applied to a 
wide variety of fields of study–such as management and organizational studies, social 
movement research, and media studies–there is no ‘general statement of framing theory’ 
(Entman, 1993:51). It was introduced to media studies by Erving Goffman (1974) as 
‘principles of organization which govern events […] and our subjective involvement in 
them’ (Goffman, p.10). In other words, frames are embedded in the process of 
communications.  They are not consciously created but they are instinctively adopted 
during a communications process (Koenig, 2009). 
Deviating from Goffman’s (1974) conceptualizations of framing, Entman is 
largely regarded as the originator of framing in media and communication research. He 
defined it as a thought that is deliberately adopted and manufactured to highlight specific 
aspects of a reality during a course of communications. He wrote, 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation. (1993:52) 
In addition to conceptualizing framing, Entman suggested that in framing theory, 
salience is ‘achieved by highlighting bits of information through placement, repetition, 
and associating them with culturally familiar symbols’ (p.53). This infers a question that 
enquires about the process of selecting and highlighting the ‘aspects of a perceived 
reality’, whose answer determines the outcome or effect of the framing. Therefore, 
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framing in journalism is a conscious and deliberate selection of ‘aspects of a perceived 
reality’. Wolfsfeld, (1997) another scholar who has written widely on framing and 
journalism, took Entman’s line of thinking even further. He argues that journalists 
routinely pursue a narrative that fits between incoming information and existing frames in 
an interactive process. Strengthening Entman’s framing theory, Reese (2001) 
systematized framing into two types: cognitive and cultural framing. In cognitive 
framing, media outlets persuade their audiences to think of a certain phenomenon in a 
certain way by highlighting certain aspects of the event. Cultural framings are deeper in 
their significance and they have a longer-term effect in audiences’ understanding and 
values. Both ‘cognitive and cultural frames’ are consciously constructed. This contrasts 
with Goffman, whose frames enhance rather than limit audiences’ reception and 
understanding of information. 
 
Elements that construct a frame and frame analysis  
For Entman (1993), frames are ‘manifested by the presence or absence of certain 
keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that 
provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements (p.52). Correspondingly, 
Gitlin (1980) described frames as ‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and 
presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely 
organize discourse’ (p.7). For Stuart Hall (1996), a frame is composed of ‘mental 
frameworks–the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems 
of representation–which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense 
of, figure out and render intelligible the way society works’ (p.26). How these bits and 
 
54  
pieces of information are assembled in a narrative manner within a specific media gives 
power to framing and decides how audience understand the information.  
Research approaches that analyze media use of “stock phrases, stereotyped 
images, sources of information, and sentences” to ascertain “persistent patterns of 
cognition, interpretation, and presentation” of certain topics is generally referred to as 
frame analyses. In order to answer the third question posed in chapter one I, will adopt 
Entman’s conceptualizations of framing as a theoretical framework. It suits ESAT’s and 
OMN’s characteristics of journalism practice, which involves active and deliberate 
selection of certain frames in order to meet their organizational principles of news 
coverage that is strongly affected by Ethiopia’s political and social context, as discussed 
in the first chapter. 
 
 Frames, Ideology and Journalism  
Frames are entrenched in existing ideologies, albeit to varying degrees. Framing 
requires tapping and exploiting the ideologies that they are grounded in. Hackett (1984) 
says that media researchers should study ideology in the news instead of objectivity and 
bias. He also suggests that frame analysis is a useful approach to media studies by going 
beneath the surface of news coverage and disclosing the underlying implications and 
assumptions. Explaining the difference between framing and bias, Hackett contends that 
framing is more complex and sophisticated than the cognitive psychological perspective. 
According to Hackett, framing goes beyond dual representation of a reality. It defines a 
situation or an event and creates a discourse or a conversation around it. Furthermore, 
framing often operates in a concealed manner, with powerful effects in influencing 
audiences’ points of view without their knowledge. ‘Much of the power of framing 
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comes from its ability to define the terms of a debate without the audience realizing it is 
taking place’. (Tankard, et al. (2001:97)  
Van Dijk (1998) introduced a new concept of ideology as ‘the interface between 
social structure and social cognition … ideologies may be very succinctly defined as the 
basis of the social representations shared by members of a group’ (p.8). That is to say, 
ideology provides some resources for framing activities in order to serve the interests of 
certain groups. Explaining the relationship between ideology and framing, Snow and 
Benford (1992) wrote that the ‘framing process involves, among other things, the 
articulation and accenting or amplification of elements of events, experiences, and 
existing beliefs and values, most of which are associated with existing ideologies’ (p.9) 
Journalism is based in ideological social practices. It is also crucial in the 
formulation and sustaining of ideologies. Journalists constantly decide which “events, 
experiences, existing beliefs, and values” to include or emphasize when reporting a story. 
These decisions create a frame that both supports the story (like the frame of a house) and 
defines what belongs inside (like a picture frame), and thereby signals what news 
consumers should find important (Tiegreen, and Newman, 2012). This makes journalism 
an exercise of filling ‘frames’ with ‘a pattern or set of ideas, assumptions, beliefs, values, 
or interpretations of the world by which a culture or group operates’ (Foss, 1996:291). 
These all are products of ideologies. In other words, framing is the approach of 
constructing elements with a certain logic to make sense of the dominant ideology 
(Bhaskar, 1989). Eder, (1996) in his book, The Social Construction of Nature: A 
Sociology of Ecological Enlightenment, suggested that ‘Discourse analysis looks at the 
medium in and through which frames are constructed and reconstructed’, thus ‘frames are 
the micro-units of a discourse analysis’ (p.166).  
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Taxonomy of Frames  
Over the last two decades, scholars have expounded on a variety of frames, or 
how frames can be categorized. Neuman et al. (1992) contend that the news media draw 
upon four main frames in their coverage of issues: conflict, human interest, morality and 
economics. Such generic frames serve to organize the presentation of a story in terms of 
deciding which dimensions of an issue to emphasize. According to Semetko and 
Valkenburg (2000), conflict frame looks at a conflict between individuals, groups or 
institutions. Human life stories are the main focus of the human-interest frame. Economic 
consequences frame the concerns with issues regarding benefits or costs related to 
individuals, groups, institutions, regions, or countries (p.95). Frames can also be divided 
as ‘episodic’ or ‘thematic,’ (Iyengar, 1993, p. 369) based on the focus of their content. 
However, more potent classifications of frames can be found among social movement 
scholars. According to social movement scholars, frames can be categorized as ‘master 
frames’ and ‘sub frames’. A master frame refers to a generic frame that has a resounding 
effect on collective actions. A master frame has a broader scope and influences social 
movements more than a specific collective action frame (Snow & Benford, 1992). That is 
to say, while most collective action frames are context specific (e.g., pro-life frame, pro-
choice frame, environmental justice frame, etc.), a master frame's articulations and 
attributions are sufficiently elastic, flexible, and inclusive enough so that any number of 
other social movements can successfully adopt and deploy it in their campaigns. It was 
originally introduced to understand ‘resonant framing techniques’ of protests that emerge 
in authoritarian political environments. Since the concept of framing was widely adopted 
in the study of media discourses, master frames have emerged in empirical media studies 
research as well. Hence, I have employed the concept of master frames to reveal the 
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similarities and differences of framing (frame analysis) by ESAT and OMN in their 
reporting on political protest in Ethiopia.  
 
Master frames  
As I described above, master frames can achieve what other types of collective 
action frames can achieve, but on broader scale. For the master frames, their 
punctuations, attributions, and articulations “may color and constrain those of any 
number of movement organizations” (Snow and Benford, 1992:138). Hence, specific 
collective action frames derivate from master frames, which are generic. Specifically, 
“master frames can be construed as functioning in a manner analogous to linguistic codes 
in that they provide a grammar that punctuates and syntactically connects patterns or 
happenings in the world” (p.138). In relation to flexibility of the master frame, the first 
step is the attributional function. As the first step of framing process, collective action 
frames serve as an accenting device to identify an unjust, immoral, existing condition that 
deserves corrective action (Snow and Benford, 1992). Subsequent diagnostic attributions 
by identifying the problems and prognostic attributions are made “by suggesting both a 
general line of action for ameliorating the problem and the assignment of responsibility 
for carrying out that action” (p.:137). Master frames perform this function in a similar 
way, but on a macro scale. They “provide the interpretive medium through which 
collective actors associated with different movements within a cycle assign blame for the 




Principal Master frames of Ethiopian Media Discourses 
The set of master frames I have deployed in my frame analysis are frequently 
used in media discourses. They appear in the forms of ethno-nationalism and 
civic/political nationalism (Billing, 1995; Eder, 1995; McAdam, 1996; Gamson, 1992). 
They are based in the discourses of nations and nationalism. Anthony Smith 
conceptualized these two concepts of nations as Western/civic nation and non-
Western/ethnic nation. The civic nation points to a territorial nation. In other words, 
‘nations must possess compact, well-defined territories…People and territory must, as it 
were, belong to each other’ (Spencer and Wollman, 2005:178). The civic nation is also “a 
community of laws and institutions with a single political will” (Spencer and Wollman, 
2005:178). The laws and institutions are centralized within the community. Finally, it 
claims that the nation is made up of various races, colors, creeds, genders, languages, etc. 
It is “civic” because it emphasizes the equal rights of citizens as well as democratic 
political practices and values. In the context of the Ethiopian media discourse, civic 
nationalism is articulated in terms of Pan-Ethiopian nationalism, although it has Amhara 
and Tigrayan roots, as I have described in Chapter one. By contrast, ethnic nationalism 
historically considers nationhood as homorganic and it defines the individual by their 
inherited roots, rather than the laws that are made in the nation to which they belong 
(Lecours, 2000). In Ethiopian political context, Oromo nationalism, among other 
nationalisms, is a good example. I will expound on how these two master frames are 





METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY  
Introduction  
In this chapter, I will discuss the methodology that I have adopted for my 
empirical work. First, I will begin with describing my sampling technique, followed by a 
detailed description of the research design. Then, I will briefly lay out the theoretical 
underpinnings of quantitative content analysis, critical discourse analysis, and frame 
analysis as well as discuss how these three methods work together as a whole. In real 
practice, the data are analyzed in three steps. First, quantitative content analysis gives 
general answers to questions regarding the differences and similarities between ESAT 
and OMN in framing political events related to Ethiopia. Particularly, what are the 
differences between ESAT and OMN reporting on several rounds of political protests that 
shook the country for more than three years (May 2014 to October 2017). In the second 
step, I analyze transcripts of video packages from ESAT and OMN on a textual level, 
from journalistic context to political context, in order to explore the different ideologies 
behind news reporting. The last step is frame analysis. Based on the results from the other 
two methods, frame analysis is used to explore how the two struggling forces–Oromo 
Nationalism and pan-Ethiopian Nationalism presented as two contrasting frames in media 
discourses within a broader socio-political context–are adopted in news reporting. The 
last section of the chapter shows the procedure of how the three research methods are 





Chronology of Events 
In April 2014, students in Ambo–a town located 80 miles west of the capital city, 
Addis Abab–began to march, protesting the Ethiopian government’s plan to expand 
Addis Ababa into the territories of Oromia, the largest of nine ethnically federated 
Ethiopian states (HRW, 2014). In May and June of the same year, they were joined by 
students from other towns in Oromia. Ethiopian authorities clamped down on student 
protests with force, killing at least 30 students and arresting hundreds before they were 
able to put a break on the spiraling protest (Amnesty International, 2014). The crackdown 
succeeded in dampening the protest, but not for long. After just a year of hiatus, in 
November 2015, the protest resumed in Ginchi, another town located 70 miles west of 
Addis Ababa (Chala, 2015). In Ginchi, students had more localized demands, asking 
local authorities to halt leasing out a protected forest and land owned by their school for 
private individuals. For the second time within a year, security forces opened fire and 
killed several demonstrators. Since then, the protests spilled over into greater parts of 
Oromia. The cause of the protests came full circle, returning to the demands that students 
made in their first protest in Ambo in April 2014. Following these two successive 
protests in Ambo and in Ginichi, the country lived on a knife’s edge for a year. 
Particularly, the protest that broke out in Ginchi had greater political significance. It 
ushered in an unprecedented eleven months of political uprising and unrest that engulfed 




I have analyzed sample story items and punditry analysis (packages) of television 
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programs containing any reference to the protest. They are usually described as 
#OromoProtest on social media and appear between November 12th, 2015–the day the 
protest started–and August 31st, 2016, which marks the day that the Ethiopian 
government started to take drastic measures against the protesters. It then declared a state 
of emergency on October 9, 2016. The protest that was started in Ginichi on November 
12th, 2015 is generally considered to be a follow-up to the protest that was started in 
Ambo in May 2014. This indicates that the two protests have a common cause. As such, 
it is logical to focus on the incidents that have happened after November 2015. 
Since the protest occurred during specific stretches of time, I have divided the 
protest period into three protest waves. The first wave of the protest from November 12th, 
2015 to February 28th, 2016, includes the beginning of the protest in Ginichi and a series 
of protest incidents that happened in western Oromia throughout the next four months. 
The second wave of the protest, March 1st, 2016 to May 30th, 2016, is when the protest 
started to engulf Oromia. The third wave of the protest is from June 1st, 2016 to August 
30th, 2016. This is when the protest started to occur in the Amhara region with messages 
of solidarity voiced in Oromia. Activists in Oromia declared a national day of protest 
called the Grand Oromo Rally. It took place in more than 50 towns across Oromia on 
August 6th, 2016 (Opride, 2016). Although these waves of protest are unequal in duration, 
they are designated to represent the major events that occurred throughout the protest. To 
have a wide-ranging representation of events, at least one critical event from each wave is 
included in the sample. The first event was the initial protest demonstrations that started 
in Ginichi on November 12th, 2015, which ushered in an insistent period of protest for 
almost a year. The second is the widely-publicized ‘Grand Oromo Rally,’ a national day 
of protest that took place in more than 50 towns across Oromia on August 6th, 2016. The 
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third event is the protest done by prominent Ethiopian Olympian marathon runner, Feyisa 
Lilesa, who won the silver medal and showed a protest sign by crossing his wrists over 
his head at the finish line during the Rio Olympics (Iaccino, 2016).  
The choice of the events is not arbitrary. These were events identified as critical 
junctures in the entire duration of the protest. Contrary to the daily violence, daily 
demonstrations, and repeated slogans–to which ESAT and OMN found repeated answers, 
interpretations, and analyses–singular events ‘distinguished for selective inclusion in an 
analysis’ (Krippendorff, 2004, p.98) highlight the protest. The events provide practically 
on-the-spot readings that tend to be more revealing in terms of lexicon, sources of 
information, and rationale employed to explain the out of the ordinary occurrences. 
Furthermore, I picked these events because each lent itself to different and opposing 
interpretations, pushing to the surface the distinctive elements that portray bias. Besides 
being critical junctures of the protest, these events have certain characteristics in 
common. First, compared to other Ethiopia-related news, these three events are popular in 
terms of coverage in ESAT and OMN, as well as in international media in the same 
period (Lefort, 2016). Secondly, horizontally speaking, the four events cover economic, 
political, social, and cultural dimensions of the protest. Vertically speaking, the events 
will reveal how the frames of ESAT and OMN changed over time. Last, by selecting the 
three big events of the protest, this research fills a gap in the current research on diaspora 
media representation of political events in Ethiopia.  
The population of the sample is the whole range of the protest archives from 
YouTube and Vimeo channels by ESAT and OMN. As I have explained in the previous 
chapters, ESAT and OMN are primarily free over satellite television channels. Most of 
their broadcasts are also readily available on their YouTube and Vimeo channels, helping 
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them to complement their satellite broadcasting program. ESAT, created its channel on 
April 8th, 2010, and now boasts having more than 100,000 subscribers and more than 
ninety-six million views of its channel. OMN launched its YouTube channel on January 
19th, 2014 and has more than 20,000 subscribers with more than eleven million views. 
Together, ESAT and OMN roughly define the borders of the present space for political 
discussion in Ethiopian online media.  
Mostly, ESAT and OMN put the same program items on their YouTube channels 
that appear on their satellite television channels. The videos they store on their YouTube 
channels include news anchors reading reports, breaking news stories, daily news 
programs, programs that feature exiled academics, their editorial staff, and frequent guests. 
These videos represent the main news broadcasts of the most widely watched programs. 
Of late, both ESAT and OMN also started to upload videos of interviews and punditry 
analysis from their Facebook Live videos. They have been uploading their videos since 
they have launched their satellite broadcasting. ESAT and OMN provide more extensive 
content archives making it easy for researchers to access their materials on their YouTube 
channels. 
Both ESAT and OMN have large archives of videos devoted to covering the 
protest as they were recorded by citizen eyewitnesses and participants. These videos were 
either exclusively sent to ESAT and OMN, or they were posted by the citizens 
themselves on social media. ESAT and OMN broadcast these videos through their 
satellites, incorporating them into their news broadcasts. I have selected 238 videos to be 



















1st Wave Protest 
11/12/15 – 02/28/16 
Incident 1: The 
Master Plan Protest  30 35 65 
2nd Wave Protest 
03/01/16 – 05/30/16 
Incident 2: The Small 
Rallies of Spring  35 28 63 
3rd Wave Protest  
06/01/16 – 09/01/16 
Incident 3: Feyisa 
Lelisa Protest at Rio 
Olympics  
50 60 110 













Definitions and Procedures  
In the following section, I will highlight some general points about the definitions 
of quantitative content analysis with emphasis on the purpose and procedure of content 
analysis. Berelson (1952) wrote a definition of content analysis as a research method for 
the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the evident content of 
communication. It is credited by some as familiarizing content analysis as a research 
method. However, other scholars have defined quantitative content analysis both before 
and after Berelson’s renowned definition of content analysis. For instance, Holsti (1968) 
stated that it is any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively 
identifying specified characteristics of messages. More recently, describing the method in 
terms of its basic function, Krippendorff (2004) defined it as ‘a research technique for 
making replicative and valid inferences from data to their context’ (p.21). Based on the 
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three definitions with different emphases, a more comprehensive definition can be made 
as follows: 
Quantitative content analysis is the systematic and replicable examination of 
symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to 
valid measurement rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those values 
using statistical methods, in order to describe the communication, draw inferences 
about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production 
and consumption (Riffe et al., 1998, p20). 
 
For all of these definitions, the focus has been exclusively on quantitative 
description of communications content. Indeed, the very name ‘quantitative,’ implies the 
statistical nature of the method. The name carries a sense of epistemological 
underpinning within communications research that makes use of statistics for broader 
inferences about the processes and politics of representation’ (Deacon et al., 2007:119). 
However, quantitative content analysis is the first stage of textual analysis, as it sketches 
out a general picture of main features of selected media texts. It only counts what is in the 
coverage, rather than the implicit meaning of the content. It does not explore the internal 
meanings and relationships between texts, but only provides general answers to certain 
research questions and functions as a filter to justify the sample and selected dataset for 
further in-depth analysis, such as discourse and semiotic analysis. Similarly, Gerbner 
(2002) argued that content analysis aims to produce ‘a big picture’ (delineating trends, 
patterns and absences over large aggregates of texts). So, it is a method which suits 
the analysis of general meanings rather than deep inferences. With the sole purpose of 
quantifying the salient and manifest features of ESAT’s and OMN’s coverage of the 
protest, I deployed quantitative content analysis at the start of my empirical study. This 
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sets the stage for critical discourse and framing analysis. The following steps will show 
how the content analysis as a method will be carried out in my empirical work. 
 
Producing a Coding Book: Step 1 
First, I have produced a coding book which is composed of two research 
instruments: a coding form, and a coding manual. As I have specified earlier, my 
sampling period encompasses four protest waves, with each wave comprising at least one 
critical episode of the protest. All protest waves share the same coding form. For the four 
critical protest incidents selected as critical junctures of the protest, I have prepared a 
coding manual. The coding form is a sheet covering all the variables designed for the 
study. In a typical content analysis study, at least four textual dimensions–who appears, 
how they appear, evaluative features, and interpretive dimensions–are coded (Deacon et 
al.,2007). All protest waves share the same coding form and the same variables. They are 
included as follows: 
 Story Date  
 Story ID 
 News outlet: ESAT vs OMN 
 Duration in minutes  
 Headline  
 Prominence  
 Type of Story  
 Broad Story Topics/ Themes  
 Actors 
 How the actor appears 
 
The second research instrument–the coding manual–includes detailed categories 
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for each protest incident selected as critical junctures of the protest. For example, 
regarding the protest in Ginichi: Addis Ababa Master Plan was the main focus of the 
protest. The emphasis of the Grand Oromo Rally was demanding the release of political 
prisoners who were arrested during the first wave of the protest. The remaining protest 
incidents, although thematically related, have their own exclusive demands. Hence, 
specific categories are designed for each protest incident and assigned to the different 
characteristics of each protest incident.  
 
Collecting Data: Step 2 
After setting up my coding instrument, I set out to download news packages, 
programs, and features from the online platforms of ESAT and OMN. As I have 
explained earlier, both ESAT and OMN have developed YouTube and Vimeo channels 
as alternative platforms to their satellite broadcasting services. Based on my sampling 
frame I have downloaded 238 videos from their respective YouTube and Vimeo 
channels. Since the greatest number of the packages are available on their online 
platforms, downloading the videos is a straight forward process albeit, time consuming. 
However, it is not always simple and easy when filling the categories with data.  
 
Coding Procedure: Step 3 
With regard to story selection for coding, all stories pertaining information on the 
protest in Oromia, or #OromoProtest, as it is commonly referred to in social media, have 
been coded. In order to be classified as an #OromoProtest story, the words ‘Oromo’ or 
‘Oromia’ had to be mentioned explicitly at least once in the story. As I have explained in 
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this chapter, all stories have been coded on the same sub-set of variables. If the story was 
an OromoProtest story, coding continued for another #OromoProtest-specific subset of 
variables. In order to be selected as critical junctures of #OromoProtest, names such as 
‘Addis Ababa Master Plan’, ‘Grand Oromo Rally’, or ‘Feyisa Lelisa’s protest at Rio 
Olympics’ had to be mentioned at least once in the story. In total, 238 stories have been 
coded. While downloading the videos, I have watched and re-watched a significant 
number of the videos, which helped me get acquainted with the data. This, in turn, 
facilitated the coding process. All Amharic stories are coded by two coders in close 
cooperation with myself, the principal investigator. Both coders of Amharic stories are 
native speakers, but I have coded all of the Afan Oromo stories by myself, since the other 
coder does not understand this language. Afan Oromo stories were coded with only one 
coder due to a lack of resources. However, given that the primary focus of my 
quantitative content analysis–producing a big picture–does not require advanced 
statistical interpretation, one-person coding is reasonable. An inter-coder reliability test 
based on a subset of Amharic packages was conducted and yielded satisfactory results. 
The unit of analysis and the coding unit was each distinct story. Coding was conducted 
electronically on excel spreadsheets in which coders entered their codes, storing all data 
automatically. 
 
Analyzing Results: Step 3 
For data analysis, I used Microsoft Excel spreadsheet software. The first step is 
putting individual variables with data from the general and specific OromoProtest case 
studies under their appropriate columns. Then, I run the spreadsheet software with three 




For generating frequency tables, the results are presented with names like ‘overall 
frequencies of reporting by media sources: ESAT and OMN’, ‘overall frequencies of 
themes by ESAT and OMN’’, etc. Cross-tabulations provide more complex findings by 
analyzing more specific aspects of the data or comparing different datasets. Both 
generating frequency tables and cross-tabulations are used in the content analysis part of 
my research. They are used in general measures of tendency and in the comparison 
between ESAT and OMN in order to answer the initial research question of the 
differences between ESAT and OMN in relation to their effort in covering political 
events in Ethiopia.  
 
Problems with Content Analysis 
Content analysis as a research method consistently encounters several problems. 
Key among them is what I call ‘conjectural problems’. In his seminal book, Berelson 
(1952) wrote “content analysis is ordinarily limited to the manifest content of the 
communication and is not normally done directly in terms of the latent intentions which 
the content may express nor the latent responses which it may elicit” (Berelson, p.262). 
By using the term ‘manifest,’ Berelson emphasizes that content analysis does not discern 
the basic assumptions that underlie and define a content. Instead, content analysis 
assumes that “the relationship between intent and content or between content and effect 
can validly be made, or the actual relationships established [...]” (Berelson, p.264). 
Another assumption that is essential to content analysis is the study of the manifest 
content. Berelson further comments, “content be accepted as a ‘common meeting-ground’ 
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for the communicator, the audience and the analyst” (Berelson, p.264).  
Almost all discussions of content analysis emphasize the method's application of 
statistical application. Statistical methods are applicable to any area of communications 
research and are, therefore, useful. What this indicates is that meaning is universally 
present. This possibility, as one of Berelson’s main concerns, that content analysis 
assumes that the “quantitative description of communication content”, is meaningful. 
This is to say, frequency of occurrence of various characteristics of the content is itself an 
important factor in the communication process (Berelson, p.265). 
Berelson’s argument about the ‘conjectural problems’ of content analysis 
provides a solid foundation for the integration of quantitative content analysis with other 
methods. More practically, quantitative content analysis as a standalone method cannot 
answer why ESAT and OMN adopt different frames to report on political events in 
Ethiopia. The fact that some specific key words appear more frequently on ESAT over 
OMN does not mean ESAT is more concerned about the protest in Oromia than OMN or 
vice versa. Deciding if the event is significant for certain media also depends on how it is 
reported, such as what perspectives and descriptions are used. This is why quantitative 
content analysis is also used as a filter to identify ‘valuable’ items for further analysis. 
But content analysis is unable to answer questions such as why ESAT and OMN have 
different ways of reporting political events in Ethiopia. So, linguistic analysis and 
analysis of larger outside influences is important. In order to answer why ESAT and 
OMN have different ways of reporting political events in Ethiopia, I have adopted 




Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
As noted above quantitative content analysis has limitations. The question of why 
ESAT and OMN have different ways of reporting political events in Ethiopia will be 
answered by applying the method of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). I shall begin by 
defining ‘discourse’ and ‘discourse analysis,’ followed by a discussion of theories and 
practice of discourse analysis. Then I will briefly show how I will do the actual practice 
of discourse analysis in the empirical section of my research.  
By its nature, discourse spans a multitude of disciplines, philosophies, and 
methodologies. This, of course, allows for a variety of definitions, be they philosophical 
or methodological. The definitions I present here reflect some of those wide viewpoints. 
Schiffrin (1994) classified the definitions of discourse into two broad categories: 
structuralist and functionalist. According to structuralists, discourse is generally defined 
as a unit of language, specifically, as a unit of language that is bigger than a sentence. 
Given, this definition of ‘discourse,’ it is now possible to discuss discourse analysis itself. 
The first of these is the emphasis on a unit of language bigger than a sentence. 
Structuralist discourse analysis is an analytical research that primarily studies cohesion, 
narrative, causality, and motivation within a text. In this context, a text is everything 
(may be a magazine article, a television interview, or a conversation) that is meaningful 
in a particular situation. Richardson says, “Theorists who adopt this first definition of 
discourse tend to look at the features which link sentences together; the formal features 
which make two sentences ‘a discourse’ rather than just two unconnected phrases” 
(Richardson, 2007, p.22). 
From the perspective of functionalists, discourse is viewed broadly as a social 
phenomenon. Van Dijk (1997) defines ‘discourse’ as “a practical, social and cultural 
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phenomenon,” and though there are various elaborate functionalist definitions of 
‘discourse’ available, Van Dijk’s conceptualization of discourse has the most important 
concepts for discourse analysis. By using the terms such as ‘practical’, ‘social’ and 
‘cultural,’ Van Dijk emphasizes that ‘discourses’ are not just structures. For example, 
“language users engaging in discourse accomplish social acts and participate in social 
interaction, typically so in conversation and other forms of dialogue” (p.2). In a similar 
vein, Brown and Yule (1983) argued that discourse analysis is “the analysis of language 
in use. As such, it cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic forms independent 
of the purposes or functions which these forms are designed to serve in human affairs” 
(p.1). The preceding discussion of functionalist view of discourse analysis has shown that 
functionalists attempt to understand how people use language. Therefore, if a researcher 
adopts this definition of discourse, they tend to understand how language is used.  
Both structuralists and functionalists focus on texts, although they differ in their 
approach towards discourse analysis. Structuralists see discourse as a form, while 
functionalists see it in terms of its use. Some scholars call structuralists and functionalists 
as textual linguists. For instance, Halliday said that ‘text’ is everything that is meaningful 
in a particular situation: “By text, then, we understand a continuous process of semantic 
choice” (1978, p.137). In the ‘purely’ textual linguistic approaches, –such as the 
cognitive theories of text–texts are viewed as “more or less explicit epi-phenomena of 
cognitive processes” (Tischer et al., 2000,p.29) while ‘context’ plays a secondary role. 
However, text and context must be viewed as two kinds of information that contribute to 
any kind of communicative act. Schiffrin wrote:  
I will use the term “text” to differentiate linguistic material (e.g. what is said, 
assuming a verbal channel) from the environment in which “sayings” (or other 
linguistic productions) occur (context). In terms of utterances, then, “text” is the 
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linguistic content: the stable semantic meanings of words, expressions, and 
sentences, but not the inferences available to hearers depending upon the contexts in 
which words, expressions, and sentences are used. […] Context is thus a world 
filled with people producing utterances: people who have social, cultural, and 
personal identities, knowledge, beliefs, goals and wants, and who interact with one 
another in various socially and culturally defined situations (1994,p.363). 
 
According to Schiffrin, to do a discourse analysis, one must study both text and 
context. Every text encapsulates a context in which the text is produced that is not simple 
and linear, but complex and multi-layered. One field of discourse analysis that involves 
the study of both text and context is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Critical 
Discourse Analysis, a research method from a critical perspective, pays equal or more 
attention to language use in relation to social conditions, political ideologies, and cultural 
aspects. Critical Discourse Analysis considers discourse as a practical, social and cultural 
phenomenon but it “links linguistic analysis to social analysis” (Woods and Kroger, 2000, 
p.206). What this means is that Critical Discourse Analysis offers interpretation of 
meanings of texts and situates what is said in the context in which it occurs. Hence, for 
my research, I adopt Norman Fairclough's work on Critical Discourse Analysis. Unlike 
other critical discourse theorists who treat all social practice as discourse, Fairclough 
confines the term ‘discourse’ to language and images. Fairclough starts with the texts and 
gradually builds towards understanding how societal power relations are established and 
reinforced through language use. This has significant differences from van Dijk’s 
(1993,1997a,b) social psychological model of discourse analysis, which focuses on how 
mental structure of preconceived ideas shape news production. Comparatively, 
Fairclough’s discourse analysis makes reference to historical, social, and ideological 




Norman Fairclough's Theories of Critical Discourse Analysis 
For Fairclough,  
to fully understand what discourse is and how it works, analysis needs to draw out 
the form and function of the text, the way that this text relates to the way it is 
produced and consumed, and the relation of this to the wider society in which it 
takes place (Richardson, 2007, p.37).  
 
He defines critical discourse analysis as a systematic approach which seeks to explicate:  
Often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive 
practices, events and texts and (b) broader social and cultural structures, relations and 
processes […] how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically 
shaped by relations of power and struggles over power […] how the opacity of these 
relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and 
hegemony (Fairclough 1993, p.135; reprinted in Fairclough 1995a, p.132f). 
 
Hence, the aim of discourse analysis is to shed light on the relations between the 
actual language used, and the wider social and cultural contexts (Titscher et al., 2000). In 
order to put discourse analysis into practice, Fairclough has constructed an important 
analytical framework. In the past, this analytical framework has been used for empirical 
communications research. According to this model, every instance of language use is a 
communicative event consisting of three dimensions: text, discourse practice and socio-
cultural practice. Fairclough, also identified three basic procedures of critical discourse 
analysis. It starts with textual analysis and then uses analysis that sheds light on the links 
between texts and societal structures (power, political, and cultural). Fairclough 
suggested a critical discourse analysis should condense:  
1. description of text (in my case ESAT’s and OMN’s coverage of #OromoProtests), 
2. interpretation of the relationship between text and interaction, and  
3. the wider social practice to which the communicative event belongs (2001). 
For Fairclough, text analysis alone is not sufficient for discourse analysis, as it 
does not shed light on the links between texts and societal and cultural processes and 
 
75  
structures. An interdisciplinary perspective is needed that combines textual and social 
analysis. Fairclough’s three-dimensional model reproduced in Figure 3.1 represents an 
interdisciplinary perspective on analytical framework for my empirical research. 
 
Figure 3.1. The Analytical Framework of Critical Discourse Analysis  
 
(Fairclough, 2001, p.21) 
 
From the picture above, we can see that the first analytical focus of Fairclough's 
three-part model is a text. In Fairclough’s sense of the term, analyzing a text means a 
deeper linguistic analysis that involves a study on vocabulary, grammar, semantics, the 
sound system, and cohesion-organization of a unit of text (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 57). 
Fairclough also views text from a multifunctional perspective in the sense that any 
sentence in a text can be analyzed in terms of the articulation of these functions, which he 
calls representations, relations, and identities (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 58). To avoid the 
impossible task of translating complex linguistic features of Amharic and Afan Oromo 
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texts into the English language, I have adopted the multifunctional perspective for my 
analysis. Hence, my analysis aims at  
1. Representations and recontextualizations of OromoProtests in ESAT and OMN 
2. Constructions of identities on ESAT and OMN (for example, in terms of what is 
highlighted during the protest–whether status and role aspects of identity, or 
individual and communal aspects of identity) 
3. A construction of the relationship between ESAT and OMN and the protesters in 
Ethiopia (for instance, formal or informal, close or distant) (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 
58) 
Second, the process of text production (example editorial procedures of ESAT and 
OMN) and interpretation is not only cognitive as suggested by van Dijk. It is also 
determined by social ‘context’: “they are socially generated, and their nature is dependent 
on the social relations and struggles out of which they were generated” (Fairclough, 200, 
p.20). This social context is made up of three levels of social conditions: the level of the 
social environment in which the discourse occurs; the level of social institution which 
constitutes the discourse; and the level of the society (Fairclough, 200). Hence, my aim in 
applying Fairclough’s three-part model of analytical framework is to show the social, 
historical, and political contexts in which the Ethiopian diaspora media report on events 
in Ethiopia. This approach “justifies the use of CDA rather than purely descriptive, data-
driven approaches which are epistemologically inadequate in accounting for the complex 





Discourse as Social Practices 
As I have explained in the previous paragraphs, Fairclough (1995a) suggested that 
for a broader understanding of discourse as a social practice, textual analysis is not 
sufficient because discourse works in combination with other forces (often these forces 
are called non-discursive elements)–e.g. historical, political, and ideological–to constitute 
a social practice (p.57). Analyzing the non-discursive elements of social practice might 
require “different levels of abstraction from the particular event: it may involve its more 
immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is 
embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture” (Fairclough, 
p.62). Luke (2002) argued that, 
[...] what texts 'do' in the world cannot be explained solely through text analysis or 
text analytic language. To reiterate, the actual power of the text, its material and 
discourse consequences, can only be described by reference to broader social 
theoretic models of the world (p. 102). 
 
Hence in order to set up the broader social context for the textual analysis of 
ESAT’s and OMN’s coverage of #OromoProtests, I have briefly introduced the 
historical, social, and political contexts in which the Ethiopian diaspora media operates. 
The non-discursive elements represent moments of every social practice, which are in a 
dialectical relationship with each other. For instance, the social context cannot exist on its 
own, but is constituted by discursive elements such as journalism. The work of 
journalism is also influenced by the social context. Hence, the social context is deeply 
produced and structured within the non-discursive elements and each element has its own 
logic and is influenced by discourse practices such as journalism. As suggested by 
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Richardson, “society and the social formation–that is, the historic, economic, political 
and ideological features of society–forms a backdrop that both structures and enables the 
work of journalists” (Richardson, 2000, p.43). The dialectical relationship between 
society and journalism is to say that society influences journalism in various ways, “from 
the constitutive effects of ideology, social structures, social power, other agencies and 
institutions to the values and preferences of the target audience” (Richardson,2000). 
Journalism, on the other hand, uses its power to enforce or resist social movements. 
Therefore, “social practices surround and shape the work of journalists, meaning that an 
analysis of the social practices of newspaper discourse requires the analyst to look 
outside the text and examine the relationships between journalism and the social 
formation as a whole” (Richardson, 2000). 
 
Discursive Practice 
The discursive practice dimension of a communicative event consists of both the 
processes of text production and text consumption. Since my research aims to answer 
how ESAT and OMN cover political events in Ethiopia, my research involves only the 
first part of discursive practice dimension: text production. This stage of critical discourse 
analysis focuses on how the two media outlets covered #OromoProtests under a wider 
journalistic and social condition. Hence, the texts about #OromoProtests, shaped by their 
producers, represent the ideology, identity, and their relationship with the event–
#OromoProtests. According to Fairclough (2001), since “the values of textual features 
only become real, socially operative, if they are embedded in social interaction, where 
texts are produced and interpreted against a background of common-sense assumptions 
 
79  
which give textual features their values”, the texts and social structures together are 
coherent (p.117).  
As a central claim of Fairclough’s CDA model, intertextuality is understood as an 
interpretive analysis that draws from earlier events. It refers to the influence of history on 
a text and to a text’s influence on history, in that the text draws on earlier texts and 
thereby contributes to historical development and change (Kristeva, 1986 p.39; quoted in 
Fairclough 1992b, p.102). For Fairclough, the notion of intertextuality has two 
constructs: external and internal intertextualities. External intertextualities are variables 
that are related to other broader issues. As Blommaert (1999) stated: “Every text 
incorporates, reformulates, reinterprets or re-reads previous texts, every act of 
communication is grounded in semantic and pragmatic histories which are not simple and 
linear, but complex, multi-layered and fragmented” (p.5). The internal intertextuality 
shows variables that are limited within the text presented in the media report. In my 
analysis I will highlight both kinds of intertextualities. 
 
Material Selection and Analytical Procedure 
Selected Materials  
Having given the theoretical underpinning of CDA, I will now proceed to outline 
the selection and application of specific CDA analytical tools, research procedures, and 
selection of materials for my critical discourse analysis. From the four protest incidents 
selected as critical junctures of the protest, I chose headlines and news contents that 
would provide context for the descriptive content analysis. Hence, headlines, news 
contents and punditry analysis of OromoProtests are the three major parts of the story 
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items selected for analysis. My objective is to show how exactly I have applied such 
analysis to the empirical work.  
 
Headlines 
Both in Amharic and in Afan Oromo television, news headlines take similar 
forms. They both have a similar tradition of using one or two independent sentences. 
Some may involve a visual accompaniment or news presenters reading headlines straight 
on camera. They always come at the beginning of news bulletins and indicate the 
essential information about the news of the day. In other words, they define the situation 
and evaluate it. Hence, the headlines not only sum up the information of the event, but 
also give ideological implications. In Ethiopian tradition of television news reporting, 
journalists usually tell stories by injecting their opinions. They use various strategies such 
as identity description to insert their opinions in the news bulletins. ESAT and OMN 
usually use specific identities to describe political groups or a person. When used in 
headlines, these kinds of strategies lead to ideological implications, which might bias the 
perception of their audience. “They summarize what, according to the journalists, is the 
most important aspect, and such summary necessarily implies an opinion or a specific 
perspective on the events” (van Dijk, 1991, p.51). 
 
News content 
The textual analysis of news contents in this thesis is composed of two major 
sections. First, I will analyze the selection of words, metaphors, and the referring of 
social actors. I will examine how they cooperate with each other in the news in order to 
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establish the relations between the social actors who are referred to and the social context 
they are associated with. The ‘ideological square’ is a popular strategy often used by the 
journalists. It was developed by Teun van Dijk, who suggested that it is “characterized by 
a Positive Self-Presentation and a simultaneous Negative Other-Presentation,” which 
emphasizes the positive characteristics of ‘Us’ and de-emphasizes negative 
characteristics of the ‘Other’. Through this framework, the world is perceived and 
represented based on where the reporter stands.  
The second section is presupposition. Beside analyzing what is ‘there’ in the texts, 
it is also important to “be sensitive to absences from the text, to things which might have 
been ‘there’, but aren’t” (Fairclough, 1995a, p.106). Presupposition is between the 
absence and presence of what is in the texts and taking for granted that the information 
which is ‘unsaid’ exists and is given to readers, or that the readers have established 
certain knowledge on a specific subject. 
 
 Transcription  
I transcribed the videos before I translated them into English. All the videos I 
have selected for CDA are in Amharic, while the news contents are in both Amharic and 
Afan Oromo. As Ochs (1979) shows, the process of transcription contains interpretation 
of the spoken language (Fairclough, 1992b, p.229), thus I have attempted to minimize my 
subjectivity by presenting the headlines and the content of the news and the analysis as 
they are. As I stated earlier, my aim is not to do a detailed analysis on the linguistic 
features of the headlines and the news content, thus I have adopted Gail Jefferson’s 
simple transcription system. Gail Jefferson’s simple transcription system shows a 
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sentence for both the headlines and the content of the news. It also shows pauses, silent 
periods, and overlaps between speakers in the punditry analysis videos selected for 
critical discourse analysis (see, for example, Potter and Wetherell 1987; Wetherell and 
Potter 1992).  
 
Analysis  
Fairclough proposes a number of tools for analyzing text as text, and for analyzing 
text as discursive practice. In his book, Doing discourse analysis: methods of studying 
action in talk and text, he suggested: 
1) “Play with the text. Ask how it would read if a particular item (word, phrase, etc.) 
were omitted, phrased differently (i.e., consider substitutions), or combined with some 
other item…consider syntax: How would the text read if the sequence of two items were 
reversed (e.g., a compliment comes after rather than before a request)?” (p.93). 
 
2) “Look carefully at how the text is structured, shaped, and ordered in both individual 
segments and overall, because structures are ways of achieving both content and 
function” (p.93). 
 
3) “Part of the analyst’s task is to describe and analyze the ways in which participants 
treat categories. Similarly, comparison is not only an essential activity of the analyst (e.g., 
comparing a participant’s formulations of an event in different contexts); it is also a 
device used by participants (e.g., a participant employs a comparison as justification for a 
particular judgment)” (p.94). 
 
4) “It is important (although often difficult) to consider what is not there (in terms of both 




5) “Assume that a focus on the literal meaning of an utterance or text may be the least 
helpful analytic strategy; concentrate on what the speaker or writer is doing, how that 
segment is related to other segments, and so on; consider also the possibilities of irony. 
This does not mean the complete neglect of literal meaning; rather, we need to ask how 
the literal meaning is used to do something, how it is related to what is done, and so on” 
(p.92), 
 
6) “You do not need to be a linguist or grammarian, and your goal is not to identify 
linguistic or grammatical features. However, grammar is important to the social workings 
of discourse, and attention to grammatical features can help to identify those 
workings…the emphasis is on the social implications of grammatical features” (p.94-95). 
 
7) “In a sense, all of the ideas that you can muster will constitute your analytical 
resources. It is important to remember that you come to discourse analysis as a member 
of the culture, as a speaker-hearer and writer-reader of the language. This raises some 
dangers, but it also means that you can draw on your own knowledge. Discourse analysis 
is not like studying rocks. Rocks do not change under the gaze of the investigator in the 
way that people do under the scrutiny of a social scientist. As elsewhere, the critical 
feature is not how you come up with patterns, interpretations, and so forth, but how you 
justify your identification of patterns, how you ground your interpretations” (p.95). 
Additionally, due to the intertextual characteristic of news reporting, a news 
article always involves either quotations in the form of information and comments, or 
background information (Fairclough, 2003). Therefore, it is more important to investigate 
how the previous messages occur in the current news reporting rather than just simply 
stating its existence. 
 
Frame Analysis  
As I discussed in the second chapter, the frames of ESAT and OMN are 
 
84  
analyzed based on Entman’s theory, which involves an active and intended selection of 
frames. ESAT and OMN choose their frames to meet their organizational principles. 
Since frames have social and political origins, frame analysis might require broader 
research that is not limited to textual analysis. According to D’Angelo, (2002) two of 
the main purposes of frame analysis are identifying thematic units knows as frames and 
investigating the precursor conditions that produce frames (p.873). This suggests that 
frame analysis goes beyond linguistic textual analysis and provides broader social 
relations and structures that are included within media texts. However, textual analysis 
is still the fundamental foundation upon which all other wider analysis is built. This 
explains why frame analysis works hand in hand with other methods; it is often 
integrated with other quantitative and qualitative textual analysis methods (Downey and 
Koenig, 2006). But in practice, it is usually difficult to explicate the underlying social 
relations and structures, as they are usually subtle. To achieve this, there are two 
questions frame analysis needs to answer: 
1) With particular passages operating within these stages of the narrative as well as 
contributing to the sense of a sequenced development of the story as a whole, 
what makes the text hang together as a narrative with a beginning, middle and 
end? 
2) What assigns each part of the news text– the events described, the quotations 
used, the outcome forecast, and so on– its position within the hierarchically 
ordered progression of the narrative? (Deacon et al. 2007:183) 
These questions imply that frame analysis is an advanced stage of thematic 
analysis, but it should not be distinct from the discourse analysis. Discourse analysis 
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and frame analysis should work together to explain how the news text is constructed. In 
my analysis, I use the “spotlighted facts and sources” strategy to investigate how ESAT 
and OMN use frames to report on political events in Ethiopia. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Entman’s work suggests that media 
producers deliberately select information to highlight or ignore from a news item. 
Similarly, this strategy is applied to sources. It can be analyzed from two aspects. One 
is the quantitative aspect. For van Dijk (1983), the construction of news is “most of all 
a reconstruction of available discourses” (p.28). Journalists often use other sources 
when they cannot witness news events. It is important to explore if there is any 
preferred other source adopted and the frequency of its appearance. The other is the 
qualitative aspect. The emotional reference attached to a certain fact needs to be 
investigated through concrete analysis. 
1. Prioritized value 
This can be analyzed in two steps. The first step is to “identify the stance taken 
and the values advanced by each source, and then plot out the relative position each is 
given in the overall sequence as this is arranged in the explanatory order, from the ‘who 
did it’ initiating summary, downwards through the representation of the main events, 
circumstances, possible consequences and comments” (Deacon et al. 2007:184).  
 
Interviews 
In this section I provide a description of interview as a data collection method. 
The 20 interviews I conducted with journalists and employees of both ESAT and OMN 
are entirely based on qualitative interviewing techniques that are semi-structured and 
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open-ended. They were individual and in-depth, often taking between 30 minutes and an 
hour. My interview with ESAT took place at ESAT offices in Washington D.C. I was 
initially able to access the organization through my contacts in the organization. In the 
summer of 2017, I spent about seven days there to interview employees and journalists 
who work at ESAT. Since I had developed personal connections with the staff, it was 
easy for me to set up my own appointments with personnel based in Washington D.C.. 
The interviews in Washington D.C. started in July 2017, and I was able to conduct a 
follow up interview in October 2017. I conduced my interviews with the staff of OMN 
through Skype. The OMN interviews were conducted largely in the Fall and Winter of 
2017. 
While conducting the interviews, I documented the process. I always identified 
myself as a researcher, informed interviewees that they can stop at any moment, and that 
they could access the transcripts and manuscripts later on if they had any concerns. My 
research was described to them as emphasizing the institutional operations of ESAT and 
OMN in general, and that I was interested in writing about these two media outlets as an 
essential part of the story. I have audio recordings, or notes of the interviews when 
participants preferred they not be recorded. I prepared basic questions and topics, but 
treated the list as more of a flexible “interview guide,” rather than a rigid “schedule” 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 194-5). I modified the questions and approach for particular 
media outlets and different employees to find out more about the work they engaged 
with. My questions for both ESAT and OMN staff tended to focus on their mission, 
organization structure and culture, their performance, their assessment of their 
distribution, and who they imagine the audience to be. I also took a flexible approach to 
determine what was important to them. The staff of both ESAT and OMN represented 
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several departments and specializations, but most were journalists or editorial staff. 
Others worked in programs for fundraising and website design. 
Two issues inherent to the use of interviews as a method concerned me: 
trustworthiness, and determining that the number and sample of interviews are sufficient. 
Trustworthiness is a fundamental issue, especially given that my participants are strategic 
actors whose work could possibly be impacted by my study. I use this term to refer to the 
accuracy of information conveyed in interviews. I tried to address this problem by 
triangulating–or cross-checking–facts with other sources (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). While 
certain facts were very difficult to triangulate–given the sensitivities required by 
competition and the necessity of organizational secrecy–the few that were not are noted 
in this study. As for knowing if the number of interviews were sufficient, one test 
proposed by Means Coleman explains that once the point of “redundancy is reached” in 
responses, (2000, 269) continued, focused interviewing will unlikely produce more 
information. 
Consistent with research ethics standards, I also provided interview subjects with 
a consent form, which stated their rights and my obligations as a researcher in order to 
ensure that no harm comes on any of my participants as a result of this research. 
Although most of my participants stated that they do not mind being directly quoted, a 







ESAT’S ORIGINS, IDENTITY AND POLITICS  
Introduction  
The most prominent political phenomena in the Ethiopian political scene 
during the last ten years is arguable the creation of a diaspora based Ethiopian 
Satellite Television channel–ESAT. ESAT beams news and political discussions 
from Washington D.C. and Amsterdam to Ethiopia 24 hours a day. Since its 
formation in 2010, ESAT has gathered significant contribution from the Ethiopian 
diaspora community and has altered the Ethiopian political scene. Priding itself as ‘an 
eye and ear of Ethiopians’ for diverse views, focusing on issues with broader political 
implications, ESAT has grown its prominence since it was created. Since its creation, 
the channel has been at the center of Ethiopia’s media scene. (HRW 2016). It has left a 
permanent mark on Ethiopia’s media scene and developed potential to influence public 
opinion in Ethiopian politics. At the same time, it is highly controversial. Both pro-
government and some opposition groups are critical of ESAT’s coverage and 
programming. Because of its critical stance on Ethiopian government, pro-government 
activists always regard ESAT’s coverage with skepticism. However, among 
Ethiopian diaspora community, ESAT has acquired an image as a channel for the 
‘voiceless’ Ethiopians. Away from the enthusiasm of those who champion it and the 
bitterness of those who criticize it, ESAT remains not only a phenomenon of 






ESAT has sources on the ground to capture some of the most important political 
events in Ethiopia, even before they were reported by Ethiopian State media. This 
coverage helped create an audience in Ethiopia and abroad. ESAT’s first big scoop came 
in 2012 when it reported about the disappearance and finally the declaration of the 
death of Ethiopia’s longtime leader Meles Zenawi. The channel has sparked a much-
publicized controversy, garnered much loathing from Ethiopian government, and 
attracted considerable praise from opposition forces. ESAT’s vigorous reporting on the 
protest that started in Oromia in 2014 has further garnered its image as a news leader in 
Ethiopia. Capturing videos and stories of the violence attracted the attention of Ethiopian 
viewers. The channel vastly outpaced the Ethiopian state TV channel Ethiopian 
Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) that previously dominated the domestic news 
environments. However, the Ethiopian government has always accused ESAT of 
arousing popular passions through over-dramatic coverage and glorification of political 
protests in Ethiopia. However, evidence suggests that ESAT is enormously popular 
among Ethiopian audiences and has severely undercut Ethiopian government’s narratives. 
To better understand ESAT’s influence on Ethiopia’s politics, it is useful to put its 
political economy, identity, its content, and its framing of political events in Ethiopia’s 
political and historical context. In this chapter, I evaluate ESAT’s maxim: “An Eye and 
the Ear of Ethiopians”; and its journalism, asking how objectively ESAT reports on 
Ethiopian political events as opposed to oppositional events. In the later part of this 
chapter, I will show how Ethiopian government’s antagonism to ESAT made its 
operations in a transnational setting difficult. The Ethiopian political context and the brief 
history of the Ethiopian private press presented in the first chapter are crucial in 
understanding ESAT’s beginning. 
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ESAT’S Beginnings  
 
ESAT’s history is intimately tied to the development of the Ethiopian diaspora 
community, a community that has grown in the United States and around the world since 
the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution. As described in the first chapter, following the 1974 
Ethiopian Revolution that brought the Derg military regime to power, thousands of 
Ethiopian political dissidents fled to Western countries. Although the Derg was defeated 
in 1991, exile has not stopped. Recent political conflicts and mobilizations have also 
produced yet another wave of migration of political elites. Particularly, the crackdown on 
members of the private press following the 2005 Ethiopian parliamentary election led to 
the exodus of hundreds of journalists and opposition supporters. Ethiopian exiles 
dispersed around the globe, but they most are primarily settled in Europe and North 
America. One result of such migration has been the emergence of news organizations 
founded and run by Ethiopian exiles. ESAT then came about as the result of two related 
political developments. The first was waves of migration of political dissidents that 
resulted from political conflict rooted in the causes of Ethiopia’s 1974 Revolution. ESAT 
is used, therefore, to give Ethiopians, who were on the losing side of the political conflict, 
some leverage in the formation of greater influence over public opinion. A second reason 
is a complete shutdown of independent and or opposition media inside Ethiopia. In fact, 
ESAT’s origin can be traced back to 2005. Prior 2005 the Ethiopian private press had 
thrived and journalists had developed an oppositional tone in reporting political events. 
However, most of the journalists were exiled following Ethiopia’s only democratic, yet 
controversial parliamentary election in 2005. According to CPJ, of hundreds of 
journalists who were exiled to the United States and Europe after the 2005 parliamentary 
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election, most were involved in intensive reporting on the process of the 2005 election 
that threatened the political power of the EPRDF.  
As for planning ESAT, the idea began in 2009. It found its first manifestation in 
different online publications, and then resulted in a satellite TV channel in April, 2010, 
after many months of working out its editorial policies, financial sources, and journalistic 
endeavors. The basic logic behind ESAT’s launch, according to its executive director, 
Abebe Gelaw, is the complete shutdown of free press in the country (Personal 
communication, 2017). He said ESAT was “supposed to operate in Ethiopia, but arrest 
and torture drove hundreds of journalists out of their country” (Personal communication, 
2017). In 2010, ESAT was launched after a series of fundraising events held across cities 
in the United States and Europe. A significant number of Ethiopian immigrant 
communities, exiled journalists, and opposition political groups donated an unspecified 
amount of money (ESAT, 2010). ESAT has risen immediately as a vibrant, critical, 
diaspora media organization that has entered into the Ethiopian public sphere via a 
transnational communicative space, thanks to exiled journalists–especially those who 
were exiled to England, Netherlands and the United Sates. Why did ESAT take off so 
quickly as a leading Ethiopian diaspora media? There are three key factors, which I 
provide as follows. 
First, it was able to exist because of the continuous financial support of Ethiopian 
diaspora community throughout the world. The strong support base of ESAT are 
opposition affiliated exiled politicians, journalists, and members of Ethiopian diaspora 
community (more on this on political economy section of ESAT). Second, ESAT’s 
commitment to hiring journalists who are exiled from Ethiopia–many of whom are in 
turn attracted to the first diaspora satellite outlet that have significant presence in 
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Ethiopia–was important in the channel’s take-off. In fact, what made this venture 
possible was the initiative of exiled journalists. ESAT’s earliest planners and its top 
officials who worked to form its operations were uniformly journalists who had either 
their own newspapers or worked in private newspapers in Ethiopia. Fasil Yenealem, who 
fled to Netherlands after he was persecuted for treason in Ethiopia, is ESAT’s key driver 
in Europe. He began working with ESAT in 2010. Similarly, Dereje Habtewold was a 
journalist with a private newspaper before he was forced out of Ethiopia during the post-
election crackdown in 2005. Sisay Agena, who has grown to be one of the most respected 
Ethiopian television journalist, came directly to ESAT after his newspaper business was 
refused to resume when he was released from prison in 2010. The domination of 
journalists who were forced out of Ethiopia in its earliest stage seemingly reflected 
ESAT’s journalistic identity. Seen from this vantage point, the key to ESAT’s success is 
having journalists who are chased away from Ethiopia and who have the freedom to 
work at ESAT. As such, ESAT enjoys unprecedented access to Ethiopia’s exiled 
journalist community with an unprecedented margin of freedom of speech. ESAT’s 
journalists interviewed for this research underline how ESAT has created an opportunity 
for them to remain in touch with developments in Ethiopia. Reeyot Alemu, an award-
winning journalist who was forced into exile in 2015 after she served a five-year term on 
terrorism charges said: “ESAT has given me a chance to report about Ethiopia’s political 
development from afar. It is an important media for my work for distributing information 
to Ethiopia” (Personal communication, 2017). Also, a key impetus in ESAT’s rise was 
the collapse of its predecessor known as Ethiopian Television Network (ETN) in 2008. 
The ETN initiative broke down due to its lack of a sustainable business model to operate 
as a non-political, entrainment diaspora television. This left many experienced Ethiopian 
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journalists, producers, and technicians in a position to re-think their model. Seizing the 
opportunity to staff their new endeavor, the more political and oppositional journalists 
corralled them to launch ESAT.  
Third, technology is the most important factor to ESAT’s origins. ESAT’s access 
to international communications infrastructure, such as satellite services and social media 
platforms, has proved crucial. The recent journalists and opposition exiles are better 
connected to their homeland than any of the exiles from the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution. 
In fact, ESAT’s success can be singularly traced to the flourishing of satellite dish 
distribution and increasing access to social media platforms in Ethiopia. The proliferation 
of satellite dish and social media platforms in Ethiopia seem to contribute to the rapid and 
prominent rise of ESAT in the Ethiopian public sphere. The combined effect of satellite 
and social media platforms, especially Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, is profound and 
multidimensional in the sense that it has given even more capacity for ESAT to easily 
seek audiences. 
 
Who Watches ESAT and Why: A Statistical Snapshot  
 
Over the last ten years, a sea of satellite TV dishes sprinkled the rooftops of most 
big cities of Ethiopia (The Economist, 2016). ESAT is considered one of the most 
popular channels, but actual audience figures for ESAT inside Ethiopia do not exist. 
According to Abebe, Ethiopians who have access to satellite tuned in to ESAT 
immediately after it was launched (Personal Communication, 2017). There are also 
evidences that show several diaspora satellite televisions are frequently used as a source 
of information in urban areas. Since conducting a cross national audience survey for this 
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research is difficult, I rely on surveys that are done for other purposes. In 2015, a survey 
commissioned by Kana TV, an Ethiopia based satellite entertainment television, has 
revealed that there are up to 18.5 million people watching satellite televisions every day. 
The survey was conducted by Ipsos Kenya, an affiliate of the Ipsos International market 
research group, and about 3,500 people took part across 12 major Ethiopian cities. Even 
though the survey seems most interested in measuring the ownership of satellite receivers 
and television sets, it can be inferred that satellite televisions are widely watched–albeit 
with interesting nuances between rural and urban areas. In urban areas satellite dish 
receiver ownership is about 77%. This means nearly four-in-five urban households in 
Ethiopia watch satellite televisions regularity. Meanwhile, 11 million people who live in 
remote parts of Ethiopia are satellite viewers (SmartMonkeyTV, 2016, The Reporter, 
2016). From the data, one can have a single overarching conclusion that satellite 
televisions are now an important sources of information in Ethiopia. Although the data 
have not revealed which satellite channels viewers watch in their household, the officials 
of ESAT reported that the content of the channel is watched like a soccer match in TV 
rooms that hold up to 150 people (Personal communication, 2017). They also claim that 
ESAT’s contents spread throughout Ethiopia using CDs and USB drives, even to tiny 
villages (Personal Communication, 2017). This reveals the potential for much larger 
audiences. 
There is a long and interesting history surrounding Ethiopians tuning in to foreign 
based satellite broadcasters for their information diet. National surveys have documented 
that Ethiopians tuning in to foreign based satellite broadcasters have increasingly become 
an integral part of their everyday life. For instance, in 2003, only 8% of young adults 
tuned in to foreign based satellite broadcasters, and that figure has steadily grown to 77% 
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by 2015. The shortwave radio Amharic service of the Voice of America and Deutsche 
Welle have been mentioned consistently as a source of information for millions of 
Ethiopians throughout the surveys. The new key element of this history is the emergence 
of satellite television service as a source of information, which first came into the 
Ethiopian media scene in 2007.  
ESAT’s reach to Ethiopia’s growing online communities is also a necessary part 
of its audience. ESAT has already made strides developing multiple online access points 
in pursuit of its stated aim to make its content available to as many people and as many 
platforms as possible. Hence, when it comes to online distribution, ESAT’s availability 
amongst Ethiopians with internet access is 100%. Over the last two years, access to the 
internet in Ethiopia doubled from 2.2 million to 4.5 million (Freedom House, 2016). For 
those without satellite receivers, ESAT’s online outlets such as its website, YouTube 
Channel, Facebook, and Twitter pages are the primary face of the organization. 
 
Website  
ESAT developed its website immediately after they began their satellite 
broadcasting. It is administered by ESAT’s information technology team and it features 
unique articles and opinion pieces, as well as blogs written by ESAT’s journalists in 
Amharic, Afan Oromo, and English. ESAT’s website carries news, program videos, and a 
livestream media player that lets web users watch ESAT videos and listen to ESAT Radio 
programs on their computers. I was not able to get a reliable audience data about ESAT’s 
website statistics, but ESAT occasionally revealed that its website is one of the top 
websites that Ethiopian people visit to access information. For example, in September 
2016, ESAT’s executive director, Abebe Gelaw, wrote on his Facebook page that 
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ESAT’s website traffic has increased during ESAT’s continuous reports on the ongoing 
protest in Ethiopia in 2016, with the majority of the traffic coming from Ethiopia. Using 
Google Trends data, we can see a significant rise in the search for ESAT during the 
protests in Ethiopia. Google trend data also indicates that much of the traffic was from 
Ethiopia. Moreover, ESAT was one of the top Ethiopian search terms on Google in 
Ethiopia during the protest. 
 
Figure 4.1. ESAT’s Google Search Trends of the Last Five Years 
 
 
Social Media Platforms 
ESAT launched a YouTube channel on April 6th, 2010, a few days before it began 
its Satellite broadcasting. For Ethiopian media outlets, ESAT was an early adapter of 
YouTube. It is one of the first Ethiopian media outlets to adopt YouTube as a platform 
and it relied heavily on YouTube to reach new audiences. It uses YouTube to post news 
packages, short bulletins, some of the shorter programs, and other supplementary content 
that is not broadcasted, such as user generated contents, photo slideshows, or video shot 
by citizen journalists. It is Ethiopia’s most popular channel, with over 1.5 million views 
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since its beginning. It has more than 135,000 subscribers that get notifications when 
videos are posted.  
During the protests in April 2016, ESAT tapped into a pool of readymade sources 
in Ethiopia. Its journalists have established contacts with hundreds of activists on the 
ground who are ready to send in videos and tips. ESAT uses social media sites not just 
for news-gathering, but for distribution and advertising. Its Facebook and Twitter 
accounts are managed by journalists (Personal Communications, 2017), who approach 
their tasks as a combination of developing content designed to promote ESAT’s videos 
and website, and also to engage in the conversations as they happen in the platforms. 
ESAT has a Facebook and a Twitter account, but its primary social media account is 
Facebook. ESAT’s Facebook page has 884 528 ‘fans,’ and it is quite active on a daily 
basis. It is one of Ethiopia’s top growing Facebook pages. It is only fourth behind KANA 
TV in terms of the number of followers. ESAT’s journalists frequently provide news 
updates with ESAT’s videos and content, driving traffic back to ESAT’s YouTube 
channel and website. ESAT’s Facebook page also initiates discussion among its ‘fans.’ A 
typical Facebook post collects several hundred “likes” and generate hundreds of 
comments. 
The dynamics of social media has given ESAT an extra opportunity because they 
let the media outlet engage with audiences on a very different basis. Rather than a one-
way communication as with broadcasting, their social media allows them to interact with 
their audience. Almost all ESAT journalists listen in on social media conversations and 
react to some of the inquiries and comments they receive (Personal Communications, 
2017). They also systematically track how social media users are talking about ESAT, 
which lets them respond, an important public relations function. ESAT is attentive to 
 
98  
non-social media online opportunities as well. It developed applications for different 
operating systems, such as the Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android series. It launched 
both unique apps for live streaming as well as mobile phone-optimized website apps for 
text and still images, as well as audio. These special website apps make accessing the 
web content and information about ESAT easy. 
As I have shown above, there is no exact data on ESAT’s viewership, but its 
popularity on online platforms and the public reactions to its programs on Facebook and 
YouTube can be a measure of ESAT’s popularity. ESAT used social media platforms–
mainly Facebook, YouTubem, and Twitter–to achieve two things. It gave the political 
opposition a voice by subjecting viewers to unedited pictures of violence on ESAT, 
and it exposed the Ethiopian regime to the world as a police state (Personal 
Communications, 2017). In fact, ESAT is popular in Ethiopia because it openly 
discusses sensitive topics and tackles controversial issues. It ventures into a realm of 
open discussion rarely attempted by budding television broadcasters in Ethiopia. Its 
talk shows unabashedly tackle such unmentionables as government corruption, poor 
human rights record of the Ethiopian government, the persecution of political 
dissenters, journalists, and the dominance of one ethinic group over the others.For 
Ermias Legesse, a former deputy communication minister of Ethiopian who turned to 
be an ESAT journalist after he defected from the Ethiopian government in 2010, one 
of the major reasons why ESAT is popular among Ethiopians is “because people feel 
ESAT always reports on political events and it gives them an instant access to 
information in the form of breaking news” (Personal Communications, 2017). Not only 
does ESAT pursue aggressive political reporting, but it also has come to claim a 
unique access to information–information which may not otherwise be available. For 
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instance, when Ethiopia’s prime minster, the late Meles Zenawi, disappeared from 
the public view for about two months and eventually died in July 2012, ESAT has 
been a vital source of information, providing news and reports about the whereabouts 
of the ailing leader while others remained somewhat silence or misinformed. Similarly, 
in 2015 several covertly recoded audio tapes of meetings of the regime officials have 
found their way to ESAT. The tapes have featured government senior political 
figures such as Abay Tsehaye, Bereket Simon, and others discussing political 
conflicts in the inner circle of the regime. Although publishing this kind of material 
might raise questions about ESAT’s ethical issues in journalism, they have 
unceasingly provided comprehensive coverage of news based on such kinds of 
materials. In fact, according to Ermias, ESAT’s commitment to broadcast 
government secrets is part of their appeal to the public (Personal Communications, 
2017). Likewise, ESAT’s Amharic daily news talk show programs such as the 
‘Weekly Guest’, ‘Focus’ and ‘Afflation’ aired with regular sharp critiques of the 
regime in Ethiopia. Besides, ESAT made a significant human rights activism by 
spreading statements and reports of human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and Committee to Protect Journalists.  
 
ESAT’s Identity as Pan-Ethiopian Ethiopian Channel  
ESAT claims to be a voice of all Ethiopians. By declaring to be “An Eye and Ear 
of Ethiopians”, ESAT aimed to be a unique television station among Ethiopian diaspora 
media outlets. For ESAT, being “An Eye and Ear” of Ethiopians is both a marketing 
strategy and an ideological expression. It positions itself as a watchdog channel 
representing all Ethiopians irrespective of their ethnicity, unlike other diaspora media 
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organizations. Also, it is claiming to be a television channel broadcasting in three major 
Ethiopian languages Amharic, Afan Oromo, Tigeregna, as well as the English language, a 
reflection of their vison of united yet diverse Ethiopia. ESAT played up its diverse 
peculiarity as Ethiopia’s first trilingual satellite television news channel to have its 
headquarters in Washington D.C., Amsterdam, and London and it also stresses its 
“global” outlook with its English language service. ESAT’s focus on united yet diverse 
Ethiopia is equated with all shades of Ethiopians, meaning Ethiopians whose views are 
suppressed by Ethiopian government or not well-represented by opposition media, are 
welcome at ESAT, regardless of their ethnic allegiance or ideological predispositions. 
Tamagn Beyene, who served as ESAT’s executive director, said that ESAT is a media 
outlet that makes Ethiopians feel represented and that works to truly represent their voice 
(Personal Communications, 2017). This framework can be observed in different aspects 
of their work. For example, Befeqadu Moroda, a long time journalist who worked for 
Oromia Media Network before he joined ESAT in 2016, interviewed Assefa Jalata, an 
ethnonationalist Oromo intellectual who is recognized for his secessionist views. 
Whether this is a sign for their commitment to diverse views or a marketing angle, it is 
novel for a major Ethiopian diaspora media to engage people from different points of 
view. 
ESAT distinguished itself by its attempt to reach out to a large Ethiopian 
audience, discussing issues that are pressing in Ethiopia. Dealing with a wide range of 
issues that touch Ethiopia–such as human rights violations, corruptions, political protests, 
ethnic conflict, and political repressions–ESAT has managed to carve a niche for itself. 
Not only are the issues that are relevant to Ethiopia also prominent on ESAT’s news and 
discussion programs, but the very issue of ‘Ethiopian-ness’ is paramount. According to 
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Tamagn Beyene, ESAT plays off and even feeds Ethiopian nationalist trend in its viewers 
(Personal Communications, 2017). Through some of its programs and talk shows, the 
channel promotes a pan- Ethiopian nationalism wrapped in a democratic style which 
makes it easy for viewers to appreciate Ethiopian civic nationhood. But ESAT is not 
nostalgic of Ethiopia’s past nationalism that was endorsed at the expense of cultural and 
ethnic variety of people of Ethiopia. It may be vaguely reminiscent of Ethiopian 
nationalism of the Derg regime but Tamagn points out, it is very different than the 
nationalism of the long-gone era of emperor Haile Selassie I (Personal Communications, 
2017) but some regard it as its closest successor. The Ethiopian nationalism overtones are 
not only subtle, but different and less contrived. ESAT also has come to play an 
important role in broadening interaction among different Ethiopian people in diaspora. As 
such, it projects an inclusive identity which crosses ethnic boundaries. The ESAT notion 
of pan-Ethiopian identity manifests itself in the very image the channel projects of itself 
through its staff, its language, and its name.  
Pan-Ethiopian nationalism is very prominent as a unifying sentiment on the 
channel. This is evident not only in the terminology that is used and the issues that 
are discussed, but also in the tendency of ESAT journalists to identify themselves 
first and foremost as Ethiopians. Pan-Ethiopian nationalism has in some ways 
become the basis of a sharp critique of the politics of the Ethiopian regime and 
ethnonationalitists at the same time. ESAT has employed exiled Ethiopian journalists 
who describe themselves as multiethnic or post-ethnic. Two of its staff who came out of 
the Oromia Media Network are Oromos, but most ESAT journalists identify themselves 
as just Ethiopians with no apparent expression of their ethnic identity. Although there is 
no deliberate policy of diversification when it comes to personnel decisions, ESAT has 
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relatively diverse personnel compared to the Oromia Media Network. Naturally, the lack 
of a single dominant ethinic group in its workforce gives ESAT a pan-Ethiopian ring. 
This pan-Ethiopian nationalist rhetoric is prominent in the weekly entertainment 
program of ESAT’s widely recognized figure Tamagn Beyene, who leads his own show. 
Advocates of pan-Ethiopian nationalism are regularly invited; slogans, songs and 
poems referring to pan-Ethiopian nationalism or Ethiopian unity are often invoked; 
and images which suggest the historicity of the Ethiopian State are frequently 
broadcasted. Equally important is that the name Ethiopian Satellite Television has pan-
Ethiopian overtones. The location of ESAT in Washington D.C. is also not without 
significance. It is located in a place where the largest presence of Ethiopian community 
outside Ethiopia lives. In so doing, it is closer to its core of supporters. 
In a way, ESAT is a channel that appeals to the masses that have an overt pan-
Ethiopian nationalist orientation. In many ways, it has reinvigorated a sense of pan-
Ethiopian nationalism and is even encouraging Ethiopian unity, so much so that pan-
Ethiopian nationalism and unity is being reinvented on this channel. As a pan- Ethiopian 
satellite television, ESAT caters to the Ethiopian audience that may be heterogeneous in 
some ways, but is nonetheless bound by a common political fate. If anything, ESAT has 
been at the forefront of Ethiopian diaspora media which has brought about “Pan 
Ethiopian consciousness” and “imagined community”–to borrow Benedict Anderson’s 
term–comprised of individuals who have a sense of belonging to and affinity with other 
people that they have never met and who actually share a similar homeland. ESAT also 
helps nurture a sense of community among Ethiopian diaspora. It does so in two ways: by 
tapping into exiled figures outside Ethiopia, and by appealing to Ethiopian viewers 
outside their homeland. In a number of its programs, ESAT has invited exiled intellectual 
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figures and journalists who live in the United States and Europe. In doing so, it has 
enhanced the cultural connection between its viewers in Ethiopia and overseas. Tapping 
into the Ethiopian nationalism during a time marked by the predicament in Ethiopian 
nationalism, ESAT has emerged as a key opinion maker. Hence, ESAT is leading a 
growing change in Ethiopian politics and is influencing power relations.  
  
The Politics of ESAT  
Presenting ESAT’s origins, identity, and fan base attends to the element of 
ESAT’s role in Ethiopian politics. Faced with a set of difficult balances in its identity, 
mandate, and operations, ESAT’s earliest planners made decisions about ESAT that 
would come to define it and thus, bear on its reputation to be a platform for all Ethiopians 
regardless of their ethnic or religious background. These decisions were not 
straightforward but involved resolving difficult foundational questions, which provoked 
internal debate: founders within the channel debated on what ESAT should be. Looking 
at its mission, organizational model, and its programming, this section investigates what 
ESAT actually is. Is it an opposition mouthpiece or non-profit communal media? Is it 
transnational or local? I will highlight where ESAT lands on these binaries,and how it 
stands out from the fast-growing Ethiopia television channels.  
 
Political Economy of ESAT 
Tightly connected with the huge Ethiopian diaspora community across the world, 
so is ESAT’s political economy. ESAT was started after its founders got seed money 
from the Ethiopian diaspora community across the world. Seen from a transnational 
diasporic community perspective, there is nothing out of the ordinary about the initiative 
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of ESAT. If anything, the initiative of the Ethiopian diaspora community corresponds 
with an interesting trend of other diaspora communities across the globe. For example, 
Iranian opposition groups and exiled journalists in the diaspora commonly fund satellite 
television stations whose purpose are to challenge Iranian government from afar. 
Likewise, the Burmese diaspora community have had a pioneer of diaspora satellite 
channel in Europe. ESAT epitomizes a transnational trend which is characterized by the 
politicization of diasporic media. 
At the same time, ESAT fits in with Ethiopian media ownership tradition. In 
Ethiopia, the media generally operate under a group who are usually either pro-
government businesses or independents, who in many cases are allied with opposition 
groups. Currently, Ethiopian television networks such as Fana Broadcasting Corporate 
and Ethiopian News Network are subsidized by businesses associated with the ruling 
party, the EPRDF. Historically, the last two successive Ethiopian governments maintain a 
strong grip, particularly on broadcast media including television. Both the imperial and 
the Derg regimes controlled and preserved centralized radio and television stations. They 
used radio and television as an extension of state power and a mouthpiece for different 
state agencies making sure that dissident voices did not have access to the public. The 
incumbent regime also has direct control over the state broadcaster, Ethiopian 
Broadcasting Corporation (EBC). However, as the effect and popularity of Ethiopian 
state television EBC has declined, EPRDF have sought to maintain its influence in terms 
of “behind the scenes” relationships with emerging ‘private’ channels (as in the case of 
Fana Broadcasting Corporate, and Ethiopian News Network) or allowing private 
entertainment television networks to flourish (as is the case of EBS and Kana Television). 
The strong support base of ESAT is opposition affiliated exiled politicians, 
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journalists, and members of the Ethiopian diaspora community. The ownership structure 
reveals the peculiarities of Ethiopian diaspora media and is a subject of inquiry on its 
own. But the patterns of media ownership in Ethiopian diaspora point to some 
contradictions. While ESAT is inclined to operate as a non-profit, community funded, 
public service media, diaspora-based opposition political groups conceive of ESAT as the 
extension of opposition groups. The outcome is an interesting marriage of the two 
models: opposition mouthpiece and non-profit communal media. As it is, ESAT is both a 
non-profit community–and although some people may have leanings towards certain 
ideologies–the network is not necessarily affiliated with a particular opposition party. 
To overlook the interconnectedness of these two aspects is to ignore the 
specificity and complexity of the unique forms of ownership and financing of ESAT. For 
instance, ESAT gives substantial coverage to several Ethiopian opposition groups; 
however, the freedom of expression that ESAT enjoys in the United States is not without 
constraints. ESAT is suspiciously silent on Eretria, Ethiopia’s northern neighbor that 
accommodates Ethiopia’s main opposition groups. It offers careful coverage of Eretria 
and is cautious not to criticize it. Apart from a few instances when it covered the Eritrean 
relationship with the Ethiopian government, it generally stays away from reporting about 
Eritrea. Eritrean issues, such as human rights violations, do not find an outlet on ESAT, 
nor do critiques of Eritrean alleged confrontational foreign policy in the Horn of Africa. 
Most pro-government activists allege that ESAT has a financial backing from the Eritrean 
government. Furthermore, in spite of its political impact in Ethiopia, ESAT strangely 
does not have enough impact on Ethiopia’s inter-party-political dialogue among 
opposition groups in diaspora. For some critics, ESAT’s relentless probes into Ethiopia’s 
government affairs distracted viewers from the profound differences that Ethiopian 
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opposition groups have. There is a perception that ESAT disregards the grievances of 
select opposition groups because it is affiliated with a prominent opposition groups 
known as Ginbot 7, a political party established in 2008. Indeed, the prominence of 
ESAT has been at the expense of its reputations on its neutrality in partisan 
opposition politics. Talk shows and even newscasts are slanted to Ginbot 7. Ginbot 7 
works for regime change, including the use of military means. According to a report 
prepared by a Norwegian non-governmental organization called Lnadinfo, ESAT and 
Ginbot 7 are partially financed by the same sources, but are otherwise separate entities 
(Landinfo, 2012). Critics acknowledge that ESAT has made a breakthrough in the 
Ethiopian political scene, but remain wary of its agenda and its politicized 
journalism. Although the channel claims that its reporting is mostly factual and 
denies any link with Ginbot 7, it does acknowledge that it is a platform for various 
Ethiopian opposition groups. Abebe Gelaw said that ESAT has an editorial 
independence and it is empowered to report independently. For him, ESAT is an 
autonomous entity that does reporting based on decentralized news gathering techniques 
that privilege views from the opposition groups:  
ESAT’s reporting indicates that we have given a substantial interest in bringing 
political change in Ethiopia. Our journalists prioritize stories according to their 
newsworthiness and our news values may well reflect our interest in bringing about 
a political change in Ethiopia (Personal Communications, 2017). 
 
Of course, autonomy and independence are relative terms. After all, one of 
ESAT’s longtime executive director, Naemin Zeleke, that lead the media outlet for 
over four years, is a member of Ginbot 7. Still, the idea of a media organization that 
has some ties with an opposition political party and is yet independent is altogether 
new to Ethiopia. This independence and autonomy lend ESAT a great deal of 
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credibility that made it serve as an alternative source of news. Nonetheless, some find 
the link between Ginbot 7 and ESAT somewhat uncomfortable. ESAT may claim 
independence, but to what extent its link with Ginbot 7 affects the independence and 
editorial decision-making of ESAT remains a pressing issue. 
Advertising is the lifeline for other satellite television stations such as EBS and 
Kana TV. This is not the case with ESAT, as advertising is tied with political 
considerations and advertisers succumb to the pressure from the Ethiopian government. 
Potential advertisers in the diaspora have been wary of advertising on ESAT partly 
because of the political nature of ESAT. Advertisers avoided ESAT for fear that dealing 
with the channel may trigger a backlash for their business in Ethiopia. Rather, ESAT 
raises “big money in little sums” from the broader Ethiopian diaspora community across 
the world (Personal Communications, 2017). It reaches at least hundred thousand 
Ethiopian immigrants all over the world for regular fundraising events in countries as 
diverse as the United States, the Netherlands, South Africa, Norway, Australia, and 
Israel. Globally there are about forty-seven regular ESAT fundraising committees over 
forty cities. The one glaring exception to its financial contribution is Ethiopia, the target 
of ESAT broadcasting. This is an exception worth studying because while Ethiopia is the 
main target of ESAT’s broadcasting, Ethiopians who live inside Ethiopia do not 
contribute financially. ESAT’s commitment to broadcast to Ethiopia without any 
apparent financial contribution from inside Ethiopia is as an important backdrop to the 
formation and prominence of ESAT in Ethiopia’s political context.  
However, ESAT seems to have benefited from digital advertising that it gets from 
its website and YouTube channel. Some operational expenses are covered by its income 
from digital advertising. Yet, the ESAT has to rely on donations from the diaspora 
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community to cover the cost incurred by capital investment, namely funding new 
services, such as Afan Oromo and Tigergna language programs. Deprived of commercial 
autonomy–as the Ethiopian government put pressures on advertisers–and dependent on 
the handouts of Ethiopian diaspora community, ESAT illustrates the fragility of 
Ethiopian diaspora media. Furthermore, the willingness of the diaspora community to 
provide funding for the media is tightly connected with political movements in Ethiopia. 
In times of heightened political movement inside Ethiopia or when the community 
perceives that there is an imminent political change in Ethiopia, funding for ESAT will 
surge. An employee in ESAT’s finance department said, “The amount of money ESAT 
gets ebbs and flows with political movements in Ethiopia” (Personal Communications, 
2017). 
 
ESAT’s Transnational-Local Dimension  
ESAT employs over 40 staff members who are working in three studio centers 
located in Washington D.C, London, and Amsterdam–a novel attempt at de-centralized 
production processes. The journalists and employees in the three centers all work to get 
information out of Ethiopia in their own ways. The journalists that are based in the three 
centers were connected to their sources in Ethiopia, but their broadcasting emanates only 
from the two centers–Washington D.C. and Amsterdam. The London studio only 
produces documentaries and interviews. This de-centralization among the three centers 
makes ESAT transnational (D.C., Amsterdam, and London) in its operation, and 
local/domestic in its reporting of Ethiopian politics. Ermias pointed to the centers as what 
ensure ESAT as an independent media entity, suggesting, ‘All journalists in the centers 
operate on their own’ (Personal Communications, 2017). The structure then seemed to 
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suggest a transnational operation as each center was given some degree of editorial 
autonomy. With the two broadcasting centers, ESAT has expanded its options to 
broadcast to Ethiopia’s two national prime-time audiences. It must be noted that the two 
centers each broadcast via ESAT’s single satellite. While their reporting functions were 
meant to center on different issues, they use the same signal. The prime time for 
television in Ethiopia is 8:00 PM to 11:00 PM and 12:00 PM and 1:00 PM, meaning 
ESAT’s broadcasts will go on landing thoroughly in Ethiopia’s prime time viewing 
hours. This confirms about the ESAT’s target audience, according to Abebe Gelaw, that 
ESAT is primarily an Ethiopian media outlet: “ESAT’s primary audience are in Ethiopia, 
we always broadcast for Ethiopians based in Ethiopia… we are a local media 
organization based outside Ethiopia’ (Personal Communications, 2017). 
As the political crisis in Ethiopia has unraveled over the last three years, ESAT 
has continued its wall to wall coverage. Since the protest begun in 2014, (more on this in 
chapter five) ESAT has become an outspoken advocate of the protesters in Oromia. In 
addition to documenting the unraveling political protest, ESAT has participated in 
fundraising for humanitarian aid, advocated an anti-government stance among the 
diaspora community, and strengthening its undercover network of journalists in Ethiopia 
that continuously sent reports from the frontline. In the following section, I will highlight 
some of the changes ESAT has brought to Ethiopian politics.  
 
Programming Content 
While the history, identity, and ideology of ESAT is important, a dissection of a 
one of its most watched programs also yields great insight into ESAT’s role in Ethiopian 
politics. ESAT is credited with the introduction of punditry television journalism into the 
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Ethiopian broadcasting scene through the airing of a series of talk shows characterized by 
intensive discussions and extensive viewer participation. Multiple feature programs are 
offered throughout the twenty-four-hour broadcast, all laden with political information. 
Even ESAT’s entrainment programs regularly highlight Ethiopian artists who have 
issues with the Ethiopian government. The most famous of such programs are The 
Afflation, The Daily, Weekly Guest, Focus, The Writers Voice and Tamagn Show. 
These programs share one common feature: they seek to break away from dull 
television talk shows by hosting dissenting Ethiopian political figures and adopting 
an uncompromising approach to Ethiopian political issues. They seem to be generally 
held in high esteem by Ethiopian audiences because of their confrontational spirit and 
their airing of oppositional points of view.  
The most outstanding of these programs is probably The Afflation. The Afflation is 
a regular news analysis fixture in the station’s schedule that has been running since the 
inception of ESAT, featuring usually four male cohosts. The hosts have held no pretenses 
for objectivity, they openly referring to themselves as pro-change forces. The format of 
the show involves two of the cohosts confronting each other head to head about a major 
news event. Typically, after the end of the daily news broadcast, a tune of prominent 
Ethiopian string instrument music is broadcasted to indicate the beginning of The 
Afflation. The news analysis program usually takes into account ‘domestic events,’ 
beginning with major news event in Ethiopia. Even though discussion topics are 
prompted by events–as in the protest in Oromia, corruption in Ethiopian regime, human 
rights violations, the regime’s internal power struggle, and similar issues–program 
makers have chosen subjects of perennial interest that have to do with pan-Ethiopian 
nationalism. Some of the topics chosen for the program are likely to relate to what has 
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traditionally been perceived as important public interest issues. The hosts usually 
engage in an aggressive defense of pan-Ethiopian nationalism while attacking ethno-
nationalism and the Ethiopian regime. The program is concluded with a recap of the 
discussion points and then the cycle repeats again on the following day. 
The Afflation’s coverage of Ethiopian news events is a preview of how the rest of 
ESAT covers Ethiopian political events. In the following section, I specifically examine 
the language use of the hosts of The Afflation in describing news events in Ethiopia. My 
analysis is not centered around a single political event because language use is harder to 
pin down on a single political event and the hosts usually change roles. However, a 
review of several instances of language use might be enough to drive home that the show 
is leading ESAT’s position. 
The regular hosts–Mesay Mekonon, Ermias Legesse, Sisay Agena, and 
Minalkachew Semachew–all rotate their roles as the lead host of the show. They all view 
their roles as analysts with deeper understanding of the Ethiopian government. The 
show’s hosts imply that they are on the side of Ethiopian change agents whenever there is 
a political incident, say like a protest in Ethiopia, they always ramp up their rhetoric 
condemning the government and offering support for the protesters. And it’s all couched 
in language that makes it seem like they are on the side of the opposition. When they 
analyze a major news event, they do it with broader context by recollecting what the 
regime has been doing for the last quarter of a century. They also predict what the regime 
might do to contain Ethiopia’s deepening political crisis. They use the word “regime” 
more frequently to describe the Ethiopian government and ‘change agents’ to describe 
political opponents of the Ethiopian government. Occasionally, they hint that their 
political goals and the goals of the political opponents of the Ethiopian government are 
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somehow tied. For instance, when the protest in Oromia in the summer of 2017 triggered 
a power struggle within the country's governing coalition, the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF), the hosts implied offering help to some 
sections of the coalition that have emerged as advocates for political reform within 
EPRDF on several occasions.  
 
News Broadcasting  
In addition to ESAT’s punditry analysis, its news programs are informative of 
ESAT’s role in Ethiopia politics. ESAT news programs are heavily focused, first to the 
events within Ethiopia, then to those stories that demonstrate the failure of the Ethiopian 
regime throughout the world, and finally on events in the diaspora that might show 
solidarity among Ethiopians. For example, the newscast of October 2nd, 2016, which 
summarized the major events of the week, provides evidence as to how ESAT reports on 
political events in Ethiopia. Headlines lead with information about the regime’s campaign 
to snatch rifles from farmers in Amhara region, followed by details of a request that a 
diplomatic community in Addis Ababa made to Ethiopia’s government to explain the 
then political crisis. Next was a story about a stay home strike in the Amhara regional 
state. Subsequent stories touched upon another protest in the same region, an unfolding 
political crisis, followed by the government declaration of a state of emergency in 
Ethiopia. The major international stories that involve Ethiopia on that day concerned the 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Addis Ababa. On the news, it was stated 
that Merkel voiced her concern about the Ethiopian government’s response to peaceful 
protesters. In this way, news briefings were strictly controlled to follow the anti-




ESAT’s CNN Effect  
As I have explained in the previous sections, ESAT has quickly grown to become 
Ethiopia’s leading diaspora satellite televisions causing a change in Ethiopia’s 
information flow and shaping power relations. In the founding document of ESAT, its 
founders emphasized that the existence of free and independent media is critical for the 
public to exercise their freedom of expression. Throughout the interview process and 
during data collection, ESAT’s editorial staff also highlighted that free media is 
fundamental for citizens to exercises their fundamental human rights. Sisay Agena 
remarks, “independent media are key tools to bring political change in Ethiopia.” As 
described in chapter one, prior the arrival of as ESAT as prominent alternative source of 
information, Ethiopian media environment was largely dominated by the ruling regime as 
part of its tightly controlled political and social environment. Television was only owned 
by the state; radio stations and print press were either owned, financed and run by the 
state or they belonged to individuals and agencies connected to the government directly 
or indirectly. In the words of Abebe, ESAT “has challenged the long-held Ethiopian 
tradition that television is only held by the state.” This remarkable status enabled ESAT 
to be a pioneer in the realm of diaspora based Ethiopian satellite televisions by being an 
alternative source of information. Having its clandestine reporters close to the events in 
Ethiopia, ESAT has acquired substantial clout in Ethiopia by bringing political 
information right into the living rooms of Ethiopians. This is one of the reasons why 
ESAT has branded itself as “An Eye and Ear of the Ethiopians,” which questions 
authority and exposes political conspiracies, human rights violations, and corruption 
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in Ethiopia. Projecting an ardent oppositional tone, ESAT covers mainly issues that have 
political significance and that the Ethiopian regime prefers to keep as secret. Over the last 
eight years since its foundation, ESAT forcefully criticized the Ethiopian regime and its 
prominent journalists often invite guests that are unapologetic about their critique of the 
Ethiopia regime. In the process, ESAT played a key role in bringing news from Ethiopia 
to audiences in the diaspora as well as in Ethiopia, as domestic private media are 
restricted. 
One of the most profound changes that ESAT has brought into the Ethiopian 
media landscape is ending the government’s control over information. Among the most 
apparent implications of the emergence of ESAT in the Ethiopian public sphere is its 
ability to contest the Ethiopian regime’s narratives and reverse the influence that the 
regime exerts over the media by monopolizing the process and circulation of information. 
In addition to ending the regime’s monopolistic control of information flow by filling 
a media void, ESAT also fills a political void. It serves as a de facto Ethiopian 
opposition and a platform for Ethiopian oppositions. It provides a voice for 
Ethiopia’s opposing views and a platform for political dissidents, many of whom live 
in the diaspora. In the words of ESAT’s news anchor and program presenter Mesay 
Mekonen, “ESAT is the choice for the voiceless” (Personal Communications, 2017). He 
said that one of ESAT’s missions is to be a platform for all people who were denied their 
right to speak (Personal Communications, 2017). In this way, ESAT has re-instituted 
the right to have access to the media for representatives of Ethiopia’s myriad 
opposition groups.  
ESAT has also developed the potential to shape public opinion, both in the 
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diaspora and inside Ethiopia. For Ermias, it is the only institution that has the power to 
influence people: “Among all the major influences on Ethiopian public sphere–ESAT is 
the most influential institution.” Ethiopians all over the world can now have instant 
access to what is happening in Ethiopia (Personal Communications, 2017). Such 
exposure has helped develop a sense of political awareness for its ordinary viewers. 
Occasionally, this awareness translates into popular pressure on Ethiopian government to 
step up its efforts to act on certain issues and its policy. The ever-growing political 
influence that ESAT has over Ethiopians in certain circumstances translates into 
mobilizing the people to take their demands to the street for political demonstrations. For 
instance, the wall to wall coverage of the 2015-2017 political protests and the 
government’s violent response fueled further protests and inflamed public opinion. As a 
result, the regime was forced to respond to the demands of the protesters. The discontent 
of the Ethiopian public–which ESAT contributes to and is sometimes fueled by– is heard 
by opening up the lines of communication so that their viewers can call in and participate, 
thus venting some of their angers. The call-in segments of ESAT allow anonymous 
callers to openly criticize the Ethiopian government. Seen from this perspective, ESAT 
plays an interesting role in diffusing–and not just inciting–the public. ESAT can be said 
to have a cathartic effect, and some of its viewers have come to be content with the relief 
of expressing themselves. At times, ESAT acts as a window through which many muted 
Ethiopians can vent their anger, offering an opposition perspective that can be seen as a 
shock-buffer between reality and the viewers. To put this differently, ESAT plays the role 
of a preventative medium and an outlet for the disenfranchised public, thus providing a 
safety valve in what may be described as a repressed Ethiopian public sphere. 
 
116  
The Regime’s Offensive  
In response to the increased role of ESAT in Ethiopian politics, the Ethiopian 
government launched a range of attacks against ESAT and its journalists. The regime’s 
offensive can take various forms: satellite jamming, hacking, blocking of contents, legal 
threats, physical harm to the journalists’ families in Ethiopia, and smear campaigns. Of 
all the regime’s offensive acts against ESAT, satellite jamming is the most frequent one. 
Satellite jamming is defined as ‘intentional interference’ of broadcasting and is 
considered a violation of Article 15 of the Radio Regulations of the International 
Telecommunications Union. As satellite dishes continue to proliferate across Ethiopian 
cities, urban areas, and villages, the Ethiopian government has been accused of ramping 
up of its effort to jam ESAT’s satellite transmissions. The first jamming attacks on 
foreign-based Amharic language broadcasting occurred in 2010, when the late prime 
minister Meles Zenawi publicly admitted jamming the Voice of America’s Amharic 
broadcast to Ethiopia (BBC,2010). Although the jamming of the Voice of America 
eventually ceased, satellite jamming against ESAT now takes place on a regular basis. 
Abebe said ESAT had been subjected to jamming numerous times since its inception. 
“We have been jammed at least 26 times since we began transmitting to Ethiopia 
(Personal Communications, 2017). I asked how ESAT knows if they are jammed in 
Ethiopia. Abebe said “viewers make them aware them through their social media.” Abebe 
says the jamming of ESAT is part of a concerted campaign to get ESAT off of Ethiopian 
airwaves because:   
ESAT provides information that was mostly related to the crackdown on protesters, 
news and reports on human rights violations of peaceful Ethiopians and the 
corruption of the regime. The last three years were critical time for ESAT because 




During the protest in 2016, the regime blacklisted ESAT for stoking unrest in 
Ethiopia and increased its effort of jamming. The channel was forced to adopt strategies 
to bypass jamming, which has impacted ESAT’s ability to operate. Abebe said “The 
jamming has an economic impact, we were forced to look for new satellite companies to 
relocate our broadcasting (Personal Communications, 2017). This means new 
frequencies, which in return means, a brief decrease in our audience size until our 
audience finda ESAT’s new frequency position.” 
Over the last three years, ESAT was forced to change its frequencies over a dozen 
time. Satellite jamming frustrates viewers and journalists alike. Mesay said “whenever 
we know our programs do not reach our audience it really disheartens me” (Personal 
Communications, 2017). 
In addition to targeting ESAT for jamming, the regime restricted the public from 
watching ESAT over satellite dishes (HRW, 2016). Through the media that the regime 
controls, it warned its citizens not to watch diaspora satellite broadcasts because they are 
“foreign agents” and their content is propaganda that smears “the image of Ethiopia” and 
“incites violence” in Ethiopia. At the height of the regime’s animosity towards ESAT, the 
Ethiopian government passed a law preventing Ethiopians from watching any of ESAT 
programs (State of Emergency Command Post,2016). It made the grounds for arresting 
and prosecuting people who were caught watching ESAT in their private space clear 
(HRW, 2016). The regime also tried to establish greater control over international 
satellite companies, such as Nilesat and Eutelsat, by purchasing the frequencies they sell 
for ESAT (MessengerAfrica, 2017). After acquiring most of the frequencies from these 
two companies, the regime announced the creation of a single satellite television platform 
called Ethiosat that would require all broadcasters to use only government owned 
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platforms (INSA, 2017). 
In addition to consistently jamming ESAT’s broadcasting, the regime routinely 
blocked ESAT’s website and YouTube channel (Freedom House, 2017). The regime 
also sought to curtail the activities of journalists working for ESAT by hacking their 
email and spying on them (Timberg, 2014). Since 2012, the regime has targeted 
journalists in the diaspora by spying, using malwares purchased from companies 
based in Europe and Israeli (EFF, 2015, (Bill Marczak, and Et al. 2017). The regime 
purchased a spying software called FinSpy and attempted to spy on email 
communications between journalists who works with ESAT (Timberg, 2014). Spying 
on email communications of journalists not only signals the monitoring of exile 
activities by state authorities, but also alerts to possible perils for contacts in 
Ethiopia. Since 2015, hundreds of people were charged with inciting violence after 
their email and chat communications with diaspora-based journalists had been 
compromised (Addis Standard, 2017). Given ESAT’s heavy reliance on anonymous 
reporters from Ethiopia, the risk of being exposed is high. ESAT has reported that the 
regime’s security agents sought to uncover the identities of such reporters in 
interrogations of political prisoners. In 2017, journalists, activists, and politicians 
were charged with inciting violence after they had given interviews to ESAT (ESAT, 
2017). This adds to the general difficulty of ESAT to obtain relevant information 
from inside the country. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have broadly given an essential background of ESAT, what 
factors lead to the formation of ESAT, and what the channel is exactly. ESAT is 
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broadening its audience base and its content. As ESAT has purposefully used online 
communication platforms such as Facebook and Twitter along its satellite 
broadcasting services, the channel is able to reach more and more people living in 
Ethiopia. ESAT’s ‘pan-Ethiopian nationalist’ agenda has driven its journalism and 
programming content. The various balances (communal media vs. opposition 
mouthpiece, local vs. transnational) it had to strike in its operation and allegiance are 
some of ESAT’s challenges in its efforts to be a ‘Voice of All Ethiopians’. In the next 
chapter I will, outline OMN’s origins, politics, ideology, programming and its reporting 





OMN ORIGINS, IDENTITY AND CONTENT  
OMN Beginning  
In the summer of 2013, an acrimonious debate broke out on Facebook among the 
Ethiopian diaspora community when Jawar Mohamed, an Oromo activist, said “I am an 
Oromo first” and “Ethiopia is imposed on me” on Al Jazeera’s English daily television 
program, The Stream. During the show, the British journalist, Femi Oki, who was co- 
hosting the show with Malika Bilal, asked Jawar whether he is ‘Oromo first’ or 
‘Ethiopian first.’ He answered: “I am an Oromo first … because first Ethiopia is imposed 
on me, the second important point is that because we [the Oromos] were forced to 
denounce our identity, we [the Oromos] ended up reaffirming and reasserting our 
identity.” Jawar’s Oromo identity is common knowledge within the Ethiopian diaspora 
community. He is best known for advocating for the rights of the Oromo people in 
Ethiopia. he is often critical of both the current Ethiopian government and of earlier 
regimes for their treatment of the Oromo people in the past. Yet, the fact that Jawar had 
dared to say that ‘Ethiopia is imposed on me’ was considered an outright disavowal of his 
‘Ethiopianess’ by pan-Ethiopian nationalists. Simultaneously, Jawar drew an enthusiastic 
support from ethnonationalists, particularly from the Oromos themselves because they 
think his response laid bare the central founding myths around which the pan-Ethiopian 
nationalism have been built since 19th century. Jawar’s response generated wide debates, 
discussions, and threats among the Ethiopian online community on whether Jawar’s 
characterization of the challenges of the Oromo community removed the nuanced role 
that the Oromos played during the formation of the Ethiopian State, whether Ethiopia is a 
political entity that obliterated the cultural identities of the Oromos, and whether the 
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severe restrictions on freedom of expression in Ethiopia concealed such kinds of 
opinions. While one can say that Al Jazeera helped to generate debate among Ethiopians, 
the content of these debates has revealed a deep division within the Ethiopian diaspora 
community on the issue of Ethiopian cultural and political identities. Beyond and behind 
these debates, however, there is a greater lacuna: a lack of independent and effective 
media platforms that can accommodate a diversity of opinions and tolerate such kinds of 
debates to happen inside Ethiopia. 
After this debate, an opportunity presented itself for the Oromo community in the 
diaspora to launch their own media organization. Possibly unconnected to this incident, 
there was an ad hoc committee that comprised of prominent Oromo journalists and 
community leaders, including Jawar Mohamed, that was formed in 2012 (Personal 
Communication, 2017). The committee was established in response to calls from the 
diaspora Oromo community to have a media outlet of their own. However, quickly after 
the incident, Jawar Mohamed and the ad hoc committee used it to gain momentum in 
planting the seed for the foundation of the Oromia Media Network. The first step they 
took was appropriating the first line of Jawar’s Al Jazeera response, “Oromo First,” as a 
guiding catch phrase–spontaneously, it seemed–to embark on a series of fundraising 
campaigns in cities where there are substantial Oromo immigrants throughout the world. 
Jawar’s ad lib remark, “Oromo First,” turned into slogans and worked its way into 
campaign speeches and onto poster signs. “Oromo First” was a serviceable slogan with 
layered meaning.  
Following the startling exuberance that “Oromo First” created among the Oromo 
diaspora community, the ad hoc committee continued to operate and hold meetings and 
fundraising campaigns throughout the second half of 2013, which was widely covered in 
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Ethiopian diaspora media. The committee became a structure attached to the founding 
members of the Oromia Media Network that was dedicated to creating a dialogue with 
Oromo journalists, academics, and public figures, thus allowing the voice of diaspora 
Oromo to reach broader Ethiopian society both at home and abroad. With the funds that 
the ad hoc committee raised during the ‘Oromo First’ campaign, they established OMN, 
the first Oromo satellite television channel, in March 2014. OMN is headquartered in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota where there is the large Oromo diaspora population. Since its 
establishment, OMN has been giving a wall to wall coverage on all things Oromo. As the 
protests in Ethiopia have unraveled over the last three years, OMN has earned a 
reputation as an oppositional bulwark. It has become an outspoken advocate of the 
protests in Oromia. 
In a similar manner with ESAT, migration of Ethiopians and exile of journalists 
have contributed to the rise of OMN. Although there is no official data that show the 
ethnic identity of Ethiopian immigrants who entered the United States, Oromos are 
among largest groups. By the 1980s, Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, aka the Twin 
cities, have become the hub for Oromo immigrants. Current estimates suggest that there 
are about 50,000 Oromos living in the Twin cities, most of whom immigrated to the 
United States in the aftermath of the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 (Opride, 2013). A 
clear majority of migrant Oromo singers, intellectuals, politicians, and media 
personalities settled in the Twin cities as well. Since the 1990s, these groups had been 
setting up local community radio programs to cater to the growing number of Oromos in 
Minnesota. These were community radios, newspapers, and websites, and they were 
conceived of as the first wave of diaspora-based Oromo media outlets. However, 
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with the launching of OMN in 2014 came the realization of the first Oromo diaspora 
satellite television channel, something they had never had before.  With the 
establishment of the first ever Oromo satellite television in 2014, it became possible for 
the Oromo community in the United States to broadcast directly into Ethiopia and bring 
the Oromo community in Ethiopia and elsewhere in the diaspora to the same live 
coverage of unfolding political events by Oromo news anchors and commentators. 
 
OMN’s Reaches  
Since its establishment, OMN has become the default channel for the majority of 
the Oromo community in Ethiopia with a considerable reach and power, albeit there is no 
public opinion poll that shows who watches OMN. Among the Oromos, both in 
diaspora and in Ethiopia, OMN is quite popular. In Oromia, OMN is a local channel. 
Since the Ethiopian state-controlled media either do not report–or report it in their 
own political bias if they report it at all–many people watch OMN to see what is 
happening and to follow what the diaspora-based analysts have to say. For these 
people, OMN is a convenient and reliable means to find out what is going on in 
Oromia. Jawar claims that for the majority of the Oromos, OMN is their preferred 
channel. According to Jawar the viewership of OMN is at least 20 million (Personal 
Communications, 2017). By the standard of Ethiopian media audience, this figure is large. 
The survey results that Kana TV commissioned in 2015 from the polling firm Ipsos 
showed that at least six out of ten Ethiopians watch satellite televisions programs, 
increasing the odds of OMN to be among the top diaspora channels in Ethiopia. But the 
ratings are almost beside the point and OMN might not be among the top television 
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channels that remotely rivals the likes of Kana TV and EBS; but in the new, Ethiopia’s 
‘networked’ public sphere, it doesn’t need to. Since its establishment, OMN has come to 
form the hub of a new kind of diaspora media operation: one that travels through online 
channels, collecting news from Ethiopia through Twitter-and-Facebook, and broadcasting 
them back to Ethiopia through satellite. In the process, OMN has built the most effective 
media operation that has descended on the Ethiopian public sphere. OMN’s content is 
disseminated to viewers across the world, mainly through satellite television and social 
media, making OMN amongst the largest Ethiopian TV station on social media 
platforms. Particularly, Facebook is not only a platform for free expression, but it is also a 
medium for exchange of materials between OMN reporters in Ethiopian and the studio 
journalists in Minneapolis. 
Using their social media accounts, the journalists of OMN encourage their audience 
to actively participate and enrich OMN’s news content. For instance, the executive director 
Jawar Mohammed has a massively popular Facebook page, with over 1.2 million 
followers. He receives pictures and video clips from eyewitnesses and clandestine reporters 
from Ethiopia then, OMN re-broadcasts them back to Ethiopia using satellite. This has 
allowed people with limited resources and modest technical experience to share their stories 
and discuss their ideas with a widening network of viewers and interconnected audiences 
around the world. Jawar’s Facebook page allows OMN to have field reporters in every 
single district of Oromia. It has introduced a truly citizen driven newsgathering and 
strengthened OMN’s relationship with ordinary people on the ground. By using this service, 
the audiences are no longer just recipients of the story that television stations broadcast to 
them. They have become part of the story themselves. They have even become a sort of 
broadcasters themselves who do not need to wait for the regular TV news bulletin to bring 
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them stories they already know about. As Jawar says, social media plays an increasing role 
in enriching the content of the OMN news channel as well as speeding up the process of 
opening up Ethiopia’s closed political environment. Jawar constantly receives tips 
about incidents and clashes and statements from various Oromo political factions and 
viewers in Ethiopia. Some feel that if OMN does not cover it, it simply did not 
happen; while others find in OMN, a platform to expose the practices of the 
Ethiopian government. Describing the role of his own Facebook page, Jawar 
Mohammed says: 
I receive every political development essentially from every corner of the country. 
Anybody who has an internet connection sends tips, pictures and videos to me then, 
we will check the materials in our newsroom. A lot of times people send me 
something like a video by a mobile, an audio file, an image or some text if they want 
to share. Then together with my team, we will make sure the materials go through a 
filtration and verification process, then we will broadcast them back to Ethiopia 
(Personal Communications, 2017). 
With the recent political developments in Ethiopia, OMN seems to have gained 
more relevance to both the Oromo community and the broader Ethiopian community. 
Traditionally, media whose focus is the political and cultural aspects of the Oromo people 
has been either heavily censored by the Ethiopian government or marginalized by 
opposition media outlets (Jalata, 2007). However, the dynamics of Oromo protests 
reshaped many aspects of the Ethiopian media landscape, including that of the opposition 
media. It changed the way opposition media outlets interact with the members of Oromo 
community, who uses social media as sources of information. Since the outbreak of the 
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protest in Oromia, the diaspora media and the social media platforms have become close 
partners. OMN played a defining role in making this partnership and benefiting from it at 
the same time. The amount of information flowing out of Ethiopia that gets onto OMN 
through the Facebook page of Jawar Mohammed demonstrates that not only the Ethiopian 
diaspora media found a broader access to Ethiopian public, but also that the diaspora media 
heavily relies on the content generated by members of the Oromo community in Ethiopia. 
This mutually beneficial relationship between OMN and the Oromo community in 
Ethiopia empowers both sides, says Jawar Mohammed (Personal Communications, 
2017). On the one hand, the Oromo community in Ethiopia use social media platforms to 
send information that cannot be shared in Ethiopia to OMN then OMN will rebroadcast 
the information back to Ethiopia so that broader Ethiopian public can watch it on 
traditional television. As I have described previously, since most Ethiopians who live in 
urban areas own televisions, they watch OMN in their homes through satellite dishes at their 
house, in cafeterias, or on their computer screens through internet. On the other hand, OMN 
receives up-to-date information on Ethiopia’s political development without having 
professional reporters on the ground. Making use of these pools of readymade sources was 
manifest during the Oromo protest.  
 
OMN’s Content and Programming  
Most of the production work is undertaken in OMN’s Minneapolis studio, but 
they also have news centers in London and Cairo. The channel is licensed in the United 
States to the founding ad hoc committee. Broadcasting began with Afaan Oromo, 
Amharic, and English languages, which gradually expanded to four languages, adding a 
30-minute news bulletin in Arabic in January 2017. Programming is varied and diverse, 
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including two newscasts a day in Afan Oromo and Amharic. The newscasts and 
programs of OMN changed the of Ethiopian media landscape and reshaped the media-
politics relationship in Ethiopia. Immediately after its launch in March 2014, it turned into 
the leading diaspora media outlet that reported the political protests in Oromia and 
dominated the Ethiopian media discourse. It brought to the Ethiopian media landscape 
citizen driven media reports aimed at creating an ethnic, vibrant, and engaged community. 
Having access to on ground activists and political operatives in the Oromia region 
enabled Oromia Media Network to stand alongside and compete with diaspora media 
organizations like ESAT and international broadcasters like the Amharic and Afan 
Oromo services of VOA. 
OMN runs a non-stop news flow throughout the week with one newscast every day 
and two punditry analyses of two hours long both in Afan Oromo and Amharic languages. 
A ‘Day in Oromia’, a newscast of the day and a follow up analysis of the day’s top news 
stories are its flagship programs. OMN also broadcasts several live- discussion talk shows 
on its Facebook live sessions and rebroadcasts it to Ethiopia via satellite. A news analysis 
program known as ‘Gadisa Raba Dori, and ‘A News Analysis’ are broadcasted regularly, 
each lasting about two hours. Audience members also participate in these programs. 
The producers of the show often ask audience members to ask questions about the 
political situation in Ethiopia. Reflecting on the impact of these talk shows, Abdi says: 
“Discussion programs are watched by millions of Oromos and other Ethiopians and are 
contributing a great deal to the formation of unified Oromo centric public opinion over 
many issues” (Personal Communications, 2017). Abdi’s view is shared by the executive 
director Jawar Mohammed, who said OMN’s talk shows are a key factor in raising the 
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political awareness of the Oromo community in Ethiopia. He said, “we launched OMN in 
March 2014, the first round of Oromo protest in Ethiopia broke out in April of the same 
year” (Personal Communications, 2017). 
Besides OMN’s leading position in Ethiopian media landscape in terms of news 
coverage of Oromia, its talk shows often set the agenda for government and other opposition 
media outlets, as well as reflecting the issues considered important among Oromo 
intellectual elite. Critics on the contrary, believe that OMN’s talk shows such as Gadisa 
Raba Dori are ‘a feel-good discussion among acquaintance who have the same 
ideological predisposition rather than a true rational debate between opposing ideological 
camps’ (Tedla, 2016).  
The critics add when such kinds of television talk shows dominate the schedules, 
they indicate tendencies towards politicization, polarization, ethnicization of public debates. 
Critics of OMN tend to generalize this picture and extend it over the channel's coverage of 
news stories. OMN’s executive director responds to such claims saying: “OMN is 
unabashedly and proudly offering a uniquely Oromo perspective. We are siding with the 
people of Oromo, who we are denied not to have their own independent media in their own 
homeland” (Personal Communications, 2017). 
In addition to the talk shows, OMN airs a program called public opinion shows. In 
this program, the hosts read letters from viewers over selected hot issues or members of the 
public call in to give their opinions about the programs of OMN or the Ethiopian government. 
As Suleman Hussien one of the main hosts of the show says, “This program lets us know who 
our viewers are, what they feel about our programs. It allows our viewers to have free access 
to our channel and will give a chance for them to express their opinion about Ethiopian 
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government” (Personal Communications, 2017). Before OMN, the Oromo community had 
only government owned Oromo language television to watch, let alone to participate in or to 
give political opinion about the Ethiopian government. As Usman underlines, the Oromo 
community has had enough of being “treated as a threat and tired of being accused by 
Ethiopian government as a threat for a unity of Ethiopia” (Personal Communications, 2017).  
OMN’s Identity 
In asking if OMN is well-positioned to compete with other diaspora media outlets 
such as ESAT, we must first get a grasp of what it is exactly. Since OMN has been 
interested in differentiating itself as a voice of the Oromos, its programming and content 
can be defined in terms of its focus on the cause of the Oromo people. This is true, even 
if there is plurality and diversity in its language and content. For example, it has Amharic 
programs and interview politicians from other Ethiopian ethnic groups. OMN’s 
newsroom is operated by ethnically homogenous staff, but they bring their own 
journalistic, political backgrounds and ways of working to the space. Like ESAT, it is not 
of one mind and can show signs of change and contradiction, while its editorial 
management has some measure of consistency. In a similar fashion with ESAT, there are 
certain balances that OMN wrestles with consistently: Is it partisan or community media? 
Its identity is the function of the balances struck between these two poles. 
 
OMN as the Voice of Oromo Community 
Oromia Media Network distinguished itself by its attempt to reach out to a 
large Oromo audience, discussing issues that are both timely and pressing in Oromia, 
Ethiopia’s largest regional state. Covering political events, such as protests, drought, 
or arrests of political figures in the region has created milestones in the short history 
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of OMN. Although seen from a perspective of wider Ethiopian politics, such a focus 
on Oromo issuea is a shortcoming as it dwarfs other Ethiopian non-Oromo issues in 
Ethiopia. In a series of interviews given by the founders of Oromia Media Network 
around the time of the launch, a clear message was propagated that OMN would advance 
‘the Oromo Question’ and offer an ‘Oromo perspective’ on the news. Although different 
individuals have given diverse aspects of what ‘the Oromo question’ and ‘an Oromo 
perspective’ would consist of, in summary it could be described as follows: The ‘Oromo 
question’ is a term widely used to refer to the fact that the Oromo people want self-rule 
in their own homeland, Oromia. It is part of a broader socio-political consciousness of 
the Oromo people, and it is the single most important political question for the 
Oromo people since the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974.  
Advancing the ‘Oromo question’ and bringing an ‘Oromo perspective’ to the 
news was underpinned by the deployment of Oromo journalists and analysts who offer an 
Oromo perspective on the top news stories of the country. However, critics point out that 
focusing on Oromo perspective ran the risk of fanning ethnic divisions and waning the 
unity of Ethiopia. But as OMN executive director Jawar Mohammed says it, the overall 
aim was to ‘enable Oromos to tell their own stories’ (Personal Communications). It is 
clear, then, that every second of OMN’s broadcasting is an echo of the Oromo question, 
as inscribed in OMN’s mission statement. OMN asserts that its news content and analysis 
emanate from a unique Oromo perspective (OMN, 2014). As the first ever satellite 
television that focused on Oromo, OMN is a phenomenon for the Oromo people, as 
labelled by a former member of OMN’s editorial committee (Personal Communications, 
2017). Jawar Mohammed expressed how OMN satisfied the needs of Oromos. “Before we 
started OMN, I have been going to other diaspora media outlets to do political analysis. 
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Now we can report political events and do analysis on our own television” (Personal 
Communications, 2017). 
Afan Oromo is the main language in which OMN fulfills and conveys the 
information, intended for its community in the diaspora and in Ethiopia. Although Afan 
Oromo was not officially banned in Ethiopia, it was not a language of publishing or 
broadcasting until at least until 1974 (Teferi, 2015). Scholars of the language allege that 
during the imperial era, the language was a target of symbolic violence. The Oromo 
people were made to be ashamed of their language, culture, and origins or were 
considered as retrogressive tribal groups who resisted the civilizing mission of the 
Ethiopian State. Personal and geographic names were replaced by Amharic names 
(Mollenhauer, 2011, Teferi, 2015, Baxter, 1991). As recently as the 2000s, Afan Oromo 
student literature clubs are banned. In this sense, every second of OMN’s broadcasting is 
both a cultural and political fight against the Ethiopian State (Aliyi, 2014). Therefore, for 
OMN to be broadcasting in Afan Oromo is not only a matter of communicative purpose, 
but also it is a matter of affirming and asserting its Oromo identity.  
When news stories about events of significance to Oromos in different parts of the 
world are communicated to them in Afan Oromo and from the perspective of Oromos, it 
brings them together, across the difference of their geographical locations. What unites 
the Oromos across the world is their shared identity, the common language, and the 
common news agenda. In other words, what OMN does is unite the Oromo public that is 
actually composed of multiple, overlapping publics that should be defined not 
territorially, but by reference to a shared identity and a common set of political arguments 
and concerns. What OMN has offered to the Oromo community is a platform to express 
their views without fear of being persecuted or harassed by the Ethiopian government. It 
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encourages the Oromo community to expresses their views without fear of repercussion.  
The logo of OMN, always present in the lower right corner of the screen, is an 
assertion of the Oromo identity. The colors of OMN’s logo–black, red, and white–are the 
colors of the Oromo flag. These colors appeared frequently in the programming, ranging 
from news and information, to entertainment and culture. The daily broadcast begins with 
the OMN logo, decorated with the Oromo flag, being played at the beginning of every 
broadcast. The presence of the Oromo flag meant that OMN considers itself not only as a 
media organization, but as a genuine representative of the Oromo people. 
Is OMN exclusively an Oromo community media? While it formally functions as 
an Oromo community media with an exclusive mission to advance the interests of the 
Oromo community in Ethiopia, it does also report on other Ethiopian related issues, 
making it something similar with ESAT. This question is difficult as well because 
treating the Oromo community and other non-Oromo issue of Ethiopia as binaries is 
somewhat of a politically loaded assumption. As I have described in previous section, the 
interest of the Oromo community is articulated as a question of self-rule, defined in terms 
of the right of the Oromo people to determine their political, economic, and cultural 
status within or outside the Ethiopian state. OMN’s mission to advance the interest of the 
Oromo people was the result of a historical, political and cultural distinctiveness of the 
Oromo people and it would prosper best as such. Also, OMN came out of the ‘Oromo 
First’ campaign and drew on talents from exiled Oromo journalists. The focus on Oromo 
issues arguably makes OMN’s independence to report on other Ethiopian issue tenuous 
and conditional. While it should be added that reporting on other Ethiopian issues would 
not be a guarantee for its independence, its absence makes OMN one-sided. Therefore, in 
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similar manner with ESAT, OMN struggles for independence as a media outlet and has 
the mission and reliance on community finance, typifying it as a community media. This 
makes OMN similar with ESAT in that ESAT’s pan-Ethiopian outlook on political events 
of Ethiopia does not prevent it from generating a massive audience in Ethiopia. This is 
hardly contentious. OMN reflects the same sort of bias on issues of close proximity to the 
interests of the Oromo people. Some critics suggest Afan Oromo service of OMN is more 
opinion-driven and is highly politicized, which could be a function of its editorial tone 
and style. To what degree is it partisan, or more specifically, does it reflect the interests 
of diaspora-based Oromo opposition political parties? Being headquartered in 
Minneapolis with the huge number of Oromo community and funded by the diaspora 
Oromo community, it seems somewhat obvious. And whenever there is convergence 
between OMN’s reporting and Oromo opposition parties, such as in OMN’s aggressive 
reporting of the Oromo Protest in Ethiopia, pro-government commenters claim it is a 
mouthpiece for Oromo oppositional political parties, such as the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF). However, it cannot be just that. As I have described earlier, of late, so much of its 
content go beyond the interest of the Oromo people.  
OMN’s marketed identity as an ‘Oromo’ news channel that brings the Oromo 
perspective in Ethiopian political discourse was a function of its own agency, planned by 
design, and carried out consciously by its journalists, editors and producers. Its goal was 
to be both credible news sources and to represent the interesta of the Oromo people. 
However, the debate and discourses during its formation were intertwined with political 
factors, such as the on-going adversarial relations with ESAT and a sense among many 
that Oromos needed a venue for speaking back to other Ethiopians. It started as an outlet 
for expression of Oromo priorities. By 2017, we can see that OMN is not only what one 
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would expect of an Oromo news channel per se,–an implied Oromo and perspectival 
focus–and that it does give coverage to other Ethiopian related issues. At the same time, 
it reports on Oromia disproportionately suggested that it tends to lean toward Oromia and 
covers other Ethiopian issues as well. While striving to be an all-inclusive Ethiopian 
diaspora media, it is undeniable that it originated as an Oromo news channel that started 
broadcasting in Afan Oromo. 
The question of OMN’s identity as an Oromo only media outlet is incomplete, 
and like every organization, it is subject to contestation and flux, reflecting editorial 
changes and organizational structure, among other factors. In April 2017, one of the 
founding members and the leading Afan Oromo and Amharic anchor, Abdi Fite, 
resigned, mentioning his disagreement with the executive director as a reason for his 
resignation. Abdi’s resignation was not the only one, numerous others have left OMN, 
leaving its staff in a constant flux. Abdi’s resignation raised many questions, such as 
whether the executive director is controlling and shaping OMN in his own ‘Oromo First’ 
ideology. Instantly after OMN was formally started, there were journalists who broke 
ways from OMN, alluding administrative and ideological issues as their reasons. The 
narrative was that the executive director is there to enforce his ideology and set his own 
editorial agenda. The degree to which individual influence and institutional regulation 
represent a new balance for OMN is shown in the media. 
 
OMN’s Political Economy 
OMN’s financial support initially came from members of Oromo diaspora 
community within the broader Ethiopian diaspora community. Members of the Oromo 
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community in the diaspora have provided financial support for the setting up and running 
of OMN. Particularly, the Minnesota Oromo community provided a space and sponsored 
large numbers of fundraising events before OMN was launched in 2014. The financial 
support OMN is receiving from the Oromo community is substantial and growing, and a 
significant share of its programming on social and political issues is paid for one way or 
another by the diaspora donors. Since its establishment, OMN did not run commercials 
from private companies, but they tried to pursue advertisers without success. Jawar said 
‘Companies would not be willing to run commercial on our network for fear of 
repercussion in their operation in Ethiopia’ (Personal Communications, 2017). OMN’s 
dependence on community coffers resembles ESAT, and is welcomed by many at OMN, 
as this is a model in many of other diaspora media outlets. However, OMN staff implied 
relying on funds raised from the Oromo community might not be sustainable. 
 
Ethiopian Government’s Pushback Against OMN 
The Ethiopian government put pressure on the Ethiopian public, particularly 
the residents of the Oromia region, not to watch OMN. According to Jawar, many 
people have individually resisted the pressure by secretly watching the network 
(Personal Communications, 2017). Reported cases include jamming, taking down of 
satellite dishes, the intimidation of viewers and dish installers, and passing 
legislations criminalizing watching OMN (HRW, 2016). On its Facebook page, 
OMN frequently provides information about satellite receiver specifications such as 
symbol rate and angle and instructions to its viewers. New forms of censorship were 
used against OMN in Oromia. The regime’s power to censor OMN also extends 
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beyond its territorial base. Members of the Ethiopian embassy in the United States 
are habitually ordered to collect information on the personnel, financial, and 
organizational structure of OMN. The regime also outbid OMN to deny its use of the 
services of satellite companies such as Eutelsat. Bowing to pressure from the 
Ethiopian government, satellite companies such as the Egyptian Nilesat and the 
European Eutelsat took down OMN from their transponders or refused to renew 
OMN’s lease when it expires in 2015. Thailand and Canadian companies followed 
suit throughout the time of the state of emergency (Personal Communications, 2017). 
In direct contacts between diplomats, Ethiopian authorities asked the United States 
government to take action against OMN. On a number of occasions, Ethiopian 
government demanded the expelling of OMN. Ethiopian government also accused 
OMN of ‘terrorism’ and ‘hate propaganda’ and called for the revocation of its 
license. The Ethiopian embassy in the United States mobilized pro-government 
immigrants in the United States to petition to the United States government to 
extradite OMN’s executive director, Jawar Mohammed. He also received a 
threatening email. In 2016 he claimed that the Ethiopian government wanted him 
dead (Personal Communications, 2017). During the height of Oromo protest in 2016, 
OMN’s broadcasting was jammed on numerous occasions (Chala, 2016). On October 
6th, 2016, after the Ethiopian government declared a state of emergency, Ethiopian 
government raided households who hoisted satellite dishes on the rooftops of their 
houses (Chala, 2016). After hundreds of people were detained during the State of 
Emergency, they were charged with passing information to OMN by using their 
Facebook pages (Addis Standard, 2016). When people were arrested, they were 
frequently asked to reveal their passwords, and then their communication with OMN 
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journalists is presented in court as an evidence of a crime (Ethiopian Human Rights 
Project, 2016). However, OMN resumed its transmissions after signing a contract with 
other satellite companies. The regime also mobilized spyware companies against 
OMN’s journalists (Citizen Lab, 2017). According to a report, Ethiopian government 
sent malicious spying software to Ethiopian journalists working for OMN. The 
Ethiopian government was involved in the hiring of a Israeli spyware company that 
was contracted to produce a spyware targeting OMN journalists (Citizen Lab, 2017). 
Since its establishment, the Ethiopian State Television has run a series of documentary 
programs on Ethiopia’s prime time television programs condemning OMN and Jawar 
Mohammed. 
 
The Reporting of Oromo Protest: Context and Process 
Less than a year after Oromia Media Network started broadcasting, its reporting 
of the political protests in Oromia changed the channel’s standing in the diaspora as well 
as in Ethiopia. The series of popular protests in Oromia that began in April 2014 proved 
to be the first opportunity for OMN to attract wide attention in the broader Ethiopian 
diaspora community. OMN’s coverage of these protests sheds light on which factors 
matter most for Ethiopian diaspora media. In its coverage of Ethiopia’s biggest news 
story, –the Oromo Protest–OMN capitalized on its cultural and ethnic proximity and most 
importantly, citizen journalists at its disposal. OMN’s reporting was some of the most 
fascinating, clearly surpassing ESAT in terms of focus, consistency, and timeliness.  
At the height of the protest in late August 2016, foreign journalists and other 
diaspora media organizations turned to OMN in record numbers for what would be one 
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the biggest developments of the protest. Political pundits and activists regarded OMN’s 
coverage as superior, especially in relation to ESAT which was a little behind in terms of 
getting the story out first. In 2017, during a scholastic conference of Oromo Studies 
Association (OSA), a scholar recognized OMN’s reporting as innovative. 
OMN’s coverage of the protest has made a great impact on news-hungry 
viewers in Ethiopia. With OMN, most people follow events in Oromia at close range. 
The impact of images and footage with brut forces of the Ethiopian government in 
Oromia is profound. Images of the brutality, which had never been seen before in any 
significant way, directly influences the residents in Oromia and shapes the public 
opinion. As Jawar put it,  
OMN’s role in propelling the Oromo protest and keeping it there is 
considerable. The coverage of the Oromo protest under the weight of 
Ethiopian government’s security forces, intensified the feeling of solidarity 
among the Oromo people (Personal Communications, 2017). 
For Kebede Lenjiso*, OMN has “helped revitalize the fight for the emancipation of 
the Oromo people.” The protest against the expansion of Addis Ababa is a case in 
point of the transnational public sphere at work. OMN’s repeated broadcasting of the 
pictures of the death and beatings of students protesting the expansion of Addis 
Ababa has inflamed passions, it has even become a rallying point of the Oromo 
protest; and it has intensified the protest. The pictures depicting death and brutal 
beatings of protesters have even become part of OMN’s regular coverage of the 
protest. Such media attention is not without consequences. For instance, partly 
because of the relentless coverage of the protest against the expansion of Addis 
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Ababa, Ethiopian authorities were forced to cancel their plan to expand Addis Ababa. 
Government affiliates of the Human Rights Commission instituted an inquiry into the 
alleged human rights abuses. More importantly, the case suggests that OMN has the 
potential to shape public opinion from afar. Overall, OMN’s coverage of Oromo 
protest has fueled the spirit of discontent in Oromia. OMN continues to broadcast 
images of the protest and mobilize support for the Oromo cause, public support for the 
Oromo protest is becoming more pronounced.  
The effect of the pictures and rhetoric of OMN can be observed by the 
Ethiopian public, who actively participate by sending thousands of messages to OMN 
journalists. OMN’s intense coverage of Oromo protest has not only fed the Oromo 
public’s fury, but also forced other media outlets to cover the protest, making other 
diaspora media outlets vulnerable to charges and open to criticism that they have not 
sufficiently covered the political crisis in Ethiopia. In this sense, OMN places itself 
as a counter-force to the indifference towards the plight of the Oromo people. Seen 
from this perspective, OMN’s success is a symptom of the failure of other media 
outlets when it comes to Oromo politics. It forced ESAT to start its Afan Oromo 
program in December 2015 five years after its formation. ESAT launched its Afan 
Oromo program during the first wave of the Oromo protest in time to report the 
developing political crisis and counterbalance OMN’s coverage of the protest. The 
initiative to persuade other media outlets, particularly in the diaspora, shows that 
OMN leads the way in reporting in Oromia. It also signals to the fact that OMN has a 
greater number of informants in Oromia. Being at the forefront of diaspora media 
outlets, OMN has nonetheless helped shape the public context for diaspora media 
outlets. In the words of Kebede Lenjiso, “Other diaspora media outlets are convinced 
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that OMN’s influence on Oromo public was a factor prompting other media outlets, 
who have only rarely report on Oromo issue start to give a wall to wall coverage 
about Oromo issue” (Personal Communications, 2017). Other media outlets in the 
diaspora have also become more vocal in their effort to highlight the Oromo protests, 
calling to the residents in Oromia and showing their suffering, which reflects the 
public outrage at the suffering in Oromia. The effect of OMN’s Oromo protest 
coverage became unavoidable, or was no longer ignored; if anything, they are taking 
note of the changes brought about by OMN. The coverage of the Oromo protest has 
gathered momentum and fueled passions in Oromia to an extent the party governing 
the regional state has permitted demonstrations and authorized fundraising 
campaigns in Oromia. 
However, even those who admire what OMN is doing have reservations about 
its coverage. Some believe that the effect of the coverage of Oromo protest is 
sometimes lost in the very act of reporting, as OMN does not have on the record 
information sources, and their reporting is based on virtual reporters with no means 
of verifications. Viewers are fed up with a constant raw stream of information that 
have gone through a minimal verification process. The reality is reported in a 
fragmented way. It is true that OMN covers the Oromo protest extensively, but the 
resultant coverage is for the most part, caught in events and developments at the 
expense of a more profound treatment. The images of suffering and victimization, of 
blood and death become a daily staple for viewers who in turn, become entangled 
with details of the conflict and are hardly able to interact with the conflict as a whole. 
The coverage of Oromo protest often comes down to material; to be consumed by the 
frustrated masses to the point of being saturated with images. In some instances, and 
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during periods of height of Oromo protest in the whole of Oromia, the same pictures 
are repeated over and over on news broadcasts as analysis comments on the events 
on Facebook live videos. Half of the screen has the picture of the commentator and 
the second half shows a rerun of footage. At the beginning, the viewer is affected by 
the scenes and responds to them in varying degrees, but as these same images keep 
recurring, the viewer risks becoming numb as a result of experiencing–‘compassion 
fatigue’– which leaves them exhausted by the spectacle of violent events and reports 
about misery and suffering. He or she becomes accustomed to seeing graphic pictures 
and dreadful events to the point that the event loses its eventfulness in the daily 
routine screenings of violence. More than that, the images that are being fed are for 
the most part tragic and in that sense, tend to sap the energies and hopes of the 
viewers. The continuous or repeated airing of images of victims and victimization, of 
expulsion and demolition may incite the masses in Ethiopia, but it also tends to affect 
them negatively. Furthermore, long distance journalism that OMN reporters and 
anchors engage in often leads them to paint a black and white picture, which pits two 
irreconcilables against each other–the Ethiopian government vs. the opposition; 
Oromo Nationalists vs. pan-Ethiopian nationalists, weakened opposition vs. a strong 
Ethiopian State, and so on. This black and white picture may leave out the ‘gray’ in 
the Ethiopian political crisis. 
For some, OMN’s coverage of the Oromo protest gives it a strong and a 
vibrant role in Ethiopian politics in general and in Oromo politics in particular. Some 
even go as far as claiming that the channel coverage lends support to ‘opposition party’ 
within the governing coalition of the EPRDF that administers the Oromia regional state. 
For other others, OMN’s coverage of Oromo protests is dubious to say the least. 
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According to a pro-government commentator, OMN is manipulative and the young 
people in Oromia have been fed with highly ethnicized report of the protest. Government 
authorities even dismiss OMN’s coverage as sheer propaganda and irresponsible 
journalism intended to bring about a regime change from afar. OMN is further 
criticized for portraying the Oromo people as helpless victims.  
As I have shown earlier, OMN is explicit that its coverage of the protests is 
unabashedly pro-Oromo. It insists that it is because the ‘facts on the ground are there 
for everyone to see’ (OMN, 2016). According to Human Rights Watch, at the end of 
its fourth year, the Oromo protests left at least 1000 people dead, thousands injured, 
and a million people were internally displaced almost all of whom were civilians. To 
take the position of the detached observer or to claim objective neutrality when it 
comes to the protests in Oromia, is something that is hard to do for many Ethiopian 
journalists in the diaspora since they themselves were victims of the Ethiopian 
government. 
OMN’s coverage of Oromo protest has also shaped the coverage of the 
protests by foreign correspondents in Addis Ababa. In the diaspora, there is a deep 
resentment toward foreign media correspondents, and in fact, many report the protest 
as a conflict between two groups with equal capacity to means of violence. There is a 
feeling, common among Ethiopians, that many Western journalists tend to be 
partisan and that their coverage of the Oromo protest tends to be slanted toward a 
government narrative. For example, correspondents do not often recognize or give 
due attention to the Oromo perspective (Personal Communications, 2017). Most 
reporters tend to highlight the ‘economic success’ that Ethiopia has achieved in a 
‘troubled and unstable’ Horn of Africa. For Ethiopians, this is suggesting that the 
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world cannot afford to have a failed state in the Horn of Africa that could trigger 
further migration to Europe. In their reporting, they give little attention to the plight 
of the Oromo people and provide little analysis about the roots of the problem. By 
and large, the perspective that one gets from some foreign correspondents in Addis 
Ababa tend to justify the violence of the Ethiopian government against peaceful 
protesters. Some even charge that for some foreign correspondents, ‘property 
damages’ are deemed more important than the death of civilians; much more extended 
coverage is devoted to property damages caused by the protesters than to incidents where 
greater numbers of peaceful protesters are killed. A Bloomberg correspondent wrote that 
one-hundred people have died because of a ‘stampede’, thus denoting the incident as 
something caused by the protesters themselves whereas OMN describes the incident as a 
massacre. Most foreign correspondents report the violent acts as work done to keep the 
law and order of the country, thus they are justified. Increasingly, the violence of the 
protesters has been labeled destructive–it has never been labeled as ‘a liberation struggle’ or 
‘a resistance,’ as OMN refers to it. Although the term “terrorism” is often applied to 
Ethiopian opposition forces including OMN, the term “state terrorism” is never applied to 
the Ethiopian government’s acts of violence. Similarly, OMN has been criticized for 
using the term “martyr” to describe Oromo protesters who were killed during the 
protesters. 
Given that the regime controls much of the media coverage about Oromo 
protests, and given that foreign correspondents rely on the authorization they get 
from Ethiopian authorities, the Oromo protest has a tendency to be framed through 
government friendly news frames. This should come as no surprise; most if not all 
foreign correspondents are based in Addis Ababa–which also serves as a hub for 
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diplomats and media organizations. To write their reports, journalists heavily depend 
on the information relayed to the reporters through government sources based in 
Addis Ababa, but they do have not lived experience of the Oromo protesters. Adding 
to these shortcomings is the reality of the private press reporting in Ethiopia, as it 
faces censure, bans, and harassment from government authorities. 
In Ethiopia there is always media repression, not only during times of political 
tension, but also in the day-to-day reporting on events. Journalists cannot always get 
to the site of events or verify happenings, as was the case during the Oromo protests 
in much of Oromia. From the beginning of the protests in 2014, OMN adopted a 
strategy to publicize the Oromo perspective of the protest and to combat the 
misrepresentation of the Oromo issue. OMN aims at counterbalancing foreign 
correspondents’ depiction of the causes of the Oromo protest against the Ethiopian 
government. The often live, gruesome pictures that OMN has been airing on the 
Oromo protests–as in the case of the incident at Irecha where hundreds were killed 
during a cultural celebration–have provided a different perspective and even told a 
different story, written by foreign correspondents in Ethiopia. The images of the 
practices of Ethiopian security forces in Oromia that OMN is making instantly 
accessible by broadcasting on TV and uploading on its Facebook page are 
increasingly finding their way to the international human rights NGOs and media 
organizations, as OMN audience is expanding to the international community as 
well. This is not without effects. Suffice to mention, two developments which may 
not be direct consequences, but are nonetheless noteworthy indicators that can help 
gauge the impact of OMN. 
The first pertains to the number and the extent of hearings held in the United 
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States congress and in the European Union parliament in support of the Oromo 
cause, not to mention the number of reports that human rights organizations such as 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International produced about the protest over the 
last four years. The second pertains to ESAT’s decision to launch an Afan Oromo 
program to influence the thinking of the Oromo public opinion inflamed by its 
practices. This was done in order to counter the effects of the plethora of diaspora 
Afan Oromo media outlets, which have sprung up recently; and more pointedly, to 
counter OMN, which given that its exceptional attention to the Oromo cause that it is 
perceived to adopt is popular among Oromos.  
Conclusion  
The establishment of OMN is preceded by ESAT, which reported on political 
events in Ethiopia. As I described in chapter three, from the death of Meles Zenawi 
and big corruption allegations, ESAT was the unique source of information that 
demonstrated the pan-Ethiopian domination of Ethiopian news and especially the 
supremacy of ESAT as an information provider. In similar manner with ESAT, the 
launch of OMN must be viewed in relation to the events of the early 2000s, 
particularly the 2005 and 2015 post-election crackdown on journalists and 
politicians. OMN was launched in the same context and with the same objective of 
changing the information flow in Ethiopia. After Oromo protests started in 2014, 
OMN exercised the same monopoly on information from Oromia, which ESAT had 
before the advent of OMN. Furthermore, the channel has become the sole source of 
information on the protests in Oromia. OMN’s journalists, many of whom are 







THE TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE IN ETHIOPIA POLITICAL  
Introduction  
This chapter builds on the discussions of the previous two chapters aiming to give 
empirical evidence of the transnational public sphere in the Ethiopian media context. As has 
been shown in the previous two chapters, ESAT and OMN have played a significant role in 
restructuring the flow of information into Ethiopia and publicizing political debates from the 
United States, where they are headquartered. In this chapter, I will highlight the practical 
manifestation of their roles. My discussion of ESAT’s and OMN’s contribution to the 
shaping of the Ethiopia’s transnational public sphere is supported by the analysis of 
Ethiopia’s government reaction to their reporting. First, I will be looking at the general 
context in which these two media outlets were able to play such a crucial role. Second, I 
will identify the key characteristics of the Ethiopian ‘transnational’ public sphere. Third, I 
will explore the political implications of this emerging public sphere with special emphasis 
on Ethiopian politics.  
 
ESAT’s and OMN’s Operations: Summary  
The continuous repression of Ethiopian journalists caused the unceasing waves of 
migration of Ethiopian journalists since the EPRDF regime came to power in 1991. This 
spurs the rise of vibrant diaspora media. With domestic media constrained by heavy state 
censorship, Ethiopian journalists working at diaspora media outlets such as ESAT and 
OMN and at international media outlets such as Voice of America (VOA), the BBC, and 
Deutsche Welle, have become key conduits of alternative news and information on 
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Ethiopian politics; and they have helped fuel the growth of a transnational information 
network connecting Ethiopians across the globe. This network has been largely driven by 
the rise of internet and satellite technologies, which are reshaping modes of 
communication and the flows of information, both inside and outside Ethiopia. Activists 
and journalists who have left Ethiopia often continue to work abroad as journalists, for a 
growing number of the Ethiopian diaspora Amharic and Afan Oromo satellite television 
chiefs among them are at ESAT and OMN, as well as other online news portals 
established by exiled opposition and independent journalists 
ESAT’s and OMN’s essential aim is political. Exiled opposition groups, 
journalists, and members of Ethiopian diaspora consider ESAT and OMN as their outlet 
to counter the Ethiopian government’s hegemonic control on the flow information in 
Ethiopia. ESAT’s strategy is not dissimilar to the efforts of OMN to combine journalistic 
reporting with forceful anti-Ethiopian government rhetoric. It is no coincidence that both 
ESAT and OMN regularly raise funds from the Ethiopian diaspora to broadcast 24/7 
news channels in order to counter what they see as the Ethiopian government’s complete 
control of information flow. They are both established by members of the Ethiopian 










Table 6.1. Comparing ESAT and OMN 
 ESAT OMN 
Source of Funding Diaspora Community Diaspora Community 
Main operations base 
Washington DC, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Main language Amharic Afan Oromo 
Annual Budget (US$) n.a n.a. 
Global Support Units 50 Cities 60 Cities 
Number of employees >40 >35 
Main target audience Ethiopians Oromos, 
Weekly online audience 500,000 250,000 
Reach (Satellite TV 
households) 
15 to 20m 10m 
 
 
In an emerging Ethiopian transnational public sphere, ESAT and OMN are 
offering a voice and a perspective to Ethiopians who live across the globe. Ethiopians can 
see more coverage of political issues and dissenting voices from ESAT and OMN than 
what would be available on most Ethiopia based television stations such as Kana, EBS, 
Fana Television. They both show a high propensity to include perspectives from 
Ethiopia’s banned opposition groups than Fana Television, for example, and much more 
about under-reported issues like corruption, human right violations, and protest prone 
regions such as Oromia and Amhara regional states. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian state 
television news reporting is characterized by long-winded speeches of EPRDF leaders 
with extreme deference to those leaders and an emphasis on government achievements. 
Negative news and critical voices are minimal with extensive coverage of an abundance 
of ordinary people being portrayed as benefiting from the policies of the Ethiopian 
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government. However, unlike Ethiopian state media outlets, ESAT and OMN have a 
different style of presenting their news. Although the styles and the program formats of 
ESAT and OMN are copied from the likes of Al-Jazeera and the BBC, ESAT and OMN 
have not taken the journalistic values. They are more oppositional in their tone, and in 
tradition of the diaspora community funded channels, they act as a platform for exiled 
political groups. Although they both show some pluralism in entertaining diverse exiled 
political groups, there is virtually no coverage about the issues that concern the Ethiopian 
immigrant communities in the United States. Over the last three years ESAT and OMN 
included more voices from protest leaders, rebel groups, parties, or social movements in 
Oromia and Amhara regions. As a result, the heavily censored domestic television 
stations have been forced to compete with ESAT and OMN. 
Both ESAT and OMN operate in a transnational public sphere in virtually all of 
the senses discussed in the second chapter. In both cases the transnational public sphere 
links the Ethiopian diaspora community that is spread across the globe, to the whole 
range of greatly different locals in Ethiopia. As I have shown in the last two chapters, 
there is a general agreement among ESAT and OMN journalists that the political events 
such as the Oromo protests and the death of Melez Zenawi are sociopolitical events and 
must be understood in the context of Ethiopia’s emerging media landscape, which has 
been changing since 2010. Reporting political events and bringing them into Ethiopia via 
transnational visual space was one of the building blocks of ESAT and OMN. Televising 
political news reports about issues and events close to the hearts and minds of Ethiopians 
and publicizing them from the United States meant that the Ethiopian government is no 
longer capable of monopolizing the public sphere. It is a new era where the Ethiopian 
diaspora media has become instrumental in the formation of public opinion in Ethiopia. 
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This has become visible during the political unrest that lasted over three years, in which 
ESAT and OMN played a pivotal role in channeling news and information between the 
domestic and international public.  
The relative freedom that ESAT and OMN have in the United States, the regular 
financial contribution from the broader Ethiopian diaspora community throughout the 
world, and the emerging citizen journalists on the ground in Ethiopia, enabled them to 
cover most of the political events in Ethiopia faster than the Ethiopian state media outlets. 
This advantage gave them importance over their competitors in Ethiopia and made them 
the preferred channels. Specifically for ESAT, this became visible in 2012, when its 
unrelenting coverage of the death of Meles Zenawi forced the Ethiopian government to 
admit the death of the late prime minister a month after his death. For OMN, it happened 
in 2015, when its wall to wall coverage of the Oromo protests forced the Ethiopian 
government to cancel the proposed plan of expanding Addis Ababa into the Oromia 
Region. Following these major political events, Ethiopia witnessed a series of successive 
political events that consolidated ESAT’s and OMN’s position and gradually built a 
reputation as the leading Ethiopian diaspora media outlets. 
For the Ethiopian government, the increasing supply of information through 
ESAT and OMN has posed significant challenges and threats to the State’s internal 
monopoly over information and communications. The Ethiopian government has 
responded by intensifying its efforts to control the domestic public’s access to global 
communication networks, using both legal and technological means–throttling internet 
speeds, filtering and blocking websites, and jamming the broadcasts of ESAT and OMN. 
However, the effort of the Ethiopian government to stave off the effect of ESAT and 
OMN inside Ethiopia is very much curtailed by the widespread global network of 
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communications infrastructure.  
Back to the Theoretical Framework: Transnational Public Sphere  
ESAT and OMN have played a leading role in the creation of a communicative space 
in the context of a transnational public sphere, giving it its defining characteristics. 
However, this rapidly expanding communicative space, which is actively being used by 
ESAT and OMN, is also used by other diaspora media outlets. Competing satellite 
television channels such as EBS, Kana TV, and other independently operated websites 
and blogs, have all contributed to the emergence of Ethiopian transnational 
communicative space to varying degrees. The unprecedented proliferation of social 
media platforms further extended the reach and influence of ESAT and OMN, adding 
new dimensions to this emerging communicative space in the transnational public sphere. 
The following are the key characteristics and defining features of the emerging Ethiopian 
communicative space in the context of the transnational public sphere. 
1. As mentioned in chapter two, transnational public sphere could be considered as a 
Habermasian public sphere in that the emerging Ethiopian communicative space 
has some defining features that accommodate a free and critical discourse about 
the issues of interest to Ethiopian communities around the world. This 
communicative space, which is heavily being used by ESAT and OMN, is 
expanding and includes a number of other platforms for free and open discussion, 
which is creating a demonstrable political implication. Exposing a large segments 
of Ethiopians to daily news reports, talk shows, and debates–in which growing 
numbers of journalists, political elites, activists and ordinary people take part–
resulted in the formation of protest movements sweeping Ethiopia over the last 
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three years. The political effects of these social movements are visible as the 
Ethiopian diaspora media institutionalizes and assumes clearer political functions. 
2. Social media platforms, particularly Facebook and Twitter, offer alternative 
communicative space for ESAT and OMN to connect, communicate, generating 
their oppositional counter-discourse far away from their country of origin. With 
their growing capacity to use social media platforms, they get boundless amounts 
of information from Ethiopia and broadcast them back to Ethiopia, actively 
engaging in discussion of public affairs. ESAT and OMN should be understood as 
major agents of Ethiopia’s new communicative space in the context of a 
transnational public sphere that allows discourse and participation that is not allowed 
inside Ethiopia. The recent political developments in Ethiopia clearly show how the 
divide between the so called ‘diaspora’ and ‘the domestic’ is superficial and has 
become completely obsolete in that the Ethiopian government is no longer capable 
of preventing the flow of critical information into Ethiopia from the diaspora. Access 
to these critical information is available to Ethiopians with a satellite dish and a TV 
set, a personal computer, internet access, and smart phones. The legal and 
technological barriers that the Ethiopian government put in place are not good 
enough to fend off the information flow. This is not to suggest that the Ethiopian 
government has stopped trying to put barriers against the flow of the information. 
However, the dedication of the staff of ESAT and OMN and the voluntary 
financial contribution they regularly receive from members of the Ethiopian 
diaspora has been a source of strength. It is remarkable that ESAT and 
OMN’s broadcasting will always resume immediately after the Ethiopian 
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government jammed their broadcasting. Other than the Ethiopian diaspora, 
ESAT and OMN are supported by non-state actors, including human rights 
groups, anti-censorship organizations, and intellectuals from the Western 
world. 
3. The Ethiopian diaspora community in the United States consists of more than a 
quarter-million and it is diverse in terms of gender, ethnicity, and religion as one of 
the largest African immigrant groups in the United States. Looking at the 
community from a mass media perspective, the Ethiopian diaspora community has 
been brought together by ESAT and OMN as well as social media platforms with 
increased importance and significance in Ethiopia. What unites them all is the 
politics of their homeland, despite their stark ideological differences. The political 
dimension of ESAT and OMN is omnipresent in the minds of their executives who 
identify their people as their target audience. 
The emergence of ESAT and OMN in Ethiopian communicative space in the 
context of the transnational public sphere has brought changes to the local political 
dynamics of Ethiopia and have manifested in the following cases. 
1. ESAT and OMN have changed the Ethiopian media landscape, and in the process, 
they have changed the local political dynamics. As I have explained in the last two 
chapters, ESAT and OMN have quickly grown to become Ethiopia’s leading 
satellite televisions, causing a change in Ethiopia’s information flow and shaping 
power relations. Both represent alternative media channels, broadcasting critical 
voices into Ethiopia, but they have also played, to varying degrees, the role of 
political representatives. In some occasions, they not only act as media outlets, but 
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they also act as political actors. In the absence freedom of expression in Ethiopia, 
ESAT and OMN are some the de facto opposition outlets, despite their stark 
ideological dispositions. They both provide platforms with opposing views and 
political dissidents living both inside and outside Ethiopia. In playing this 
remarkably active role, they provide news report on daily political developments 
and they suggest solutions on a regular basis.  
2. ESAT and OMN have shattered the information monopoly, despite the Ethiopian 
government’s effort to remain in control of the information flow. Despite 
Ethiopian’s government relentless effort to control the flow of information in 
Ethiopia, ESAT and OMN have caused a profound change in the Ethiopian media 
sphere by breaking the monopoly that the Ethiopian government has had on the 
flow of the information. In the previous two chapters, we have seen that partly 
because of the commitment and the financial backing that the Ethiopian diaspora 
community have given for ESAT and OMN, these two media outlets are playing a 
leading role in changing the Ethiopian media landscape and shaping Ethiopian 
opposition groups regarding politics in Ethiopia. Among the most apparent 
implications of ESAT and OMN is the reversal of influence that the Ethiopian 
government exerts over the media through monopolizing the flow of information 
inside Ethiopia.  
3. Over the last few years, ESAT and OMN have become capable of setting their own 
agenda, away from Ethiopian governmental and with their own financial resources. 
With the creation of the communicative space in the transnational public sphere, 
ESAT and OMN have made it possible for exiled Ethiopian political parties and 
members of the Ethiopian diaspora to bring the Ethiopian government monopoly 
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of information to an end. In the process, ESAT and OMN profoundly change the 
dynamics of Ethiopian politics by exerting influence over the Ethiopian 
government, which quite often finds itself forced to adapt its actions, policies, and 





ESAT AND OMN’S FRAMING OF POLITICAL EVENTS IN ETHIOPIA  
Introduction  
This Chapter discusses how ESAT and OMN reported on the protest incidents 
happened in Ethiopia. As I have suggested in the section that dealt with my sampling 
technique, all the news packages (n=238) are analyzed in three parts according to three 
separate reporting periods. The three periods also involve protest incidents (The Master 
Plan protest that started in Ginichi; the small rallies of Spring; and Feyisa Lilysa’s 
Olympic protest) which took the bulk of ESAT’s and OMN’s coverage and constituted 
the economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions of the protest. The first part 
(n=65) explores ESAT’s and OMN’s coverage of the first wave of the protest within a 
period of five months, from November 15th, 2015, to February 28th, 2016. The second 
wave of the protest happened from March 1st, 2016, to May 30th, 2016, and is covered by 
(n=63) story items from ESAT and OMN. A period of three months, from June 1st, 2016, 
to August 30th, 2016, was covered by (n=110) story items from both ESAT and OMN. 
This coverage period was dominated by the stories of Feyisa Lilesa’s protest at the Rio 
Summer Olympics. Feyisa showed a protest sign by crossing his wrists over his head at 
the finish line, which brought worldwide attention to the protests in Oromia. A significant 
majority of the story items were selected to explore how ESAT and OMN presented 
Feyisa’s protest. In order to explore the shift (or a lack of it) in the framing of the protests 
through the contents of the story items across the three-coverage periods, the analysis in 
this chapter starts with the first wave of the protest with due emphasis on the protest 
against the expansion of Addis Ababa into Oromia. 
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Results and Discussion 
I will present the frames and their supporting evidence in a way that follows the 
order in which the protests occurred. I have adopted the same structure of analysis for the 
remaining protest periods. I have begun my analysis with coding the story items that 
helped me discover the general descriptive statistics. Frequency of reporting and themes 
taken from the content are organized in order to explore the quantitative differences, not 
only between ESAT and OMN, but also between the three protest periods selected for 
analysis. Secondly, the master frames of Oromo nationalism and pan-Ethiopian 
nationalism that are discovered in the analysis by the defined periods of demonstrating 
composite relationships between Oromo nationalists, pan-Ethiopian nationalists, and the 
Ethiopian government throughout the protest period. The reasons behind the complexity 
of the relationship is explored throughout the analysis of the coverage. Headlines and 
excerpts from the contents of the story items are analyzed by the method of critical 
discourse analysis undertaken in the broad Ethiopian political context. In this case, while 
the frames of Oromo nationalism are represented in a form of ethnoterritorial identity, 
pan-Ethiopian nationalism is presented as a unionist ideology that encompass all 
ethnolinguistic groups under the Ethiopian nation-state, which condemns any real or 
perceived secessionist tendencies by any of ethnolinguistic groups. 
 
The 1st Wave of the Protest: Quantitative Analysis Results and Discussion 
In the second week of November 2015, OMN reported news that students in 
Ginchi held a political rally protesting the government decision to lease out a protected 
forest and land owned by their school to private individuals. ESAT and other diaspora 
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media also covered this protest, albeit later than OMN. While the Ethiopian government 
media reported nothing about the protest, both OMN and ESAT paid much more 
attention to the protest and produced a clear majority of news items.  
 
Master Frames and Discussion of the 1st Wave of Protest  
Masterframes: Oromo Nationalism vs. Pan-Ethiopian Nationalism  
Among all story items in the first period, the protest was portrayed with 
contrasting narratives. On the one hand, the protest was a ‘question of identity’ and 
‘ethino-territorial claims’ of the Oromo people, which were put forward by “courageous 
Oromo students who were willing to put their lives on line” (OMN, November 23rd, 
2015). As the single largest ethnolinguistic group in Ethiopia, the Oromos have demands 
for the Ethiopian government to stop “wresting their land away” and “abolish the 
historical and sacred Oromo history” from the areas surrounding the capital city, Addis 
Ababa (OMN, Dec 10th, 2015).  
In addition, the protest in the first period was not only presented as an ethino-
territorial claim, it was also presented as an act of solidarity that conceals the intra-
Oromo distinctions based on religion, gender, and social class, and that emphasizes a 
single community with common goals. When the protest grew into larger areas of Oromia 
in November 2015, “All Oromos across the world, regardless of their faith and political 
inclinations, must resist the wicked plan of Ethiopian government that will evict 
thousands of Oromo farmers from their sacred land” (OMN, December 19th). The 
planned expansion of Addis Ababa into Oromia was one of the biggest problems the 
Oromos face “since their incorporation into Ethiopian State” (OMN, December 19th). On 
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an OMN Town Hall hosted in Minneapolis, Minnesota and broadcasted as a special 
program, a panelist who repeatedly referred Ethiopia as an empire, said:  
We all are fighting for Oromo notwithstanding our differences. We have gotten into 
a fight with a formidable enemy that has dispossessed all of us of our land and our 
identity. Our enemy has strangled our necks and any other fighting move we can 
think of is poking our enemy in the eyes, and while our enemy is holding his eyes in 
pain, we will have our breathing space (OMN, November 19th). 
On the other hand, the same protest and the causes of the protest in Oromia could 
be perceived and presented in different frames. For instance, demands of the protesters 
could be interpreted as a question of democracy, rule of law, and equality. “Students in 
Oromia region of Ethiopia are protesting the illegal expansion of Addis Ababa into 
surrounding area of Oromia region” (ESAT December 19th, 2015). “The Ethiopian 
Regime has committed a widespread human rights violation against peaceful student 
protesters in Oromia Region” (ESAT December 23rd, 2015). In other words, these reports 
highlight the human rights violations that student protesters suffered. Additionally, whilst 
the location of the protest and the human rights violations of the protesters are 
emphasized, it could also be perceived as a broader issue of authoritarianism in Ethiopia, 
because the “the regime had arrested, tortured and killed thousands of Ethiopians” 
(ESAT, December 6th, 2015). Meanwhile, OMN interpreted the protest as the latest 
chapter of the struggle for the emancipation of the Oromo people, and drew the 
conclusion that the cause of the protest is not only to “demand property ownership, but 




Masterframe of Oromo Nationalism: Oromo Protests  
In ascribing responsibility for the loss of life, OMN blames the Ethiopian 
government for “killing, evicting and torturing” the Oromo people (November 25th, 
2015). However, it accentuates that the root problem is not the ethnic federal system that 
is instituted by the regime, but rather that Oromos do not have power over their homeland 
and thus, do not get a fair share from the federation (OMN, December 12th, 2015). While 
ESAT similarly laid the blame on Ethiopian government, it defines the problem mainly in 
terms of the Ethiopian system of governance, calling it “ethnic federalism,” suggesting 
that unless Ethiopians from all ethnic groups united against the authoritarian regime, the 
protest will not bear fruits (December 31st, 2015). Such contrasting selection of words 
used by ESAT and OMN to diagnose Ethiopia’s political problems and to suggest 
solutions that promote the view that Ethiopian regime is ‘authoritarian’, whilst 
interpreting the root causes of the problem in diametrically opposite ideological 
underpinnings.  
 
Quantitative Analysis, Results and Discussion 
As I have explained in the sampling section, hundreds of story items were 
published during the first period of the protests, 65 of which were chosen for analysis. 
Story items that are not directly related to the protest are not selected for the analysis. In 
contrast with the three-coverage period of the protest, the first period is longer – five 
months, but only 27.3% of the total number of story items (n=65) were published in this 
period; whereas the vast majority of the story items, (n=173) 72.7% of the total number, 
were published in the succeeding two periods of protests. This is because as the protests 
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intensified in Ethiopia, both ESAT and OMN gave a great deal of attention to the protests 
and produced several videos. 
 
Figure 7.1. ESAT’s and OMN’s Overall Reporting Frequencies of the 1st Wave Protest  
 
Firstly, as shown in figure 7.1 an interesting finding is that OMN covered the 
protest in Oromia more than ESAT. OMN published the most videos covering the 
protests during this sample period.  
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Secondly, Figure 7.2 gives the overall statistics of the different themes that were 
present in the content of news items. ‘Criticism of Ethiopian Government’ (n=22) in this 
period is the most frequent theme in the reporting on the protest, followed by (n=21) 
news packages covering the ‘Violence perpetrated against peaceful protesters in Oromia’. 
The theme of ‘TPLF is responsible for the violence in Ethiopia’ comes in the third period 
(n=14). By contrast, only eight news packages (n=8) put blame on regional party leaders 
as violence perpetrators. Therefore, during this period, there were 22 news items of the 
total 65 published that objected the violence against the peaceful protestors; while only 8 
news packages attribute the violence to regional party officials. Themes attributing 
responsibility to the Ethiopian government were higher than the other themes during 
reporting. It can be said that criticism of the Ethiopian government was the focus of the 
reporting during this period. The criticism of the Ethiopian government shows the non-
neutral position of ESAT and OMN in reporting on the protests.  
Taking a look at each media outlets, the graphs below suggest that first of all, 
compared to OMN, ESAT relatively adopted a frame of democracy and rule of law in its 
reporting, simply highlighting the protest as a demand for democracy and rule of law, 
rather than a question of identity by the Oromos. Figure 6.4 illustrates that 50% of the 
news packages (n=15) were published to report how the Ethiopian government was brutal 
when quelling the protests. The rest of the reporting gives equal coverage to the unlawful 











Figure 7.4. 1st Wave Protest Frequencies of Themes – OMN 
 
 
OMN also adopted a variety of themes, according to Figure 7.5. The three most 
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government and described the perpetrators of the violence as Tigryan security forces. In 
addition, it reports from the perspectives of the Oromo community. 
  
Masterframes and Discussion 
Ethiopian Government Tigrayan Minority and Authoritarian Regime 
Both ESAT and OMN use the word ‘authoritarian’ to refer to the Ethiopian 
government, and they use the Tigrayan minority forces to refer to the Ethiopian 
authorities in this sample period. It is important to examine how the Ethiopian 
government was discussed in the diaspora media in relation the protests, the 
consequences of its actions, and how the regime was described as a Tigrayan-dominated 
authoritarian government. The Ethiopian government’s response to the protest was 
described by diaspora media in several ways. Phrases such as ‘Ethiopian regime forces 
brutally murdered peaceful protesters in Oromia’ were common. Transcripts of headlines, 
which contain labels such as ‘shot dead’ and ‘killed’ are listed below. 
1. Government security forces killed a number of students in Oromia as 
students hold peaceful rally against proposed expansion of Addis Ababa 
(ESAT, Dec 7th, 2015) 
 
2. Death toll rises in Oromia as Ethiopian government unleashes members of 
Ethiopian Defense Forces on peaceful citizens protesting land grab (ESAT, 
Dec 9th, 2015) 
 
3. Oromo students shot dead in Ginchi town when they hold peaceful rally 
protesting Addis Ababa’s master plan (OMN, November 19th, 2015) 
 
4. Government troops opened fire when Oromo students protested Addis 
Ababa’s Master Plan at Haramaya University and killed peaceful 
demonstrators OMN, Dec 8th, 2015) 
 
5. An Oromo mother was heartlessly killed by TPLF troops while protecting 





Television news headlines catch the attention of their audiences by summarizing 
the central element of the news. Their ideological implications also influence readers in 
their understanding of the following detailed news stories. The list of headlines above 
identifies the violent action of the Ethiopian government in various ways.  
Phrases such as ‘government forces shot killed peaceful protesters’, ‘Members of 
Ethiopian Defense Force masquerading as a police force opened fire on peaceful 
protesters’, and ‘death toll rises as regime forces attacked peaceful protesters’, are the 
phrases chosen to define the violent action of the Ethiopian government. Both ESAT and 
OMN used these kinds of terms expansively. The words in the headlines have similar 
meaning: the Ethiopian government used violence against peaceful protesters. Thus, there 
are two messages conveyed by these words. Firstly, that students were protesting the 
expansion of Addis Ababa into surrounding Oromia Region. Secondly, that they were 
protesting peacefully, but the Ethiopian government forces were killing the peaceful 
protesters. In other words, the authoritarian Ethiopian government was quashing the 
peaceful protest using violence and force. Both ESAT and OMN presented protesting 
students in Oromia as the victim of the government’s military action. In the details of 
their reporting, both ESAT and OMN used the Tigrayan People Liberation Front, or 
‘TPLF’ troops, to refer to the regime security forces, portraying the federal government 
as a tool of TPLF. The term TPLF was used in a disparaging sense to show the federal 
government as a political structure manipulated by Tigryan minority political elites. Here, 
it emphasizes the nature of the regime as an authoritarian government, which is 
dominated by a minority ethnic group. Thirdly, the words ‘the expansion of Addis Ababa’ 
and ‘Addis Ababa Master Plan’ in the headlines provided by both ESAT and OMN, 
accepted the expansion of Addis Ababa not only as land grab, but also as an agenda 
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pushed by the TPLF in the name of urbanization. As a result, the Addis Ababa Master 
plan was a plan destroying “the poor farmers whose life is merely depended on their 
land.”  
More detailed descriptions about Addis Ababa’s Master Plan and its mission have 
been made according to the following list of punditry analysis made on both ESAT and 
OMN. In common with the headlines of the news, the analysts appearing on both media 
outlets heavily used terms such as ‘illegal expansion of Addis Ababa’ and ‘Land grab by 
TPLF elites.’ However, Ethiopian government presented Addis Ababa’s Master plan as a 
project that will integrate Addis Ababa’s service with the adjacent rural towns of Oromia. 
The plan, in a town hall style public discussion and interviews, was also broadcasted both 
on ESAT and OMN. Terms such as ‘dispossession’, ‘land grab’, and ‘displacement’ were 
used by analysts to highlight Addis Ababa’s Master Plan: “More than 150,000 Oromo 
farmers have been forcibly evicted from their lands since 2005 without compensation, 
as members of TPLF sells off the land of the Oromos for people who have become 
instantaneous millionaires” (Tsegaye Ararsa on OMN, Dec 26th, 2015).  
 
1. Land of the Oromos is up for sell (November 14th, 2015) 
 
2. The Oromos are refusing to be evicted from their fatherland (OMN, 
November 16th, 2015) 
 
3. Protesters in Oromia Region are attacked by special operations security 
forces known as Agazi for protesting their forced removal (ESAT, 
November 11th, 2015) 
 
4. TPLF armies attack civilians in Oromia for protesting the killings and arrest 
of their fellow citizens (ESAT, December 21st, 2015)  
 




6. TPLF conquest of Oromia (OMN, November 29th, 2015) 
 
Additionally, the phrase ‘eviction of Oromo farmers’ was used in a headline in 
OMN to demonstrate the forced removal of Oromo farmers from their homeland. The 
phrase ‘a right to the fatherland of Oromos’ implies the hereditary inheritance of land. 
The phrase ‘a right to the fatherland of Oromos’ also revealed OMN’s views on the 
Ethiopian government’s political and military power in Ethiopia. 
Moreover, comparisons between government security forces and protesters have 
been made in both headlines and detailed news packages. The Ethiopian government was 
always described as a ‘regime,’ committing a ‘gross violation of human rights,’ and 
Oromos were always represented as ‘peaceful people’ who are just protesting being 
evicted from their ancestral lands. OMN accused the Ethiopian government of “mixing 
violent and legal means to depopulate the Oromos from their homeland in the name of 
expanding Addis Ababa into Oromia Region” (December 2015). The Ethiopian 
government’s plan to expand Addis Ababa was even likened to the Emperor Menelik II’s 
expansion toward southern Ethiopia in the late 19th century (OMN, December 30th, 
2015). 
In the meantime, among the news items, only 8 of them describe the protest in 
Oromia as ‘liberating’ and ‘reclaiming’ the country from ‘alien powers’. OMN also 
broadcasted a voice of a government official, changing the pitch of their voice to show 
that that even the rank and file remembers of the Oromo Peoples Democratic 
Organization (OPDO) consider the protest against the expansion of Addis Ababa into 
Oromia to be ‘liberating the Oromo people’ and would lead to completing the 
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emancipation of the ‘Oromo nation’ (December 2015). As suggested above, the protest 
against the expansion of Addis Ababa’s Master plan was viewed as a defense of the land 
of the Oromos from TPLF’s agents that are frequently described as ‘aliens’. The 
Ethiopian government’s characterization of Addis Ababa’s Master Plan as a proposal that 
‘integrates the service of Addis Ababa with nearby Oromia districts’ was only a veil cast 
over the ‘blatant land grab,’ which government officials announced was simply 
propaganda. As OMN suggested,  
there is every reason to expect that sooner or later Addis Ababa’s Master Plan will 
in fact hand over the land of the Oromo farmers to few people who have 
connections with the regime and will turn Oromo farmers in to daily laborers and 
sentries (December 9th, 2015). 
 
Oromos - the victim of TPLF’s Security Forces  
While the Ethiopian government was described as a regime controlled by ‘TPLF’, 
the Oromos on the other hand, were described not only ‘a nation on their own’ (OMN), 
but also a ‘loving and welcoming people whose generosity was victimized by Ethiopian 
government (OMN). 
Firstly, OMN included sound bites that show the protesters view of the regime’s 
military two times. In the following two sound bites, protesters described the military as 
‘Agazi soldiers,’ a term used that shows that the army is commanded exclusively by 
Tigrayans. OMN also played a sound bite of the wife of Bekele Gerba, an Oromo 
opposition leader who was denied a medical attention while in jail. She said, “I was 
fortunate enough to live during the previous regime, I have never seen such a brutal 
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regime. The solders tortured him and denied him a medical attention.” 
In this sound bite, the actions of the security forces of the Ethiopian government 
are described as brutal. They were described as much worse than the previous regime. 
The term ‘Agazi’ refers to a military unit that has been accused of killing and torturing 
protesters. In the excerpt, terms such as ‘brutal’ and ‘torture’ appeared in order to 
emphasize the victimization of the Oromos, as in the phrases. There is one clear reason 
that explains why OMN chose to run the sound bite of the wife of Ethiopian opposition 
leader. Firstly, the way that the woman had judged the action of Ethiopian security forces 
matched OMN’s own description. Hence, the image of Ethiopian security forces as a 
violent and victimizing agent of the Oromos had been strengthened by running the sound 
bite. The voice of the wife of the prominent Oromo political leader constitutes a strong 
piece of evidence supporting OMN’s arguments and emphasizes that the Oromos are 
victimized by the forces of the regime. Secondly, how the woman described her 
husband’s situation matched how OMN’s saw them. OMN considered the Oromos to be 
the victims of the Ethiopian State security forces. 
In summary, of the two media outlets within the first wave of the protest, OMN 
most frequently reported on Oromia. Its news was written from the perspective of Oromo 
Nationalism: that the land of the Oromos and the way of life of the Oromos were 
threatened, invaded, and conquered by Ethiopian state, despite claims made by the 






The 2nd Wave of the Protest 
 
In total, 63 packages were downloaded from the second part of the period, 35 of 
which were chosen from ESAT, while the remaining 28 were taken from OMN.  
Unlike the previous period, ESAT provided the majority of the news coverage 
while OMN was not far behind (n=28), 44% of total the number. As the protests took 
place after the government canceled the proposed master plan, the majority of the 
reporting focused on the crackdown of the protesters, such as arrest, torture, and killings. 































Figure 7.6. ESAT and OMN 2nd Wave of Protest Overall Frequency of Themes  
 
 
Figure 7.6 presents the most popular themes adopted by ESAT and OMN. 
 
 Terms such as ‘Oromo Protest’ have been adopted by most of the reporting 
(n=16), followed by the description of the regime’s action in response to the protests in 
Oromia. It is also interesting to discover that during the second wave of the protests, after 
the government announced the withdrawal of the controversial Addis Ababa Master Plan, 
protesters’ profiles and the brutal response of regime forces became the main foci of the 
reporting. The Master Plan was no longer paid much attention to, despite it being the 
instigator of the protest.  
Figures 7.7 – 7.8 show the frequency of the different themes in the reporting of 
ESAT and OMN. As shown in Figure 7.7 below, it is very interesting to discover that 
ESAT dedicated nearly an equal number of videos to all four themes, all of which are 
news instead of punditry analysis, as was the case for the previous period. Similarly, as 
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Masterframes and Discussion of the 2nd Wave of Protest  
The Actions of Ethiopian Security Forces in Oromia 
During the first wave of the protests, the Ethiopian security forces were identified 
in different ways. As shown in the list of the news content below, the actions of the 
security forces were was criticized in various ways. Both ESAT and OMN decided to use 
the word ‘Agazi,’ which was often used to describe a military unit exclusively composed 
and commanded by ethnic Tigrayans. 
OMN defined the actions of Ethiopian security forces as having ‘aggression’ and 
‘atrocities,’ to emphasizes the human rights violations in Oromia; while ESAT on the 
other hand, adopted the same words, but they used them together with words such as 
‘citizens’ and ‘Ethiopians.’ The lists of headlines from ESAT and OMN are shown 
below. 
 
1. Agazi forces killed citizens in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region  
 
2.  The peace-loving people of Oromos are being oppressed by Agazi forces 
 
3. Security Forces are causing atrocitie on protesting citizens in Ethiopia  
 
4. Agazi’s forces aggression in Oromia  
 
5. Members of Ethiopian diaspora demonstrated in DC against Ethiopian the 
“atrocities” in Ethiopia 
 
 
Criticism of the Regime  
In a similar fashion with the previous protest period, both ESAT and OMN 
continuously accused the Ethiopian government of crushing the protest in Oromia and 
defined it with extreme words and phrases, such as ‘genocide’ and ‘mass killings,’ which 
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refer to the act of murder, a crime under international law, as well as “the deliberate and 
systematic destruction, in whole or in part, of an ethnic, racial, religious, or national 
group” (“Genocide”, 2010). In these terms, the actions of the Ethiopian regime were 
equated to criminals. 
OMN tended to focus on the ethnic character of the regime and referred to it as 
‘Tigrayan.’ The addition of ‘Tigrayan’ to describe the regime implied the domination of 
the Tigrayan elites in the country. Overall, the regime’s behavior in Oromia was defined 
as ‘terroristic,’ which summarizes how the regime was perceived by the diaspora media 
during this period. 
While ESAT described the regime in ethnic terms, it described the victims as 
‘citizens’ or simply as ‘Ethiopians’. Even when ESAT added the places where the 
protests were taking place in its headlines, it describes the place in geographic terms of 
Ethiopia, not in ethnic terms. Also, the regime was faulted for the violation of basic rights 
of its citizens who happen to be Oromos. The use of the term ‘citizens’ implies that the 
regime’s action in Oromia was a violation citizen rights. ESAT and OMN both describe 
the regime in ethnic terms.  
ESAT: 
1.The Tigrayan dictatorial regime is killing innocent citizens  
2.Protesters in Oromia Region were killed by Terroristic Tigrayan regime  
3.The Human Rights Violation in Ethiopia exacerbated   
 
OMN: 
1.The “Genocidal” Tigrayan regime committing crime against humanity in Oromia 
2.The Tigrayan regime arrested thousands of Oromos  





In terms of news contents, all criticisms are categorized in relation to the different 
perspectives from which OMN and ESAT chose to make them. This allows the 
examination of the differences between OMN and ESAT to be made in terms of their 
focuses and ideologies (see examples below). 
Category 1: 
 
TPLF overlordship of restive Oromia Region (OMN) TPLF has always regarded 
themselves as overlords of Oromia and in fact it looked down on members of 
OPDO …. over the last few months TPLF have blatantly imposed themselves over 




Unarmed peaceful Oromo protesters [vs.] Obviously the highly armed TPLF solders 
are bound to resort to strong measures to reassert their authority and the 
consequence must inevitably be a serious clash and bloodshed (OMN). 
 
Even though TPLF hate the Oromo people for who they are, it wanted to exploit 
their God given natural resources, their land through the delegate of TPLF known 
as OPDO (ESAT). 
 
In the Category 1, the TPLF position in Oromia is represented as a ‘lordship’. 
OMN directly played a sound bite of Jawar Mohammed, the executive director of OMN, 
to demonstrate TPLF’s arrogance and political chicanery. The second category mainly 
accuses TPLF of possessing an unquenchable drive for resources and of exploiting the 
resources that belong to the Oromo people. Here, TPLF is accused of violating the rights 
of peaceful protesters. Protesters are painted as the ‘victims’ of the inevitable 
consequence of the regime’s security policy in Oromia, turning into “a serious clash and 
bloodshed.” The third quote also shows that the TPLF is trying to rule by using weak 




Ethiopian Government Censorship and Propaganda 
During earlier reporting, ESAT had criticized the regime for its acts of human 
rights violations in Oromia. Here, it judged the way the regime censors the broadcasts of 
ESAT and OMN and promoted its political ideologies to Ethiopians. OMN interviewed 
the executive director of OMN, saying that the Ethiopian government is “jamming our 
broadcasting to Oromia to deny people from accessing information.” In the same week, 
ESAT made its own similar comments on the same issue: “TPLF’s jamming of ESAT is 
an attempt to impose information blackout on Ethiopians and brainwash them with TPLF 
propaganda” (ESAT, 2016). In this quote, ESAT made two statements. Firstly, that the 
regime had attempted to deny its own citizens access to information by jamming the 
broadcast of ESAT. Secondly, that the regime attempted to ideologically persuade 
Ethiopians with its information.  
 
Solidarity with the Protesters 
The ‘victim’ image of the Oromo protesters had been produced in three main 
ways in the news production. Firstly, OMN represented the Oromos as peace-loving 
people, struggling for their emancipation. Thus, OMN morally judged the regime’s 
actions by reporting, “The violence perpetrated against the peace loving Oromos must be 
stopped. And the solidarity and sympathy expressed for the Oromos is one of the major 
objective why OMN was established as media organization” (OMN, 2016). Meanwhile, 
ESAT interviewed a diaspora-based Oromo intellectual who said that Oromo students 
who are peacefully protesting are being massacred. He appealed “to the other people of 
Ethiopia to show solidarity with the Oromos and join their cause” (ESAT, 2016). Such 
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sound bites of Oromo intellectuals are treated as strong evidence to support the ESAT 
view that the regime violated citizens of Ethiopia. Secondly, this ‘victim’ image of the 
Oromos has been promoted through criticism of the regime’s security forces as soldiers 
solely composed of ethnic Tigrayans, as I discussed earlier, through a combination of the 
use of both methods described above. Comparisons were made between the vulnerable 
Oromos and the brutal regime security forces in order to emphasize that what the regime 
had done in Oromia should not be accepted. 
The Regime’s Response  
In opposition to the criticism from both ESAT and OMN, the regime justified its 
actions against the protesters as being taken in order to establish law and order in 
Ethiopia. However, when both ESAT and OMN cite statements from the regime’s 
officials about the protest, they use them to either show the regime’s contradictory policy 
or to ridicule the officials. For instance, on March 25th, 2016, ESAT used a sound bite of 
the regime’s prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, in a context that showed the 
contradiction of his government policy. In the sound bite the prime minister said, “The 
overwhelming majority of the people in Oromia are protesting because they were not 
informed about the benefit of the master plan.” In using this statement ESAT was very 
clear that what the prime minister was saying was a lie. In another instance from OMN, 
on March 24th, 2016, OMN ran a sound bite from an Ethiopian official that shows that 
what the government promised to implement in Oromia region was not implemented. 
Thus, when ESAT and OMN use statements from the officials, they used them to put the 
regime’s reaction in the context of fact checking, exposing contradiction and or ridiculing 
the officials of the regime. 
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The 3rd Wave of the Protest  
The most extensive and aggressive rallies took place during this period of the 
protest when residents of Oromia and Amhara regional states took to the streets in the 
first week of August 2016. Ethiopian security forces violently disbanded the 
demonstrators, killing about one hundred people over two days. In the same month, 
Ethiopian marathon runner, Feyisa Lilesa, made headlines at the 2016 Rio Olympics for 
an act of protest while crossing the finish line. Feyisa showed solidarity with the 
Ethiopian protesters. Political repression and the relentless protests in Oromia and in the 
Amhara regions played a huge part in Feyisa’s decision in taking his protest to the Rio 
Olympics, the most watched global sports competition. In the three months of the protest 
period, ESAT and OMN have covered the protests, along with Feyisa’s protest, with 
great enthusiasm, producing about 110 videos.  
 
Quantitative Analysis Results and Discussion 












As shown above in Figure 7.9, OMN has covered the protest with more number of 
videos than ESAT. While most of the content (n=60) came from OMN, ESAT 
contributed the remaining contents of  the sample period. ESAT leads in terms of 
reporting frequency and geographic coverage; OMN has covered the protests of Oromia 
intensively.  
Firstly, I discuss the breakdown for all the videos from both ESAT and OMN. 
The theme–Feyisa Lelisa Olympic Protest–appeared the most (20.5% of the total number 
of videos), since it was the biggest incident amidst the persistent protests in the Amhara 
and Oromia regions. The Grand Oromo Rally was the second most important theme 
(18.5% of the total number of videos), followed by the protests in Gonder and Bahir Dar, 
two of the biggest cities in the Amhara region. Criticism of the Ethiopian government 
continues to make up a significant chunk of ESAT’s and OMN’s coverage.  
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Secondly, Figure 7.10. above displays the differences in frequencies of themes 
adopted by ESAT and OMN. For both ESAT and OMN, the Grand Oromo Rally and 
Fesyisa Lilisa’s Olympic protests are still the dominant themes in the figures. Taking a 
look at each of them individually, first in ESAT, 19 news items criticize the regime’s 
‘brutal’ actions against the Grand Oromo Rally protesters and protesters in Gonder and 
Bahir Dar cities. The same number of news items discuss Feyisa Lilisa’s protest at the 
Rio’s Summer Olympic. OMN’s news items focus on the Grand Oromo Rally and 
Fesyisa Lelisa’s protest and the news items report the protests in Amhara region. The 
criticism of the Ethiopian government is also the third most frequent theme in OMN. 
To make a comparison between ESAT and OMN, ESAT discussed Feyisa 
Lelisa’s Olympic protest more than OMN did. ESAT mainly discussed three issues–
Feyisa Lelisa’s Olympic protest, the Grand Oromo Rally, protests in Gonder and Bahir 
Dar cities of the Amhara Region–and ESAT news items (n=16) criticized the Ethiopian 
government in terms of its human rights record at a higher frequency than OMN did. To 
sum up, both ESAT and OMN take a more critical approach in their news items, but they 
adopt their own critical perspective when reporting on the issues. 
 
Masterframes and Discussion 
The summer of 2016 was packed with was one of the most reported political 
events in Ethiopian diaspora media. Both ESAT and OMN were beaming reports about 
Ethiopian political developments with a mixture of excitement, anticipation, anxiety, and 
apprehension. A series of political rallies, namely the Grand Oromo Rally, were the 
major form of protest against the Ethiopian regime across Oromia; as well as the protests 
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in the two big cities of the Amhara region in Gonder and Bahir Dar and Feyisa’s Olypmic 
protest were the major political developments in Ethiopia.  
The Grand Oromo Rally started with a series of demonstrations on August 5th, 
2016. Protesters demanded the release of Ethiopian political prisoners. The government’s 
reaction to the protest was deadly. Hundreds were killed while hundreds of others were 
arrested. With this context, on the 21st of August 2016, Feyisa Lelisa, a marathoner, 
accused the Ethiopian government of killing innocent Ethiopians after he showed a 
protest sign at the finish line of his race. The following analysis shows in greater detail 
and depth how the Feyisa’s protest was represented by ESAT and OMN.  
 
 Masterframes of Oromo Nationalism  
Feyesa Lelisa – Symbol of Oromo Defiance to Repression  
The government broadcaster at EBC cut off Feyisa’s picture from live 
transmission when he crossed his fists at the finish line. Immediately after he staged his 
protest, Feyisa was accused by the Ethiopian government of being used by ‘extremist 
groups’ in the diaspora to advance their political agenda. Both ESAT and OMN presented 
him not only as a hero in his own right, but as a hero who will have the most influence 
among Ethiopians. There were two ways of portraying him as the representative of the 
Oromos’ defiance to the Ethiopian government repression that were adopted. 
Firstly, in OMN’s news reporting, Feyisa was not only symbolized as ‘the 
courageous hero’ of Oromos, but also his image equated to a defiant youth of the Oromos 
who are leading the Oromo protests in Ethiopia. He was seen to be the representative of 
Oromos leading peaceful protest: “He symbolize the Oromo youth, encourage every 
Oromo both home and abroad through his bravery, and becomes a hope for non-
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Oromos.” OMN spoke highly of his influence in Oromia and around the country, as his 
act of defiance will be a source of inspiration as a hero among Oromo youth. He made 
history by highlighting the repression the Oromos who have been suffering for centuries 
in Ethiopia (August 25th, 2016). OMN again praised him for being a man of athletic 
talent and political consciousness, which should make him the most politically significant 
personally in Ethiopian politics (August 27th, 2016). 
Secondly, Feyisa’s interviews and statements have been quoted in OMN as being 
the voice of Oromos. His claims about the human rights situation in Oromia sounded 
more ‘convincing’ to Ethiopians at home and abroad due to his economic status and 
influence. In Feyisa’s appeals, two focuses are revealed. One is the ‘suffering’ Oromos, 
and the other is his criticisms against the Ethiopian government. For instance, OMN 
quoted, 
There are many people including my own friends who were killed for protesting 
injustices and asking for freedom. I am really worried that if government is not 
attending to peoples demands the worst might happen in the future. So I am 
appealing to people of Ethiopia to eliminate the unfair government of Ethiopia. 
(OMN, August 25th, 2016) 
 
Fesyisa’s speeches that are usually quoted in OMN describe the Oromos with the 
most sympathetic adjectives, such as ‘peaceful,’ ‘unarmed,’ and ‘innocent.’ In opposition 
to these vulnerable images, Feyisa’s words such as ‘brutal’ and violent’ are used to 
describe the Ethiopian government. This contrast in Feyisa’s descriptions are often 
quoted in OMN programming contents and news reporting. They are used to gain 
sympathy and moral support among the diaspora. OMN chose to quote Feyisa to show 




Consequently, by emphasizing Feyisa’s defiance and status in Oromia and in 
Ethiopia, OMN was trying to strengthen the image of innocent Oromos protesting agianst 
injustice, a practice that falls within Oromo nationalism. Meanwhile, by quoting Feyisa’s 
criticisms of Ethiopian government, its image is further presented as authoritarian.  
 
Master frame of pan-Ethiopian Nationalism: Feyisa as an Ethiopian 
patriot and anti-authoritarian sports icon  
As soon as Feyisa protested at Rio, ESAT got ahold of him via telephone and 
conducted a phone interview. He was presented as a fearless Ethiopian patriot who used 
the Olympics as a pulpit to expose the Ethiopian dictatorship that has ruled Ethiopia for a 
quarter of a century. Feyisa briefly told ESAT that his decision to protest at the finish line 
of the marathon was motivated by a lack of freedom in Ethiopia. He referred to the 
oppression of the Ethiopian people, which Feyisa explained was ongoing in the Oromia 
and Amhara regions. Since then, Feyisa’s protest along with the protests in Ethiopia draw 
more headlines on ESAT. 
The courageous Ethiopian athlete Feyisa Lelisa exposed the human rights 
violations of the Ethiopian regime (August, 2016): 
 
1. The brave son of Ethiopia won silver medal in Rio Olympics Marathon 
(August 2016) 
2. Athlete Feyisa has done the Ethiopian people a favor (August, 2016)  
3. Feyisa’s silver medal is Ethiopia’s gold (August, 2016)  
4. More athletes join Feyisa in exposing the regime’s barbarity (August, 2016)  
5. Feyisa Lelisa is Ethiopian political wondrkid (September, 2016)  
6. Feyisa will be remembered as a gallent Ethiopian athlete  
7. Ethiopian State Televsion Forced to Cut Off Feyisa’s Protest image in Rio 
De Janeiro (September 2016) Feyisa’s protest draw the attention of global 
media to Ethiopia’s brutal regime (August, 2016)  
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8. Ethiopian regime plays down Feyisa’s protests in Rio Olympics (August, 
2016)  
9. With Olympic Over, Ethiopian team returned home without the courageous 
Feyisa (August, 2016) 
 
If the list of headlines above is compared with the headlines of OMN, it can be 
seen that ESAT put forward headlines that highlight Feyisa’s Ethiopian-ness, informing 
its audience of the symbolism and significance of Feyisa’s protest in the Olympics. The 
focus of these opinionated headlines was the bravery of Feyisa and his effort to draw 
attention to the Ethiopian government’s human rights violations. Firstly, Feyisa’s protest 
draws praise from ESAT. The emphasis of each headline falls on the regime’s brutality 
and Feyisa’s Ethiopian-ness. For example, one of the first headline of the news said, “The 
courageous Ethiopian athlete Feyisa Lelisa exposed the human rights violations of 
Ethiopian regime,” suggesting that the regime has concealed the human rights violations 
in Ethiopia until the ‘brave’ Feyisa exposed it on a global stage. It also illustrated that 
Feyisa stands up for all Ethiopians regardless of their ethnic background. Additionally, 
headlines that were used in ESAT’s sports and entertainment programs specifically 
emphasized Feyisa’s courage and Ethiopian-ness. For instance, the headline on 
September 5th, 2016, reads that “Feyisa’s silver medal is Ethiopia’s gold.” The 
description suggests that Feyisa won not only an Olympic silver medal, but because he 
also earned the honor of being a hero, his role goes beyond his silver medal. Secondly, 
how Ethiopian government reacted to Feyisa’s protest is another focus. The headline used 
to describe the regime’s reaction to headlines such as “Ethiopian government plays down 
Feyisa’s protest” and “State Television Cut Off live television of Feyisa’s protest” 
indicates the regime’s frustration with Feyisa’s protest. Therefore, Feyisa was represented 
again as an ‘Ethiopian hero’ and the Ethiopian regime as a authoritarian regime that does 
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not tolerate dissent.  
Compared to OMN, ESAT did not offer as much information about Feyisa’s 
ethnic identity, instead it concentrated on Feyisa’s Ethiopian-ness and the details about 
the regime’s frustration. The headlines from ESAT are generally longer and contain more 
details about the regime’s actions. To sum up, ESAT and OMN used various strategies in 
headlines, but they all seemed to portray the same picture about the Ethiopian 
government, in which the Ethiopian government was represented as an authoritarian and 
violent regime, while Feyisa was depicted as a courageous athlete. 
 
Summary 
Due to the different events in the three selected protest periods, the issues attached 
to each frame are different from one to the other. However, the judgments based on both 
frames have consistently remained the same, particularly those regarding the Ethiopian 
regime. The master frames of Oromo nationalism and pan-Ethiopian nationalism that first 
appeared in the first wave of the protest period remain constant in the following two 
protest periods. The protests in Oromia were portrayed as a fight for the emancipation of 
the Oromo people. During the three periods of the protest, the Oromos were mainly 
portrayed as the victims of the Tigrayan minority regime. Regarding the master frame of 
pan-Ethiopian nationalism, the protests were represented as protests against the rule of 
law and for democracy. Since the concept of pan-Ethiopian nationalism is a rival to 
Oromo nationalism, the protest in Oromia has been labelled as a protest for more freedom 
and basic human rights. A further interesting finding is that there is no contradiction 
between the two master frames in the labeling of the Ethiopian government. More often, 
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they use the same labels to describe the Ethiopian government. Thus, the Oromo 
nationalism and pan-Ethiopian nationalism frames cooperate with each other in 
describing the Ethiopian government.  
Throughout the three periods, it is not difficult to discover the strategies that 
ESAT and OMN used in terms of frame choices. In the first period of protests, the Oromo 
nationalism frame was adopted by portraying the expansion of Addis Ababa as a land 
grab. Hence, the protest was started to stop the expansion of Addis Ababa into Oromia. 
The pan-Ethiopian nationalism master frame played the leading role, labelling the 
protests as a fighting against authoritarianism, a lack of freedom, and corruption. The 
pan-Ethiopian nationalism frame appeared again in the most recent period, emphasizing 







SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
In a bid to concisely answer the research questions posed in chapter one, I will 
critically discuss and evaluates the data that has been presented in this dissertation. In the 
following sections of this chapter, I will present a summary of the findings of the study, 
the conclusions, and the implications that can be presented from the study’s data, as well 
as recommendations for future research. 
 
Response to Research Question One 
1. What is the historical, social and political context in which the Ethiopian diaspora 
in the United States sets up media outlets? When and why were ESAT and OMN 
developed? Here, I am interested in probing the contextual factors that have 
fostered the development of Ethiopian diaspora media.  
 
The rise in prominence and the progressively rising impact of ESAT and OMN 
are examined in chapter four, five, and six. ESAT and OMN were started and propelled 
by the following underlying factors. The first is the death or death of the Ethiopian 
private press that is critical of Ethiopian government. Ethiopia went from having at least 
367 weekly publications previous to the 2005 election, to having less than 20 weekly 
publications. This widespread assault on publications also resulted in exiles of journalists. 
In the 1990s, and in the first half of the 2000s, a critical Ethiopian press was reigning, but 
after the controversial 2005 elections, hundreds of journalists and opposition political 
activists were either forced out of Ethiopia or faced long prison sentences. More recently, 
top editors and reporters of influential newspapers and magazines were exiled after the 
Ethiopian government charged them with an anti-terrorism law that prohibits reporting in 




Ethiopia over the last ten years (CPJ, 2015).  
The slow death of the Ethiopian private press therefore created a void, which 
ESAT and OMN are filling. Although ESAT and OMN have their own ideological 
orientation and political bias, they expose human rights violations and corruption in more 
vigorous and effective ways than the fading private press in Ethiopia. ESAT and OMN 
have called attention to acts of human rights violations, corruption, and abuse of power in 
the domestic public sphere. For instance, in 2012, when Ethiopia was enveloped in a 
cloud of political uncertainty as a result of the sickness and eventually death of the late 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, most Ethiopians turned to ESAT for updates. Similarly, in 
2015, OMN provided wall to wall coverage of the Oromo protests that have rocked 
Ethiopia for over three years. The second reason for the ascendance in the popularity and 
acceptance of ESAT and OMN is the upsurge in communication infrastructure in 
Ethiopia, particularly the growth of satellite dishes and internet connectivity. As was 
demonstrated in chapter four and five, most Ethiopians who live in urban areas have 
access to satellite dishes and internet connections. The third reason for the emergence of 
ESAT and OMN is related to the second: the global information infrastructure such as 
satellite technology and the internet have given a chance for the exiled Ethiopian 
journalists to have access to the Ethiopian public. Another factor that has contributed to 
the strength and attractiveness of ESAT and OMN is the comparative richness of their 
sources of information, which has been made possible by the willingness of Ethiopia 
based sources to confide in ESAT and OMN. Both ESAT and OMN have built their 
credibility by publishing apparently clandestinely recorded stories, frightened in the 
corner of the ruling coalition, the EPRDF. 




First, it assures the identities of their sources would be concealed and protected since the 
diaspora-based reporters are unlikely to be under pressure to reveal their sources to 
Ethiopian authorities. Although the Ethiopian government tried to spy on the journalists 
of ESAT and OMN, there was no indication that they were hacked and that their sources 
were revealed. The diasporic location of ESAT and OMN also gives them the advantage 
of having access to a lot of information about Ethiopian political elites who have huge 
investments in the United States. Ethiopian government officials usually threaten to sue 
the journalists of ESAT and OMN in United States, but they have never materialized 
their threats into action; first, because it is almost impossible for the Ethiopian 
government to win a libel case against ESAT and OMN in the United States. Second, 
because many international media rights NGOs often provide free legal defense for 
ESAT and OMN journalists who have found themselves in legal and non-legal 
difficulties. However, the Ethiopian government engages ESAT and OMN in a non-stop 
legal fight in Ethiopia. 
 
Response to Research Question Two  
2. What is the influence of ESAT and OMN over the diaspora in the United States 
and in Ethiopia? How might the influence of these two major outlets differ from 
others? Here, I will be analyzing the transnational aspects of diaspora media, their 
power (or lack of) to influence political discourse, and their leverage with 
different audiences.  
 
ESAT and OMN have become politically consequential, precisely because they 
provide a wall to wall coverage on every political development happening in Ethiopia. As 
we saw previously in chapter four, the reporting of ESAT and OMN caused the Ethiopian 
government to cancel the proposed master plan to expand the capital, Addis Ababa, into 




of episodic, informal, but nonetheless activist, online communities that organize to effect 
change in Ethiopia based on stories broadcasted on ESAT and OMN. For instance, ESAT 
and OMN have contributed to forcing the Ethiopian government to release political 
prisoners and the resignation of political leaders in 2017. This fact conforms that ESAT 
and OMN go beyond broadcasting news; they go beyond reporting the news and ask their 
audience to take action based on the information they provide in their reportage. They 
encourage their audience to initiate online petition drives, to be part of an offline, or 
participate in on-the-ground protests in order to cause governments to change unpopular 
policies and practices. In their influential book, Activists Beyond Borders, Margaret Keck 
and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) point out that “voices that are suppressed in their own 
societies may find that networks can project and amplify their concerns into an 
international arena, which in turn can echo back into their own countries.” In the 
Ethiopian case, as a result of a domestic media formation that has been suppressed and 
therefore unable to play a traditional media role, ESAT and OMN sprouted in the 
transnational public space and helped bring to light political problems in Ethiopia. 
 
Response to Research Question Three 
3. What are the differences and similarities between ESAT and OMN in using 
frames in reporting political events related to Ethiopia? Here I will be looking at 
what major frames ESAT and OMN have used when they report political events 
from inside Ethiopia. 
 
Based on the discussion in chapter seven, it is not difficult to see that ESAT’s and 
OMN’s frames of Ethiopia consist of two major components. On the one hand, Ethiopia’s 
political malaise emanates from the current Ethiopian ethnic federal government 




‘communities’ based on their ethnic identities, attached political representation and 
solidified them as distinct members of the Ethiopian federation; thus, many Ethiopians 
began to change their allegiance from their ‘Ethiopianess’ to their ethnic identity. On the 
other hand, Ethiopia is an empire formed with the subjugation of the Oromo people and 
its remedy for this historical and current malady is either independence (the creation of a 
sovereign Oromia state), or the transformation of the Ethiopian State from an empire to a 
modern state. Based on what I have discovered in chapter seven, ESAT and OMN have 
always used this contrasting image of Ethiopia with a varying degree. The first master 
frame is generally called pan-Ethiopian nationalism, while the second is called ethnic-
nationalism in the form of Oromo nationalism. Aiming at examining how the two master 
frames work together across all cases and which master frame dominates, as well as the 
differences between ESAT and OMN, I will provide answers to the research question set 
up in the introduction chapter.  
First of all, the two master frames make their appearances in specific forms: pan-
Ethiopian nationalism and Oromo nationalism in the reporting of ESAT and OMN. As 
specific forms of the two master frames, pan-Ethiopian nationalism and Oromo 
nationalism are separate systems of concepts and are different lenses through which the 
ESAT and OMN observe Ethiopia. The similarity between them is that both look at the 
current regime from the perspective that the current Ethiopian government is illegitimate 
and authoritarian. Where they differ is in the diagnosis and the solution for the current 
political difficulties. Pan-Ethiopian nationalists essentially want to revert identity-based 
politics into what they call citizenship politics or individual rights. On the contrary, 
Oromo nationalism is the yardstick that the OMN uses to judge whether the rights of the 




frames are take place in three different forms: coexistence or intertwining, supporting 
each other, and struggling with each other. The evidence of all three types of relationships 
across all three reporting cases is summarized as first, Coexistence or intertwining. This 
means that both frames appear in the reporting of separate subjects, or that the same 
subject provides different but not opposing arguments. Second, Supporting each other. 
Although the two master frames are comprised of different concepts, ESAT and OMN 
often apply both in the same report and employ arguments for each that could support the 
other. Third, Struggling with each other. This means that two master frames are 
competing with each other on the same subject by providing contrasting arguments.  
Conclusion and Recommendations  
This research has illustrated that satellite technology and internet technology have 
combined to create a transnational public sphere that can influence, challenge, and alter 
the politics of a homelands from afar. While the transformation of audiences into citizen 
journalists has been amply documented within the bounds of nation-states, this study has 
chronicled journalists who are forced out of their country and can combine with citizen 
journalists to raise the bar of domestic national discourse, media practice, and 
governmental policy formulations. This research is therefore significant in pointing out 
ways that authoritarian regimes can suppress and throttle their domestic media system; 
however, their citizens can turn to their diasporas in the United States–or any other 
technologically and politically advanced country–to challenge or improve homeland 
information flow and to influence government policies. 
While instances of diasporic media systems challenging homeland state policies 
and even changing whole governments through the instrumentality of ‘transnational 




Iran), the kind of diasporic journalism examined in my study is unique in many respects. 
First, it is practiced by political exiles who are settled in the United States, but who 
always wanted to go home. Many of journalists and employees of ESAT and OMN are 
permanent legal residents in the United States, but they have a deep desire to return home 
if there is a regime change in Ethiopia. Second, over the years, ESAT and OMN have 
become mainstream political media outlets and are now seen as part of Ethiopia’s media 
landscape. This fact has given ESAT and OMN institutional authenticity in ways that 
other diasporic media outlets studied in different studies have not. Third, a diasporic 
media that is a located far away from home but with preoccupations completely centered 
on the homeland, is unique. It is even more unusual that ESAT and OMN can influence 
government policies from a distance. Thus, ESAT and OMN provide some interesting 
instances of a transnational public sphere. 
One of the limitations of this study is that I did not directly measure the impact of 
ESAT and OMN on public opinion in Ethiopia. Future research that interviews and 
surveys Ethiopians who live in Ethiopia to find out their views and concerns about ESAT 
and OMN would be an invaluable contribution. So would an ethnographic study on the 
news production and journalism of ESAT and OMN. This research is a descriptive study 
of an unfolding phenomenon and the insights presented in this study can become the 




OROMO PROTEST COVERAGE CODEBOOK 
 
This codebook consists of two parts. The first part is applied to all relevant story 
items (i.e., all items that fall under the selection criteria listed below). For the second part, 
a filter is applied that selects all stories that deal specifically with the four protest 
incidents that were selected as critical: Protest in Ginchi; Grand Oromo Rally; Feyisa 
Lelisa’s Protest at Rio Olympics, The Irreechaa Incident 
This codebook includes variable names, definitions and applicable procedures, 
specifics on changes that were made to certain variables such as when certain variables 
were added and subtracted from the coding scheme.  
 
The list of variables included is as follows: story date, story ID, source, duration 
in seconds, headline, placement/ prominence, story format, big story, sub-storyline and 
broad story topic.  
 
Variables  
1. Story Date: 
 
This variable designates the date on which the news story was posted on YouTube/Vimeo 
Channel of ESAT or OMN  
 
Procedure: 
Write the year, then the month, and the date (year/month/date). 
• Example: November 19, 2015= 20151119 
 
2. Story ID: 
 
This variable provides a unique ID number for each story item. 
 
Procedure: 
The number will automatically be assigned to each story manually 
 
3. News outlet: 
 




   ESAT:            01 
   OMN:             0
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4. Duration in minutes: 
 








Not a headline/round-up story  = 0 




 Designates where stories are located within a broadcast. The location reflects the 








1st story  = 601 
2nd story    = 602     
3rd story             = 603 
4th story    = 604 
5th story or later       = 605 
 Don’t Know/Can’t Tell  = 699 
 
7. Type of Story: 
 Measures the type of stories. It designates whether the story is just a factual 
news report or report of events etc. e.g., demonstrations, political rallies or  an analysis or 
interview with both internal and or external analysts. 
Codes: 
 
News: Designates a story as factual story if is a factual story= 71 
 
Interview with External Source: Interviews conducted with an analyst/ 
scholar/ journalist that is not part of the newsroom staff or not explicitly 
identified as being affiliated with ESAT or OMN. = 72 
Interview with Staff or In-House Analyst: Interview with a source who is part 
of the staff of ESAT or OMN or explicitly identified as being affiliated with the 
ESAT or OMN = 73 
Unedited audio or video: An unedited replay of a video from citizen journalists 
 
196 
(rally and protest videos) = 74 
Host monologue/conversation clips: Host (or hosts) delivers a monologue or 
has a discussion with someone in the studio, but it is not conducting an 
interview. During the monologue or conversation, video clips are played and the 
host comments on them. = 75 
DK/Can’t Tell = 99 
 
8. Big Story 
Big stories are all stories that deal specifically with the four protest incidents that 
were selected as critical junctures of the protest during the time period under study. 
Protest in Ginchi; Grand Oromo Rally; Feyisa Lelisa’s Protest at Rio Olympics, The 
Irreechaa Incident 
 
Procedure: If 50% or more of a story is about one of these big stories, code 
appropriately. If a story contains mentions of more than one big story, code for the big 
story that is more prominently mentioned. 
 
For the coverage of the four protest incidents all stories will have the big story code 81 
  
9. Sub-Story line 
The sub-storyline will apply only to the coverage of the four protest incident 
stories with big story code 81.  
 
Procedure: Find the big story located on the list of Sub-storylines and determine if the 
majority of the relevant parts of the story fit into any of the protest in Ginchi; Grand 
Oromo Rally; Feyisa Lelisa’s Protest at Rio Olympics, or The Irreechaa Incident  
Codes: 
       08101        Protest in Ginchi;  
       08102        Grand Oromo Rally 
08103 Feyisa Lelisa’s Protest at Rio Olympics  
08104 The Irreechaa Incident 
 
 
10. Broad Story Topic 
Determines the type of broad topic categories addressed by a story. The topic 




Human Rights Violations: refers to news that deals with the arrest, torture and killing 
of protesting individuals. The package addresses the protest/problem/ issue in the 
context of democratic ideals or the prescription of policy in pursuit of those ideals. This 
code would include stories on the arrest of political leaders, journalists and ordinary 
citizens such as students in Oromia and Amhara Regions. =1 
 
Land Rights: All stories primarily about the expansion of Addis Ababa’s Master Plan 
into Oromia. =2 
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Oromo Protest: Refers to the protest that was triggered by the proposed expansion of 
Addis Ababa into Oromia. The package refers to the protest as Oromo Protest. Stories 
on rallies/demonstrations /Oromo politics in Oromia would be coded under here. =3 
Ethiopian Nationalism: Refers to the historicity of the Ethiopian State and emphasis 
Ethiopians as citizens of Ethiopia facing the same set of challenge despite their ethnic 
differences. This code includes stories on the protests in Oromia against the expansion 
of Addis Ababa into Oromia and protests in other Ethiopian regions as well= 4 
Oromo Nationalism: emphasizes the distinctive ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural 
identity of the Oromo people. This code includes stories on the causes of protests in 
Oromia =5 
 
Settler Colonialism: references to Ethiopian’s State’s exerting influence (political, 
military or commercial) over Oromos controlling their land as if they were part of an 
Ethiopian empire, mentions of de/colonization; references to self-government and 
independence for Oromos; references to Ethiopian’s State’s behavior of as 
imperialistic=6 
 
Ethno-territorial Claims: Refers to stories about expansion of cities in to farmlands or 
commercial development of farmlands that are claimed as hereditary as the proposed 
Addis Ababa Master Plan. =7 
 
 
Question of Identity: Refers to stories that invoke historical reasons and blame 
Ethiopia’s past regimes for repressing the identity of the Oromo people. =7 
 
Ethnic Federalism: Refers to stories concerning the government structure of Ethiopia 
issues such as lack of equal and or equitable representation one’s ethnic group in the 
Federal government, excessive overreach of the Federal Government to Regional 
government and or even stories blame the ethnic federal government structure as source 
of ethnic conflict or weakening of the Ethiopian state =8 
 
11. Actors  
 
Refers to the major political and security organizations mentioned as perpetrators 
of violence and attribute some form of responsibility in the story.  
 
        Codes  
1. Ethiopian Federal Government - 01 
2. Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) - 02 
3. Amhara National Democratic Movement(ANDM) - 03 
4. Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO) - 04 
5. Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) - 05 
6. The Derg, or Dergue a regime that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991 - 06 
7. Emperor Haile Selassie, I – 07 





RECRUITMENT LETTER OR EMAIL 
Introduction 
 
As I mentioned in my email, the study I am conducting is about the diaspora 
media and their relationship with politics in Ethiopia I am conducting this research at the 
University of Oregon’s School of Journalism and Communication to complete my PhD in 
Media Studies.  
 
You are selected as a possible participant because you have worked or working 
with ESAT and or OMN as a journalist or a staff. I would like to inform you more about 
the study before you agree to participate. Please read this form. Please ask any questions 
that you may have. 
 
Purpose of Study: 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the influence of ESAT and OMN in 
Ethiopia’s political process. This include an examination of news room operations, news 
collection strategies and communication strategies. Participants in this study are from 
ESAT and OMN. I expect to interview up to 25 staff members of from both ESAT and 
OMN. 
 
Description of the Study Procedures 
 
If you agree to be in this study, I will conduct an interview with you. The 
interview will include questions about your news collecting methods, communication 
strategies and the reasons why you decided to work as a journalist from United States. 
The interview will take about one hour to complete. The interview will be tape-recorded. 
I might also invite you to participate in a follow-up interview via Skype if I need any 
further clarification. 
 
Risks/Discomforts of Being in the Study 
 
When you were in Ethiopia you have been through a hostile political 
environment. You might have experienced personal threats like arrest, persecution and 
exile. During the interview, we might raise some of the issues related to your reporting 
experience in Ethiopia, there is the risk this might prompt some of your distressing 
experience. In addition, this study’s results could affect your collegial relationship with 
your partners both at ESAT and OMN; however, I do not know what the possible effect 
might be.  
 
Benefits of Being in the Study 
This research will help to illustrate how the Ethiopian diaspora influence the 
political process in Ethiopia in an understudied context. It could ultimately raise 
awareness of how journalists report on sensitive political events from afar. There are no 









The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report, I may publish, 
I will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you without your 
permission. Pseudonyms will be used for the interview transcripts, and a code sheet will 
be used that links a pseudonym to your real name for a potential follow-up Skype call to 
ask additional questions. This code sheet will be password protected, and the only copy, 
which will be electronic, will be stored on a password-protected file on an external hard 
drive, which will be stored in my locked office. Data gathered during the interview 
process will be accessible to me alone, the principal investigator, and it will be stored on 
a password-protected computer. Access to the records will be limited to the researcher; 
however, please note that U.S. regulatory agencies, and the Institutional Review Board 




Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may refuse to participate without 
penalty. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time 
without penalty. If you withdraw from the study before data collection is completed your 
interview data will be returned to you or destroyed. 
 
 Contact  
 
If you have questions at any time about the study you may contact the researcher, 
Endalk Chala at 1275 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403 by phone at (541) 579-
3522 and by email at endalkac@uoregon.edu . You may also contact the faculty adviser: 
Gabriela Martinez at 541-346-1997 and her email address is gmartine@uoregon.edu  
 
If you feel you have not been treated per the descriptions in this form, or your 
rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this project, you 
may contact the office for the University of Oregon Research Compliance Services, 677 





I have read this form and I have been offered a copy of it. I have had all my 







 Signature____________________________ Date _______ 
 
In addition to agreeing to participate, I also agree to have my name appear in 
presentations, written reports or publications alongside my organizational title and 
affiliation. At the end of the study, I will receive an executive summary to the e-mail 








1. Why do you need to establish ESAT/OMN? 
 
2. Can you please tell me how and when you started working for ESAT/OMN? 
a. What motivates you to work as a journalist with ESAT/OMN 
b. What do you want to achieve by working as a journalist in ESAT/OMN? 
c. Who initiated your relationship with ESAT/OMN?  
d. Have you reached out to them or they approached you to work for them? 
e. Why do you decide to work with ESAT? 
f. What is particularly challenging to work for ESAT/OMN? 
g. Have you been a journalist before you immigrated to US? 
h. What did you feel about ESAT/OMN when you first started to work for them? 
i. What role do you have in ESAT/OMN? 
j. What was your expectation before you start to work for ESAT/OMN? 
k. Have your expectations met? 
a. If yes, how? 
b. If no, why? 
 
3. How do ESAT/OMN work to be an alternative media platform in Ethiopia 
 
a. In what ways does ESAT/OMN expand the Ethiopian public sphere? 
 
4. How do you collect news from distance? 
a. What kinds of issues do you focus on in your reporting? 
b. How do you confirm the veracity of your information? 
c. Why do you focus on the issues you focus on in your reporting? 
 
The political environment in Ethiopia is hostile. If the government learned of the 
participation of your sources in collecting information for ESAT and OMN, the may be 
charged with treason and prosecuted for giving information for ESAT and or OMN. How 
do you protect your sources? 
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d. How do you develop a relationship with sources in Ethiopia? 
 
5. What kind of relationship do you have with people working in ESAT/OMN? 
 
a. Do you have a professional or working relationship with journalists working 
in ESAT/OMN? 
b. Have you ever conflicted with journalists working with OMN/ESAT? 
c. If you have ever been in conflict tell me how was it like? 
 
6. Do you discuss about ESAT with your colleagues at OMN? 
a. If so what do you talk? 
b. Do you talk about ESAT generally? How do your colleagues discuss about 
ESAT? 
c. How do they perceive ESAT? Do they discuss positively or generally about 
ESAT? 
7. Do you discuss about OMN with your colleagues at ESAT? 
a. If so what do you talk? 
b. Do you talk about OMN generally? How do your colleagues discuss about 
OMN? 
c. How do they perceive OMN? Do they discuss positively or generally 
about ESAT? 
8. This is for OMN journalists: Do you trust journalists working for ESAT? 
9. This is for ESAT journalists: Do you trust journalists working for OMN? 




LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 Interviewee Position/job Date Length 
1. Abebe Gelaw 
 ESAT Executive 
Director  
August, 2017 2:24 min 
2. Ermias Legesse 
ESAT In House 
Commentator 
August, 2017 1:01 min 
3. Mesay Mekonnen ESAT News Presenter August, 2017 1:03 min 
4. Minalachew Semachew ESAT News Presenter August, 2017 1:07 min 
5. Tamagn Beyene ESAT Talk Show Host February, 2018 1:24 min 
6. Tewelde Beyne ESAT Talk Show Host  August, 2017 1:39 min 
7. Girma Degefa ESAT Editor August, 2017 1:40 min 
8. Fetelework Kebede* ESAT Employee  August, 2017 1:56 min 
9. Alemayehu Dereje* ESAT News Producer  August, 2017 1:12 min 
10  Reyot Alemu   ESAT Journalist  August, 2017 2:01 min 
11 Walteji Mulugeta* ESAT Journalist  August, 2017 1:27 min 
12  Jawar Mohammed  
OMN Executive 
Director  
August, 2017 2:45 min 
13 Tesfaye Tolla* OMN Journalist  March, 2018 30:33 min 
14 Solomon Abdi* OMN Journalist  March, 2018 50:20 min 
15 Abdi Fite OMN Journalist  March, 2018 53:47 min 
16 Endashaw Berecha* OMN Journalist  March  1:13 min 
17 Girma Gutema OMN Commentator  August, 2017 1:40 min 
18 Kebede Lenjiso* OMN Commentator March, 2018 50:20 min 
19 Alemu Tesfaye* OMN Journalist  March, 2018 50:20 min 
20 Temesegen Birri* OMN Journalist March, 2018 50:20 min 
 





LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INDIGENOUS WORDS 
ANDM – Amhara National Democratic Movement  
DERG – Provisional Military Administrative Council  
EBC – Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation  
BBS – The Ethiopian Broadcasting Service 
EPRDF – Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary  
ESAT – Ethiopian Satellite Television  
ETN – Ethiopian Television Network  
ETV – Ethiopian Television  
INSA – Information Network Security Agency  
OLF – Oromo Liberation Front  
OMN – Oromia Media Network  
OPDO – Oromo People’s Democratic Organization  
OSA – Oromo Studies Association  
SEPDM – Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Liberation Front  
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